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Abstract 
This research project focuses on the impact of the EU's internal security policy on 
Turkey during its accession process. It investigates the conditions that detennine the 
EU's success in effecting the changes in the internal security of Turkey. In order to 
limit the field of Justice and Home Affairs, the study selects the fight against 
Organised Crime, Terrorism and Drugs as its case studies. It takes Turkey's 
application for EU membership in 1987 as the starting point of the analysis and 
concludes in 2010. It tracks domestic change in Turkey by considering the adoption 
of the EU acquis, the development of its administrative capacity and the extent of 
internal security cooperation with the EU. The research aims to provide insight into 
the way the EU operates the external dimension of JHA towards applicant states, the 
conditions under what it exerts through influence of JHA, and the extent to which the 
EU shapes the internal security of Turkey during the enlargement process. 
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1.1. Rationale and context 
Alignment of applicant states with EU provIsIons and institutional templates is 
considered one of the main objectives in the enlargement process. The EU sets up 
conditionality to ensure integration of applicant countries into the EU. Through 
Accession Partnership documents and Annual Progress Reports, the EU lists 
accession requirements and the sequence for their implementation. Specifically, in 
the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) domain, the EU asks for the adoption of the 
legal basis of JHA, reinforcement of domestic security institutions and maintenance 
of internal security cooperation with the EU. 
EU conditionality includes ratification of international conventions, transposition of 
minimum standards in national criminal law and the development of institutional 
links with EU agencies. In this way, the EU ensures transposition of JHA standards 
in applicant states and confirms internal security cooperation with domestic 
institutions without waiting for the conclusion of the lengthy accession process. 
In the enlargement process, the EU uses various instruments to facilitate adoption of 
the membership requirements. Incentives and monitoring mechanisms are integrated 
into conditionality to convince the decision makers of applicant countries. Financial 
and technical assistance are provided for institution-building and capacity-
development. The EU also uses deterrents and benchmarking to trigger legal and 
institutional alignment and threatens to withhold rewards in the absence of 
compliance. 
Despite the use of these policy instruments, conditionality may not achieve the 
results expected. Conditions to stimulate the EU's impact on non-member states may 
change across different state structures, timeframes and policy sectors (Sedelmeier. 
2006: 9). The EU's costly or problematic requirements may face stronger resistance 
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m one applicant country as compared to other candidates. Similar factors may 
generate different outcomes on different state structures and policy sectors. In 
addition, EU adaptation pressures and incentives may not result in compliance if they 
conflict with internal norms or vice versa. Specifically, in the JHA domain, variety or 
convergence of threat perceptions between the EU and applicant countries may retard 
or facilitate alignment. 
Prevailing studies interpreting domestic transition of applicant states propound 
different assumptions to justify the success or the failure of the EU impact during the 
enlargement process (Caporaso, 2008; Grabbe, 2002; Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005). 
However, empirical studies are still needed to portray the conditions for the 
transposition of EU standards into the internal security of applicant states. To this 
end, this study aims to explore the answers to the following questions: How does the 
EU operate the external dimension of JHA in applicant states? Under which 
conditions is the EU able to ensure alignment with JHA? 
In the research, it was hypothesized that convergence of threat perceptions between 
applicant states and the EU increases the likelihood of compliance with the 
conditionality on JHA. Convergence of threat perceptions between the EU and 
accession countries is taken as a condition which facilitates adoption of the EU rules 
and practices under JHA. It is also considered as a factor which prepares suitable 
grounds for internal security cooperation between the EU and applicant countries. 
Threat perception is attributed to domestic norms, values and beliefs which are 
developed over time. Threat assessments of security institutions also contribute to the 
development of threat perceptions at domestic level. 
Threat perception, however, does not entail the mam focus of this analysis. In 
addition to "convergence of threat perceptions" further mediating factors are taken 
into account to provide a thorough understanding on how the EU influences the 
domestic infrastructure of applicant countries in the field of JHA. In this respect. 
detem1inacy of the EU requirements, credibility of conditionality and domestic 
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adaptation costs are taken into account as other mediating factors which may 
influence the internal security of Turkey. An evaluation is made between these four 
mediating factors and whether they playa decisive or less determining role for 
conformation to the EU requirements in the fight against organised crime, terrorism 
and drugs. 
The two mediating factors, determinacy of the EU requirements and credibility of 
conditionality are linked with EU policies, which are employed to facilitate domestic 
transition in applicant countries in the accession process. Determinacy of the EU 
requirements emphasizes whether the EU has precise rules and conditions to be 
adopted by Turkey. Other than that, credibility of conditionality reflects the validity 
of EU incentives and threats used to convince decision makers in Turkey for the 
adoption of accession conditionality (Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005: 13). 
Lastly, domestic adaptation costs are intrinsically linked to the cost benefit 
calculations of domestic actors. Based on this, domestic actors are reluctant to 
conform to the conditionality when the EU requirements are seen as costly at 
domestic level (Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005: 9). 
Turkey has been selected as the field of the study in order to analyse the impact of 
the EU accession conditionality on applicant states in the field of JHA. It investigates 
the extension and conditions of the EU's influence upon Turkey's internal security 
since Turkey's membership application in 1987. 
Turkey was selected as the study field for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
relationship between Turkey and the EU covers a long period of time. It is proposed 
that this lengthy relationship increases the number of observations available to test 
the causal factors of the EU's impact on Turkey. 
Secondly, the accession process of Turkey has followed a turbulent course in which 
the success of accession conditionality and the speed of domestic transition hm'e 
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changed over time. The selection of Turkey enables us to test the appropriateness and 
endurance of the EU's instruments used to mediate domestic transition in applicant 
states. Especially, political problems between Turkey and the EU offer an 
opportunity to examine the role of variation in the credibility of conditionality and 
domestic opposition to domestic policy change. Unlike other applicant states, this 
variation provides implications to test the success of conditionality over changing 
conditions. 
Thirdly, Turkey was selected as the study field because of its common borders with 
the EU and its geographical location between Europe and zones of criminal activity. 
Turkey is a transit country on the "Balkan Trafficking Route" which is used to 
transfer Afghan drugs to Western Europe. Turkish organised crime groups in Europe 
have been trafficking drugs, human beings and smuggling arms for decades 
(Europol, 2008: 21). Besides, Turkish/Kurdish immigrants and asylum seekers in 
Europe are considered as a target population by the PKK for financing its activities 
and to recruit new members. Various cultural centres, media organs and lobby 
groups in Western European countries are also used as propaganda instruments by 
the PKK (Tocci, 2007: 57, 70). Therefore, the compatibility of Turkey's internal 
security with JHA and internal security cooperation in combating transnational crime 
is considered a prominent internal security interest for both Turkey and the EU. 
Alignment with JHA is designated as one of the priority policy domains in the 
accession process for Turkey. 
The results of the study show that the resonance of threat perceptions of applicant 
states and the EU is the constituent mediating factor for the success of accession 
conditionality on JHA. Despite credible incentives and threats integrated in 
conditionality, variation in common vulnerabilities and threat perceptions between 
applicant states and the EU may limit the EU's impact in the field of JHA. For 
instance, illegal immigration is a primary security risk for the EU. However, for 
Turkey it is a secondary risk. Consequently. the EU's influence on Turkey's 
immigration policies are limited. Acti\'ities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 
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are a considerable terror risk for Turkey but not a primary threat for the EU. Due to 
the lack of common threat perception, security cooperation between the EU and 
Turkey against the PKK is modest. In contrast, drug addiction and trafficking are 
perceived as common threats for both Turkey and the EU. In consequence, adoption 
of the EU's drug policies and operational cooperation against drug trafficking is 
successful. Therefore, it is argued that the presence of common threat perceptions 
facilitates influence of the EU on Turkey in connection with JHA. 
In order to limit the broad field of JHA, this project is concerned with three sub-
domains: organised crime, terrorism and drugs. These three policy domains are 
selected because of their international dimension and being perceived as crucial 
within the security relationship between Turkey and the EU. Due to their cross-
border dimension, international cooperation is considered important for combating 
terrorism, organised crime and drugs for both Turkey and the EU. 
Another reason for the selection of three cases from the JHA domain is that they are 
composite policy sectors in which legal and institutional dimensions mutually exist. 
Domestic alignment with these JHA fields entails adoption of the body of EU Law 
(the 'acquis communautaire', hereafter the 'acquis'), administrative capacity 
development and internal security cooperation with EU agencies. Selection of these 
cases enables us to analyse the impact of the EU from different aspects of JHA. 
Since combating transnational crime is considered a sensitive and technical issue for 
political decision-makers, domestic security institutions become involved in the 
decision making process through consulting governments and by publishing internal 
security assessment reports. To this account, focusing on the fight against 
transnational crime enables us to test the role of domestic security institutions in the 
adoption of the JHA policies in Turkey. 
1.2. Formulation of the problem 
To explore the conditions of the impact of the EU on the internal security of Turkey, 
the study makes an assessment between selected mediating factors. It develops a 
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research design to analyse the causal background of domestic developments in 
Turkey. The research design entails a set of mediating factors that have an effect on 
domestic change in Turkey. In the study, effectiveness of the mediating factors is 
controlled by looking at the changes in domestic policies, institutional structures and 
the extent of international security cooperation. In this way, the research aims to 
generate plausible results that are applicable to the other sectors of JHA in addition 
to the selected cases. 
Conditions for the impact of the ED: Mediating factors 
In the research design, mediating factors that result in the success or failure of the 
conditionality are classified under two main categories: EU-Ievel (External) factors 
and Domestic factors (Table 1). The EU-Ievel factors refer to the EU's enlargement 
strategy used to trigger domestic change in applicant countries. Alternatively, 
domestic-level factors represent the conditions in Turkey that facilitate or limit 
impact of the EU. 






• Determinacy of the EU requirements 
• Credibility of conditionality 
• Domestic adaptation costs 
• Convergence of threat perceptions (Legitimacy and 
resonance of the EU approach in Turkey) 
In various policy domains, the EU requires legal and institutional alignment from 
applicant states during the enlargement process. It determines membership 
requirements and poses an enlargement strategy, the so-called "Accession 
Conditionality" to induce domestic change in legal and institutional infrastructures. 
In Accession Partnership documents and in European Commission progress reports, 
the EU outlines certain requirements and clarifies accession conditions to infonn 
1.+ 
candidate states about membership requirements. Besides, in subcommittee meetings 
and in mission visits, the European Commission presents recent developments in 
JHA and asks for further steps to fulfil the accession requirements. 
Additionally, the EU uses indirect mechanisms to raise awareness about EU policies 
and the conditions for accession. In the JHA domain, twinning projects, training 
seminars, mutual study visits and interactions of liaison officers result in a learning 
process among domestic officials of the security institutions about the EU approach 
to combating transnational crime (Kirisci, 2007: 19). As a result, determinacy of the 
conditionality increases the likelihood of rule adoption. 
In the accession process, the EU makes use of a range of policy instruments such as 
incentives, monitoring and suspension of negotiations to facilitate adoption of the 
membership requirements. EU membership is given as the key incentive and ultimate 
goal for applicant countries if they meet the EU requirements. Anticipation of EU 
membership incentivises governments to comply with the given EU conditions. To 
be able to gain further grounds towards EU membership, applicant countries speed 
up transposition of EU rules. Moreover, the EU threatens to apply sanctions and 
withholds rewards in case of non-compliance. Threats to suspend the accession 
process and withholding of EU incentives induces governments to confonn to the EU 
requirements (Grabbe, 2002: 312; Schimmelfennig et al., 2005: 9). 
In JHA, security cooperation with the EU agenCIes and member states is also 
considered as an incentive for applicant countries. Intensifying relations with the EU, 
institutional links and security cooperation are considered as opportunities for 
applicant countries to strengthen their effectiveness in combating internal security 
threats at the domestic level. The EU assistance for institutional capacity 
development is also seen as valuable to advance the technical competence of the 
security institutions. 
Together with rewards and threats, the EU endeavours to convince governments of 
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the need for compliance with the EU demands. If the EU rewards and threats 
associated with conditionality are not credible however, effectiveness of the EU 
instruments used for stimulating domestic policy transition may be unsuccessful. 
Ambiguity about delivery of the EU rewards, the EU's limited monitoring capacity 
and the high expectations of applicant countries that they will receive the rewards 
even without complying with the EU requirements could lessen the credibility of 
conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al., 2005: 13-14). In consequence, governments 
could act reluctantly to adopt the EU's requirements. In the JHA domain, a decline in 
credibility may also result in unwillingness among the officials of national 
institutions to cooperate with their EU counterparts over internal security. Therefore, 
it is claimed that credibility of the conditionality increases the likelihood offulfilment 
of the accession requirements. 
Domestic factors 
Adoption of the membership requirements could be considered as costly by the 
decision makers of applicant states. Institutional legacies could raise domestic 
resistance to the adoption of membership requirements. At domestic level, the EU 
conditionality affects the redistribution of the executive powers of domestic actors 
and the duties of public institutions. The state elites and formal and informal 
organizations could oppose domestic change to prevent the loss of their political or 
economic powers (Heritier et al., 2001: 288). 
Moreover, adoption of JHA rules may be seen as costly because of domestic 
concerns about national sovereignty. Providing internal security to the citizens and 
enforcement of criminal law is seen as one of the main responsibilities of a state in 
its national territories (Monar, 2007c: 19). However, in the enlargement process, 
candidate states are obliged to comply with the conditions on JHA alike with other 
accession conditions. They are not able to pursue their own internal security 
objectives because of their exclusion from the decision-making process of JHA. 
Therefore, the leverage of an external actor in internal security issues could raise 
domestic opposition to this involvement. 
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Due to the factors mentioned above, the EU's influence on the internal security of 
applicant states may be constrained because of sovereignty considerations. On the 
other hand, assistance of the EU for administrative capacity development, 
institutional links with the EU agencies and the benefits of strategic and operational 
information exchange for internal security cooperation may exceed national 
sovereignty considerations. Adoption of the EU rules could be perceived as 
beneficial for strengthening the internal security of the state. Accordingly, domestic 
actors favour the adoption of the EU requirements and intensified international 
cooperation against transnational crime. 
In brief, domestic adoption costs associated with to the EU's regulatory policies 
could slow down compliance with conditionality. However, the benefits of security 
cooperation tend to diminish domestic opposition and adoption costs in JHA. 
Further to the three mediating factors mentioned above, in the JHA domain, 
convergence of the threat perceptions between the EU and the applicant states 
increases the likelihood of c O J ~ f o r m a t i o n n with the membership requirements. The 
EU's requirements are likely to be adopted if they do not conflict with domestic 
norms (Checkel, 2001: 563). In this sense, conditionality on JHA would be seen as 
appropriate if it resonates with the domestic security preferences and objectives of 
applicant states. Convergence between the EU approach and domestic threat 
perceptions legitimise adoption of the EU rules in the JHA domain and give rise to 
internal security cooperation between applicant countries and the EU. 
In the study, threat perceptions of the states are attributed to domestic social norms, 
values and cultural legacies. Development of threat perceptions and security policies 
are considered the result of a social and political process (Buzan et aI., 1998: 23-33). 
Decision-makers in governments and professionals in security institutions are given 
as important actors for the construction of security policies (Bigo, 2008: 11). 
Because law enforcement is a technical issue, domestic security agencies contribute 
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to the decision-making process of internal security policies through 
recommendations and assessment reports. The identification and sequence of 
perceived threats influences political decision-makers and plays a part in the 
development of national security policies. 
To this account, interactions between domestic institutions and member state 
agencies, and training programmes for capacity development help to recover 
dissimilarities between policy preferences of applicant countries and the EU 
approach in JHA (Tomalova et at., 2007: 383). In the long run, internal security 
collaboration and institutional interactions between applicant countries and member 
state institutions initiate a learning process about the EU approach and contribute to 
the development of common threat perceptions at the domestic level (Kirisci, 2007: 
19). Specifically, twinning, training programmes and mutual study visits increase 
awareness in applicant states about EU policies. Domestic institutions become 
inspired by the EU's practices and the way the EU perceives internal security threats. 
The engagement between security institutions mediates domestic threat perceptions 
and legitimises the EU conditionality on JHA. 
1.3. Methodology 
In order to make an assessment about the dynamics of the EU influence on Turkey, 
the project follows a bottom-up approach in which domestic developments are traced 
with reference to the selected cases (Haverland, 2007: 62; Radaelli, 2004: 4). 
Domestic change in Turkey is also identified and categorized according to three 
different periods between 1987 and 2010. Later, the causal backgrounds of specific 
events are scrutinised through the control of the EU's influence mechanisms, 
domestic conditions and their outcome for Turkey's internal security. 
For making a causal inference linked with the research question and the hypothesis, 
the project makes cross-sectoral and cross-temporal analyses (King et al.. 1994: 75-
115; George et al .. 2004: 166). To increase units of observation it compares domestic 
developments in Turkey across three different periods, which are established 
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diachronically. It takes key events in the relationship between Turkey and the EU to 
detennine the start and end points of each period. The first phase covers the period 
from 1987, when Turkey made an official membership application to the EU, to 
1999, when the Helsinki Council admitted Turkey as a candidate state. The second 
phase covers the period from 1999 to 2005 in which the EU initiated structured 
relations with Turkey through the development of conditionality and the 
commencement of accession negotiations in 2005. The last phase covers the period 
from 2005 to 2010 in which accession negotiations were ongoing. In these three 
periods, the study considers four selected mediating factors to identify causal 
relationships between domestic transition and the EU conditionality. 
The cross-sectoral analysis is designed by choosing three sub-domains of JHA. In 
this way, the research makes a comparison between fight against organised crime, 
terrorism and drugs within JHA. To explore the reasons for variation in these 
selected cases, it keeps other mediating factors constant while analysing the causal 
impact of one explanatory factor on domestic change. In addition to making 
crosschecks and controls to clarify the output of each mediating factor, it also 
considers the correlation between mediating factors to eliminate indetenninacy (King 
et at., 1994: 118). 
In the project, the extent of compliance by Turkey is measured by examining the 
variation in the domestic legal system, institutional setting and the extent of 
cooperation with international organisations and other countries on fighting 
organised crime, terrorism and drugs. To make the measurement more precise, 
domestic change within these three policy domains of JHA is extracted into three 
different categories. 
Adoption of the EU provisions and ratification of international conventions are taken 
as the first category of indicators. Ratification of international conventions on 
countering drugs, organised crime and terrorism as well as hannonization with the 
definitions of offences and criminal procedures with the EU acqllis is observed in 
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order to make an assessment of compliance within the legal feature of JHA. 
Emulation of the EU strategies and action plans issued by Turkey are considered as 
another dimension of legal alignment within the JHA. 
In the second category, change in the administrative setting of Turkey is scrutinized 
to measure the extent of compliance with the conditions of the EU. The level of 
compliance with EU administrative standards is evaluated by examining the 
revisions in relevant public institutions of Turkey. Establishment of new units within 
security agencies (e.g. national focal point, liaison office), structural revisions for 
technical capacity development (e.g. maintaining a database for information 
exchange, new training units) and establishment of coordination mechanisms (e.g. 
for controlled delivery, for drug demand reduction) are considered as parameters for 
identifying the level of institutional alignment at domestic level. 
In the final category, the extent of internal security cooperation with the EU is 
investigated in order to assess compliance with the EU requirements within JHA. In 
this latter category, institutional links and cooperation agreements with EU agencies, 
implementation of twinning programs, exchange of best practices through 
institutional interactions and number of joint operations between member state and 
Turkish institutions are considered the fmal group of indicators for deciding the 
extent of compliance with accession conditionality. 
1.4. Data collection 
In the project, a qualitative methodology is used. Data and proof of the arguments of 
the project are acquired from four main sources. Initially, a review of official 
documents was done in the EU and in Turkey about JHA, the enlargement process 
and combating transnational crime. This survey included legislation, government 
decisions, internal training documents, strategy papers and the security assessment 
reports of security institutions. 
In this regard, to obtain data for the research project, a number of public agencies 
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were visited in Turkey, or their online resources accessed. The "Secretariat General 
for EU Affairs (ABGS)", the "Directorate General for Security (EGM)" and the 
"Turkish Parliament" (TBMM) have been the main Turkish institutions from which 
data was collected. In addition, resources of the Gendanne, the Turkish Radio and 
Television Agency (TRT) and the Turkish Grain Marketing Board (TMO) were 
explored to scrutinize domestic developments with respect to the selected case 
studies of the research. Lastly, an extensive overview was perfonned in the archives 
of Turkish newspapers for data-gathering purposes. 
In the EU, official documents about the external dimension of JHA and the 
enlargement process of Turkey were obtained mainly through online resources of the 
'Directorate General: Justice Freedom and Security' and 'Directorate General: 
Enlargement' in the European Commission. The resources of the European Council 
and the European Parliament were also used for the review of other relevant 
documents. 
Secondly, a total of 11 semi-structured interviews were conducted with semor 
officials and a researcher in Turkey and in the EU in 2009, 2010 and in 2011. In 
Turkey, 7 interviews took place. These were with officials at the Ministry of Interior 
(3), the Ministry of Justice (1), the Secretariat General for EU Affairs (1), and the 
Undersecretary for Public Order and Security (1) and with a researcher from an 
independent think-thank organization (1). 
In the EU, four interviews were conducted. These were with officials of the 
European Commission in DG Home (1), DG Justice (1) and DG Enlargement (1). 
One interview was conducted with an official in the European Council Counter 
Terrorism Coordination Unit (1). 
Thirdly, participation in a range of seminars, workshops and conferences in Turkey 
and in the EU took place. The researcher attended two comprehensive research 
activities related to the subject of the research project. The first activity. 
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"SECURINT Project 3rd Research Seminar" took place on 23-27 June 2008 at the 
Strasbourg Robert Schumann University, which was funded by the EU as a Marie 
Curie Action in the context of its "Sixth Framework Programme for Research". It 
focused on terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration in the context of ffiA. 
The second activity was "The Summer School on Understanding and Fighting 
Organised Crime in the New Europe" which took place from 28 June to 9 July 2010 
in Belgium at the Leuven Catholic University and was supported by the European 
Consortium for Political Research. This event focused on challenges of organised 
crime and its control in Europe. 
Lastly, a comprehensive review of secondary literature and academic materials on 
JHA, Europeanization, and Turkey was undertaken to grasp an understanding about 
theoretical and methodological issues. Recent publications were also followed by 
using University of Nottingham library resources. 
1.5. Limits of the research 
The main limit of the project is its focus on one country, Turkey, as the field of 
study. This selection can raise questions about the validity of the findings for 
different countries. However, due to the extensiveness of JHA, the research is 
constrained to focus on a particular country. Accordingly, it has been possible to 
make a comparison between three extensive sub-domains of JHA as an alternative to 
making a comparison of different countries across a narrow field of JHA. 
The second limiting factor of the research is the difficulty of approaching officials in 
domestic security agencies and getting access to empirical data about the research 
subject. Due to the sensitivity of internal security issues, it has been a challenge to 
identify the relevant officials to conduct interviews. In some cases, interviewees were 
tentative about making comments on a few research questions. However, they replied 
to the majority of the questions without any prejudice. Overall, being a native 
Turkish speaker was an advantage when exploring public documents and conducting 
interviews with domestic officials. 
1.6. Structure o/the thesis 
Chapter 1 incorporates the introduction to the research project and methodological 
issues. It outlines how the research question was formulated, which methodology 
was employed and the way the data was collected. 
Chapter 2 outlines a theoretical framework to be able to understand the relationship 
between the EU and third states in the context of JHA. Governance is introduced to 
explain the motives for the EU to operate an external dimension of JHA. Later 
theories of 'Rational Choice' and 'Sociological Institutionalism' are presented to 
explain the influence of international institutions on state behaviours. Dependent 
variable and mediating factors of the research design are explained in detail by 
considering Rational Choice and Sociological Institutionalism. 
Chapter 3 sets the scene for the next stages of the research. Therefore it encompasses 
a survey of secondary resources about the historical background of the external 
dimension of JHA, the extension of JHA during the eastern enlargement and the EU's 
impact on the internal security of Turkey. It is designed to give a brief understanding 
about the experience of the EU in its enlargement process toward Central Eastern 
Europe countries. The chapters also touch upon the state of the literature concerning 
impact of the EU upon the internal security of Turkey. 
Chapter 4 presents one of the three empirical cases of the research. It analyses the 
conditions for adoption of EU requirements in combating organised crime in Turkey. 
To this account, the EU involvement in the fight against organised crime IS 
scrutinized with reference to three different periods between 1987 and 201 O. 
Chapter 5 outlines the second case of the thesis. Following a similar structure to that 
of the previous chapter, it investigates the success or the failure of the impact of the 
EU on countering terrorism in Turkey across three periods between 1987 and 2010. 
Chapter 6 includes the third case of the research, which focuses on the influence of 
the EU in combating drugs in Turkey. The causal relationship between the EU 
membership requirements and domestic change in Turkey in combating drugs is 
examined by considering the role of selected mediating factors in three different 
phases until 2010. 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion. This last chapter reflects the findings of the research. it 
makes an evaluation of the conditions that extend or constrain the impact of the EU 
on the internal security of Turkey through comparison of the selected case studies. It 
also discusses the way that the EU operates the external dimension of JHA in 
applicant states, the limits of the research and makes recommendations for further 
research. 
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2. Theoretical framework: Alternative approaches to the 
impact of the Ell 
2.1. Introduction 
Prevailing studies on the impact of the EU on third states tend to take account of two 
conceptual standpoints for analysing the relationship between the EU and non-
member states. The first approach considers the EU as an international actor which 
has accountability to maintain democracy and stability in its region. The influence of 
the EU to extend its norms and values as well as its institutional authority over states 
is linked with its institutional and economic capabilities. From this perspective, the 
interaction between states and the EU is identified as governance. This first concept 
questions the EU's role as a supranational actor and scrutinizes its reasons for 
developing economic and political relationships with third states (Smith, 1996: 5; 
Knodt et aI., 2003: 1; Lavenex, 2004: 681). 
On the other hand, the second approach investigates the way the EU influences states. 
This second concept aims to explain the causal relationship between the EU's 
policies and domestic change in member states and in third countries. It looks for the 
conditions for adoption of EU rules, the EU's influence mechanisms and mediating 
factors (Checkel, 2001; Borzel et aI., 2003; Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig et aI., 
2005). Apart from the previous concept, this second approach concentrates on the 
results of the EU's regulatory policies and excludes motivations of the EU to 
maintain relationships with states. 
In recent years a handful of studies have focused on the external dimension of the 
EU's internal security. Using the above approaches, they have considered and 
extracted the reasons for, and the results of, the EU's external policies toward non-
member states. They have examined the causal background of the EU's external 
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action and the outcomes of the EU's policies for the domestic structures of third 
states (Wolff, 2006; Wichmann, 2007; Rees, 2008). 
2.2. EU governance beyond its borders 
In the post-cold-war order, the interests of the EU in Central Eastern Europe and its 
role as a leading institution in Europe has been the main inspiration for it developing 
external relations with the CEECs. According to Smith (1999) the EU was involved 
in the transition process of the post-communist countries to prevent further rivalries 
to the liberal regime in Europe. The EU put forward a democratic and economic 
model for the new countries in Europe. The EU's preferred instrument has been the 
'politics of inclusion' in which it has extended its borders towards these states 
through institutional engagement (Smith, 1996: 5). To be specific, the EU performed 
a transforming role in these newly-emerged states by offering them EU membership. 
Parallel to this argument, another assumption postulates that the post-cold-war order 
in Europe has delivered a leadership role for the EU. The EU's economic and 
administrative capabilities have made it as an influential actor in its region. Due to 
being a regional power in Europe, the EU has attempted to solve international 
problems in its neighbourhood. The EU started to promote liberal and democratic 
values, respect to human rights and good governance (Manners, 2002: 3). 
Enlargement towards CEECs is considered as an attempt to create peace and 
democracy in the region as an international actor. Membership conditionality has 
been used to trigger domestic transformation in Eastern European countries (Friis et 
aI., 1999: 214). Additionally, since the early 1990s the EU extended its Schengen 
regime towards East European countries. The EU was able to extend its visa and 
border management regime to these countries without giving them a say in the future 
development of this regime. The relationship with these states and the EU has been 
labelled as 'Unequal Inclusion' in which the EU extends its internal security regime 
via bilateral agreements towards these countries without allowing them to participate 
in decision making (Monar, 2000: 13). 
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On the other hand, an alternative approach put forward a different argument to justify 
the EU's external relations with non-member countries. It is claimed that the EU 
endeavours to provide institutional alignment with third states through its external 
policies without aiming at institutional integration (Lavenex, 2004: 688). Specifically 
in the context of the external dimension of JHA, the EU makes use of foreign policy 
to expand its influence towards third states. In threat assessment reports of the EU 
security agencies the neighbouring countries are addressed as source or transit 
countries of the internal security threats. It is claimed that the EU should develop 
internal security cooperation with third states to prevent internal security threats at 
source. External relations with third states are considered as a barrier against the spill 
over of security threats in to the EU (Wichmann, 2007: 9, 12). 
Consequent to perception, the EU started to operate its foreign relations and exert 
influence over third states linked with JHA. For instance accession conditionality is 
used to line up internal security of applicant states with the standards of the EU. The 
EU has concluded security co-operation with Mediterranean countries through the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as well as a partnership agreement with 
Russia. Through mutual agreements the EU aims to prevent illegal immigration, 
terrorism and organised crime. A range of instruments are used by the EU to achieve 
its security objectives; for instance, the EU provides financial and technical 
assistance to strengthen the capabilities of law enforcement institutions, border 
management and for the development of a visa regime. The EU also promotes respect 
for human rights, rule of law and democracy to prepare suitable grounds for 
implementation of the legal practices of the EU (Rees, 2005: 223; Wolff, 2006: 7). 
However, it is necessary to mention that the EU's cooperation agreements with third 
states do not always involve extending influence. For example, the EU's security co-
operation with the USA comprises information exchange and operational issues, 
rather than legal and institutional alignment (Rees, 2005: 219). Similarly, the 
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relations with Russia give priority to internal security cooperation rather than the 
extension of the EU's own norms and values. 
As discussed above, the involvement of the EU in the policy making process of other 
countries is conceptualised as governance. The definition of this concept is, "the 
steering and coordination of interdependent actors through institution-based internal 
rules systems" (Monar, 2006: 4). In the field of JHA, the EU acquis and activities of 
the EU institutions on combating crime regulates the duties of governments, 
ministries, police forces, prosecution services in states (ibid.: 4). To maintain 
coordination between national initiatives the EU builds interaction mechanisms 
between member states and candidate countries. As part of the enlargement process, 
the EU offers financial aid to domestic law enforcement institutions and supports 
twinning and training projects to minimize institutional deficits in accession states 
and to strengthen operational capabilities. 
Governance does not entail a single type of EU involvement. The EU could promote 
different forms of interactions between member states or for candidate countries. 
Overall, EU governance could be classified into three categories: "soft and hard 
governance" (Friis et aI, 1999: 214), "external governance" (Lavenex, 2004: 683) and 
"old governance" (Schimmelfennig et aI., 2004: 682). 
According to Friis and Murphy (1999), the EU impact on candidate countries entails 
both "soft' and 'hard' governance. It is argued that soft governance covers formal and 
informal interactions between the EU and applicant states. The EU promotes its 
fundamental values, such as liberalism, human rights and the rule of law, to trigger 
democratic and liberal transformation in applicant states. The EU institutions develop 
contact channels with domestic public institutions and non-governmental 
organizations to promote the extension of EU norms. Therefore, the EU's indirect 
pressures on governments, such as the empowerment of domestic institutions and 
civil organizations to mediate public opinion in favour of EU standards, can be 
considered as soft governance. On the other hand, accession conditionality IS 
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labelled as hard governance because of the asymmetrical nature of the relations 
between the EU and applicant states. In conditionality, the EU uses incentives and 
deterrents to secure adoption of the acquis and administrative developments in 
candidate states. The EU offers membership as the key incentive to facilitate 
adoption of the EU requirements. The EU institutions also evaluate adoption of the 
EU rules through monitoring the progress in candidate countries (Friis et aI., 1999: 
214-215). Based on these definitions it can be argued that the EU's direct adaptation 
pressures on national governments and other decision makers in applicant states is a 
mode of hard governance. However, the EU's indirect pressures on governments 
such as empowerment of domestic institutions and civil organizations to mediate 
public opinion in favor of the EU standards can be considered as soft governance. 
A different approach proposed by Lavenex (2004) considers the EU's influence on 
third countries as 'external governance'. External governance is defined as 'linking 
third countries with the EU by various forms of institutional affiliation' (Lavenex, 
2004: 681). External policies of the EU with neighbouring countries are regarded as 
being different from co-operation because of its less voluntary and highly 
asymmetrical character. In that sense, the relationship between the EU and candidate 
states is given as an example of external governance in which the EU extends its 
acquis and institutional authority to applicant states via asymmetrical relations 
(Lavenex, 2004: 683). 
Schimmelfennig (2004) describes the impact of the EU upon candidate states as 'old-
governance'. The eastern enlargement is understood as a horizontal relationship 
because of the top-down character of the relations between the EU and applicant 
states. Emphasis is given to the lack of applicant state influence in the context of 
membership requirements. It is argued that the EU's rule transfer is similar to the 
control and command procedures found in a hierarchical authority's approach to a 
particular sub-domain. The EU's impact over CEECs is determined as a model of 
old-governance because of the asymmetrical relations between the EU and CEECs; 
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the existence of predetermined set of rules; and active role of bureaucratic actors 
during the accession negotiations (Schimmelfennig et al., 2004: 683). 
The institutional capabilities of the EU and its effectiveness in its region help to 
justify its involvement in third countries. Within the field of JHA, combating 
transnational crime has been given as the main motivation of the EU to conclude 
internal security cooperation with third states and has been a priority field in the 
enlargement process (Lavenex, 2004: 684). For the states participating in the 
enlargement process the EU envisages deeper integration. Therefore, it seeks to 
influence these countries through using certain mechanisms and policies which are 
derived from practices of previous enlargement rounds. 
The EU's policies may not result in the expected outcome in all candidate states in 
the accession period. Domestic and EU-Ievel factors may affect the EU's leverage. 
Although some membership requirements are adopted straightforwardly by an 
applicant state, in some states conditionality may encounter domestic resistance. In 
that sense, the concept of governance would be insufficient to explain the conditions 
for transposition of EU standards in third states. A different concept will be 
introduced in the following section to examine conditions for the adoption of EU 
requirements in the enlargement process. 
2.3. Europeanization: The process of domestic transition in 
applicant states 
The EU's influence on states has been a growing research field in the last decade. 
Scholars tend to use the term 'Europeanization' to explain conditions for the 
extension of the influence of the EU on domestic structures and the policy-making of 
countries. In this account, studies of Europeanization concentrated on a number of 
domestic and external factors to explain EU-led domestic change in national states 
(Radaelli, 2004: 3). 
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Europeanization is detennined as the . . . . process of constru cti on. diffu sion and 
institutionalisation of formal and informal norm s ... \\'hi ch are firs t defined and 
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
di scourse, identities, politi ca l structures and public policies' (Radaelli , 2003 : 15). 
Another, somewhat briefer, definition gives Europeanization as the ' domest ic impact 
of th e EU ' (Sedelmeier, 2006) . 
With emphas is on the different explanations of Europeanization, it can be argued that 
Europeanization encompasses the EU 's adaptat ion pressures, conditions of domestic 
change and the responses of domestic actors to illust rate domestic change in nati onal 
states . Studies in this field consider the EU 's influence mec hani sms. different 
explanatory factors and domest ic responses to exp la in the EU's impact on the 
domestic structures and policies of nat iona l states (Figure 1). 
III II ill', 11 I tI'l I 
i 
I !II ! I i 
EU's I' 'I II 
adaptation ii' I ~ ~ ~ \ I q q I I S ' ' n n ~ ~ h ! I pressures I II 1' 1 I I I I II I I 
I III I i I I I' I 
'111 11 I' ,'I !II II 1,1'1 
Figure I : Basic explanati on of domesti c change 
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The literature on Europeanizat ion can be categOlised across three geographical areas. 
The first group foc uses on the Europeanization of member states. These studies 
scrutini ze conditions for the diffusion of the EU policies in member states (Borzel et 
aI. , 2000 : 2; Radaelli , 2003: 3; Caporaso , 2008: 28) . Following the start of eastem 
enlargement , a second group of researchers started to study dome tic transiti on in 
applicant states in the accession process . This group of studies focuse on thc 
sllccesses and shortcomin gs of the EU's influence mec hani sms th at are u:;ed lar the 
tran spos ition of th e EU's policies. These studi es consider EU instrumcnts and 
dom cstic responses to expl8in the conditions of domest ic transition in C<ll1cildatc 
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countries (Grabbe, 2002; Anastasakis et al., 2003; Schimmelfennig, Engert et al.. 
2005; Bauer et aI., 2007). Finally, the third group of scholars focuses on the EU's 
influence on third states that have no prospect of EU membership. These scholars 
mainly focus on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to analyse the 
relationship between the EU and Mediterranean countries (Panebianco et aI, 2004; 
Schimmelfennig, 2007; Wichmann, 2007). 
With the beginning of eastern enlargement, scholars emphasize different factors to 
examine domestic change as a result of the EU's demands. These studies seek to find 
the answer to the following questions to give a thorough understanding about the 
conditions of domestic change in applicant countries in the enlargement process: 
How does the EU stimulate domestic change in candidate states? Which mechanisms 
are being used to elicit transition? To what extent is the EU able to influence 
domestic structures? 
During the enlargement process with CEECs, different analyses were generated in 
order to find an explanation for the transition of domestic policies and institutions. 
Borzel and Risse (2000) argued that the EU's pressures are not sufficient for 
domestic change in applicant countries as those with the power of domestic veto and 
institutions playa crucial role in Europeanization. The influence of the EU will be 
more effective if the EU engages with domestic actors and institutions. Institutional 
interactions will reduce domestic opposition and facilitate adoption of the EU 
requirements (Borzel et aI, 2000: 7). 
FUlihermore, Grabbe (2002) postulates a more detailed model to explain the EU's 
leverage on CEECs. It is claimed that the influence of the EU accounts for five 
different factors. First, the EU provisions and institutional templates are taken as 
models by applicant countries. Domestic rules are aligned with the EU acqllis during 
the accession negotiations. In some cases, candidate states may accept rule transfer 
before the EU asks them to do so. For instance, after the 9111 attacks CEE countries 
adopted JHA rules for such things as border control, police cooperation, asylum, 
migration and crime prevention before they were requested by the EU. 
Second, EU financial assistance motivates domestic decision-makers to adopt the EU 
requirements. In that sense, EU financial assistance targets institution-building, cross-
border cooperation, regional development, rural development and human resources 
development during the enlargement process. That way, the EU establishes the 
necessary administrative structures to ensure implementation of the EU acqllis in 
applicant states. Third, the EU monitors domestic developments and offers incentives 
for applicant states to undergo domestic change. Annual progress reports issued by 
the Commission summarize domestic reforms and address further requirements to be 
implemented by domestic decision-makers. 
Fourth, advice and twinning programmes facilitate alignment of domestic 
infrastructures with the EU standards. Mutual interactions between domestic 
institutions and member state agencies introduce EU practices and stimulate 
administrative developments. However, in that case, member states may have 
different technical practices, therefore advice and twinning can vary for each member 
state and the nationality of the advisor. Finally, accessing a further stage in the 
membership process facilitates the impact of the EU. Candidate status and the start of 
accession negotiations increase the probability of the membership applicant countries 
being successful and increase their willingness to implement the conditionality 
(Grabbe, 2002:310-314). 
Alternatively, in a different study, the process of domestic change in CEECs is 
outlined as "compliance", "competition" and "communication" (Bauer et aI., 2007: 
407). With "compliance", the EU raises obligations for applicant states during the 
negotiations. It uses conditionality as a coercive tool. States are compelled to fulfill 
the acqllis to obtain the rewards of membership. The EU also uses non-compliance 
measures and sanctions to ensure adoption of the EU acqllis. In that sense, states 
become likely to adopt costly regulatory rules because of conditional pressures and 
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possible sanctions. With reference to 'competition', it is assumed that states and 
institutions adapt themselves to the EU standards to improve their status against other 
candidates. Finally, 'communication', between domestic actors and EU institutions 
refers to training programmes and information exchange between applicant countries 
and the EU as an instrument of domestic change. 
Different from these arguments, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, proposes three 
different frameworks to explain conditions of domestic change in applicant states. 
They claim that domestic change could be explained through "exte1l1al incentive", 
"social-lea1l1ing" and "lesson drawing" models (Schimmelfennig et a/. , 2004: 671, 
2005: 10-20; Sedelmeier, 2006). The "exte1l1al incentive model" mentions the top-
down character of the relations during the negotiations and emphasizes material 
incentives as a facilitator for the adoption of the costly EU requirements. It explains 
success of impact of the EU by referring to the EU's strategy and domestic responses 
in the target country. 
In the "exte1l1al incentive model", the EU's influence correlates with the "clarity of 
the requirements", "size and speed of the rewards", "credibility of the incentives and 
threats" and "domestic veto players and cost/benefit calculations" (Schimmelfennig 
et aI., 2005: 10-11). They claim that if the requirements are clear, states will not 
avoid or manipulate the rules by interpreting them in accord with their own desires. If 
the target governments are aware of their obligations to get the rewards, they will 
successfully adopt the given rules. Moreover, the EU will be bound by its clear 
demands and promises. 
Besides, the EU's requirements will be more likely to be adopted if the re\\Oards and 
promises are considerable. In that sense, prospective membership is referred to as an 
important incentive for rule adoption. It is claimed that candidate countries are more 
likely to adopt EU standards because of having membership prospects (Panebianco et 
aI., 2004: 3). 
On the other hand, domestic transition will be faster if applicant states are confident 
about receiving rewards. States will not adopt the EU's rules if sanctions do not have 
a deterrent effect. It is claimed that withdrawing assistance funds, lack of enthusiasm 
for enlargement and different membership prospects reduces the EU chance to 
promote domestic change in candidate states (Anastasakis et aI., 2003: 16). 
As an alternative to the "external incentive model", "social-learning" refers to the 
legitimacy of the EU's rules and the lack of conflicting nOlms as a condition of 
domestic transition. It is claimed that the EU rules are more likely to be adopted if the 
EU is an accepted identity. Finally, the third assumption "lesson drawing" refers to 
domestic dissatisfaction as a driving factor for the adoption of the EU rules. It is 
claimed that applicant states adopt the EU standards voluntarily in order to solve their 
policy deficits. Therefore, in the lesson drawing model, EU persuasion is not seen as 
necessary for domestic transition (Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005: 21). 
Accession conditionality associated with JHA 
EU membership requires certain economic and political conditions to be achieved by 
all applicant states. Political conditions for EU membership include fundamental 
principles of the EU such as a liberal economy, democracy, good governance and 
respect for human rights. These principles are considered as crucial for the 
accomplishment of the EU standards in candidate countries, for the adjustment of 
their public institutions and the creation of a liberal infrastructure. That way, the EU 
establishes suitable grounds in applicant states for implementation of the EU acquis 
and for international cooperation through domestic institutions. 
In the field of JHA, political conditions are considered as crucial to safeguard the 
rights of individuals and to deliver a balance between human rights and the 
administrative practices of security institutions. Political conditions address the issues 
of combating internal security threats whilst maintaining transparent, reliable, 
security institutions and an impartial judicial system (Vitorino, 2002: 11). Therefore, 
in the enlargement process, the EU promotes good governance, the rule of law and 
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anti-corruption policies to encourage the development of well-built internal security 
structures in candidate states. By doing so, the EU envisages maintaining the 
accountability of public institutions, the rule of law and good governance in 
accession states. 
Along with political conditions, the EU asks for the adoption of the JHA acquis, 
maintaining adequate administrative structures and institutional collaboration in the 
enlargement process. Candidate countries are asked to adopt the EU acquis for 
harmonization of definitions of offences and criminal procedures. In that sense, the 
EU acquis under JHA comprises common positions, framework decisions, decisions 
and international conventions to regulate the fight against transnational crime in the 
EU. 
"Common Positions" set up targets for cooperation on combating cross-border crime. 
In principle, they have no binding effect, but in fact, they have a high degree of 
influence on member states and institutions (Monar, 2006: 8). Common positions 
include resolutions, recommendations, conclusions, action plans, strategies, 
programmes, guidelines, the annual programmes of agencies and best-practice 
manuals. For instance, the EU action plan on combating terrorism, the millennium 
strategy against organised crime and the EU action plan on drugs are the common 
positions expected of applicant states. 
"Framework Decisions" provide mlllimum standards for approximation of the 
criminal laws of member states. They are binding provisions and rules required from 
member states. However, states have the initiative to fonnulate these minimum 
standards according to their preferences (Ibid.: 9). 
"Decisions" represent measures, which do not envisage the approximation of laws 
and regulations between member states; yet, they have binding effect since they 
should be implemented by member states. However, similar to framework decisions, 
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they do not have direct effect at the national level and states can select their own 
methods and forms to achieve the required ends (Ibid.: 9). 
The last measure that represents the EU acquis for judicial and criminal cooperation 
is "Conventions". According to the Treaty of European Union, the Council 
recommends to the member states the adoption of the necessary UN and CoE 
conventions in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Member 
states are asked to ratify international conventions within a certain time determined 
by the Council (Ibid.:8). 
The types of the EU involvement in the candidate countries 
In the literature, the misfit or incompatibility between the EU's regulatory and 
domestic policies is addressed as a pre-condition for the examination of EU-driven 
domestic change in applicant countries. Borzel and Risse (2000) argue that 
divergence between the EU's rules and the infrastructure of states increases domestic 
resistance to the EU's regulatory polices during the enlargement process. 
Competition between domestic practices and the EU's requirements could hamper 
the EU's influence and domestic change. Thus, the EU determines requirements to 
provide alignment in applicant countries to overcome the differences between 
domestic practices and EU policies. To facilitate the adoption of the requirements, 
the EU exerts adaptation pressures and uses incentives to facilitate domestic change 
(Borzel et al. 2000: 8; Radaelli, 2004: 6). 
However, acceSSIOn requirements and the EU instruments may sometimes be 
ineffective for producing domestic change in applicant states. Domestic actors, such 
as governments, parliaments, executives of institutions and domestic elites, facilitate 
or limit conformity with the EU requirements. In addition, the credibility of the EU 
promises, the resonance and legitimacy of the EU policies and the clarity of the EU 
requirements are considered as crucial factors for adoption of the EU rules and 
policies (Grabbe, 2002: 315-316; Sedelmeier, 2006). 
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The studies analysing the conditions for adoption of the EU requirements in applicant 
countries makes reference to rational choice and sociological institutionalism to 
analyse of the causal relationship between the EU's policies and adoption of EU rules 
in applicant countries (Borzel et aI., 2003: 58-60; Kelley, 2004: 8; Schimmelfennig et 
aI., 2005: 6). Although these two theoretical viewpoints are based on different 
assumptions to justify the actions of domestic actors against the EU requirements, 
these arguments are not considered as mutually exclusive in the studies of 
Europeanization (Borzel et aI., 2003: 59). 
The lengthy accession process comprises certain domestic and external factors which 
have links with rational choice and sociological institutionalism viewpoints. Moving 
from the rational choice approach, it can be claimed that domestic decision makers 
change their actions after being faced with accession conditionality and tangible 
incentives offered by the EU. In the short or medium term actors may adopt the EU 
requirements to pass onto the next stage of the enlargement process or to reap the 
benefits of a structured relationship with the EU. 
Alternatively, alteration of domestic norms and identities result in deeper-rooted 
change in the long-term. Interactions with EU institutions and transmission of EU 
values at the domestic level lead to social change over time that initiates policy 
changes. Socialisation of the EU norms and values mitigates opposition of the elites 
in applicant countries and facilitates implementation of the EU requirements. 
Therefore, in the studies of Europeanization, rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism are taken into account simultaneously because of their links with 
domestic change. These two approaches are taken as reference points to study 
different dimensions of domestic change in applicant countries. In the initial stages of 
relations with the EU, mediating factors linked to rational choice may better explain 
the domestic transition. However, in the long term a sociological institutionalism -
based approach justifies compliance with the EU requirements as domestic nom1S 
and values changes gradually over time (Coppieters, 2004: 35). 
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According to the "rational choice" approach, the accession process is considered as a 
bargaining process in which decision makers in the countries adopt given rules to 
maximize their utility. The rationalist approach underlines the use, and withholding, 
of incentives to encourage domestic decision makers to comply with EU 
conditionality during the enlargement process. It is argued that the EU's policies, 
which favour benefits to domestic actors, prevent domestic decision-makers from 
taking action against the EU's requirements (Borzel et aI., 2000:12-13; 
Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005: 10). 
From a rationalist perspective, the reactions of domestic actors are explained as the 
"Logic of Consequences". It is stressed that the preferences of domestic actors are 
dominated by their interests and objectives. If the consequences of a decision exceed 
domestic adaptation costs, decision makers will be more likely to take the relevant 
action (March et aI., 1998: 160-162). In other words, domestic responses will be in 
favour of international institutions if this action exceeds domestic costs and coincides 
with the benefits of domestic actors. 
In the course of the enlargement process, the EU membership and incentives 
embodied in accession conditionality have been linked with the assumption of 
rational choice. Primarily, it is perceived that the possibility of membership 
manipulates domestic attitudes and facilitates rule transfer in applicant states. States 
adopt the EU's requirements to become a member of the EU. Furthermore, the EU 
assistance for administrative capacity development, institutional links with the EU 
agencies and information exchange between the EU institutions and domestic 
agencies motivate domestic security institutions and governments to adopt the EU's 
requirements under JHA. Domestic security agencies in applicant states favour the 
EU requirements under JHA if these requirements empower them and enhance their 
capabilities. In addition, governments will adopt the EU's requirements in order to 
enhance the internal security of the country. In brief, the EU's requirements in JHA 
are likely to be accepted by domestic decision-makers and internal security 
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institutions if these requirements empower the capabilities of domestic security 
agencies and strengthen the internal security of the country. 
In contrast to the rational choice assumptions, "sociological institutionalism" 
considers Europeanization as a sociological process involving social learning rather 
than a bargaining process (Checkel, 2001: 563; Diez et ai., 2006: 572). In this 
paradigm, the attitudes of domestic actors are determined as a result of the 'Louie of b 
Appropriateness' (March et aI., 1998: 160-162). In that sense, domestic actors treat 
the EU rules as appropriate if these rules comply with domestic norms, values and 
identities. 
It is argued that the behaviours of domestic actors are linked with internal identities, 
values and norms rather than their interests and preferences. In other words, 
adaptation pressures supporting institutional order will be acceptable for national 
states, if they are legitimised on the domestic level (March et ai., 1998: 160-162). 
Social and cultural developments in applicant countries could result in the EU 
requirements being legitimised or resisted. It can be stated that, if the EU induces 
normative differentiation in target states this will mediate attitudes towards domestic 
choices and lead to persuasion and social learning for the adoption of given rules. 
In the JHA domain, if the EU and domestic actors in states perceive common threats 
for internal security, this will legitimise the EU's requirements in applicant states. In 
brief, the convergence of threat perceptions between domestic actors and the EU 
facilitates adoption of the EU requirements within the context of JHA. 
In case of a contest between domestic norms and the EU approach, the EU operates 
norm-entrepreneurs, cultural organizations and non-formal institutions to 
differentiate domestic norms and values in favour of the EU (Schimmelfennig et aI., 
2005: 228). In that sense, twinning projects, training programmes and institutional 
interactions between domestic agencies and member state institutions initiate a 
learning process among domestic institutions about the EU practices and result in the 
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legitimacy of the adoption of the EU requirements (Kirisci, 2007: 14; TomalO\3. et 
aI., 2007: 387). 
Domestic actors 
In the accession process, governments are considered as the main domestic actors due 
to being the decision makers of applicant countries (Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005: 16). 
However, in some policy fields formal institutions can also have a say in the 
implementation of the EU's rules and policies. Especially in the context of JHA, 
domestic security institutions contribute to the decision-making process through 
consultancy mechanisms. Due to being a sensitive and technical issue, within the 
JHA domain, recommendations and assessment reports of domestic security agencies 
are taken into account by the political actors. In other words, security institutions are 
involved in the decision-making process through consultation mechanisms. 
In Turkey, policy makers in governments are the primary domestic actors because of 
being the political decision-makers of the state. The Ministry of Justice is the body 
responsible for drafting domestic regulations under JHA. The Ministry of the Interior 
and affiliated security institutions are responsible for implementing the EU acqllis on 
JHA and for carrying out law enforcement cooperation with EU agencies. Due to 
these responsibilities, security institutions in Turkey contribute to public policy-
making on the adoption of the EU acquis and on administrative changes. They could 
facilitate or veto EU conditionality through participation in the law-making process 
or in formal meetings with political decision-makers. 
This issue arose III an interview with an official from the Ministry of Justice m 
Turkey, 
"within the context of JHA, consultation commissions are gathered under 
the Ministry of Justice before editing draft bills. In these commissions. 
representatives of NGO's. security institutions and other relevant 
organizations give their opinions on proposals. Different viewpoints are 
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important smce they are taken into account during the law-making 
process. Apart from commissions, draft copies are also circulated to 
relevant security institutions for a last say on final drafts. Then, they are 
submitted to the prime ministry and forwarded to the parliament for 
approval" (Interview#2, 2009). 
Dependent variable 
The EU's regulatory policies and influence mechanisms result in "domestic change" 
in applicant states. In the literature, different classifications are made to make 
domestic change measurable. Borzel and Risse (2003) categorize domestic transition 
as policy, politics and polity change. In the policy field, they emphasize specific 
sectors, such as the environment and agriculture as a feature of dependent variables. 
Concerning politics, they underline how Europeanization affects public discourses in 
political life. Finally, concerning polity change, administrative developments, change 
of intergovernmental relations and national bureaucracies are given as the third 
feature of domestic change (Borzel et aI., 2003: 60). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2005) highlight "rule adoption" as a dependent variable. They determine rule 
adoption as dissemination of the EU's formal and informal nOlms and structures in 
applicant countries (Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005: 7). 
As an alternative to these two approaches, compliance with EU requirements in JHA 
could be measured by looking at three features of JHA. First, domestic transition 
under JHA comprises adoption of the EU acqllis. Adoption of the legal provisions of 
the EU and ratification of international conventions are considered as one of the tasks 
that applicant countries should accomplish in the accession process. 
Second, revisions in administrative structures and in the duties of public institutions 
constitute another aspect of compliance under JHA. In Accession Partnership 
documents and in national programmes, institution-building takes place as an 
important undertaking to tackle internal security threats and to implement the LU 
acquis under JHA. Overall, compliance with conditionality in JHA compnses 
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capacity development, establishing liaison offices in Europol and Eurojust and the 
establishment of a data protection supervisory unit, forensic units and border control 
agencIes. 
Finally, internal security cooperation between domestic agencies and the EU is the 
third aspect of domestic change in JHA. Operational and strategic cooperation 
between applicant countries, institutional links with the EU agencies and cooperation 
agreements could be considered as measurable features of internal security 
cooperation. In sum, observation of the variation in these three areas of JHA would 
allow researchers to make an assessment about the determinants of the EU impact on 
the internal security policy of applicant countries. 
Conditions shaping the impact of the EU in JHA: Mediating factors 
Although mediating channels and material incentives are used to line up the legal and 
administrative infrastructure of applicant states with those of the EU, they may not 
stimulate domestic change during enlargement. The different structures of the 
countries and diversity of the policy areas may generate different outcomes for the 
EU's regulatory policies (Sedelmeier, 2006). The attitudes of national governments 
and domestic institutions can retard or facilitate alignment. Instead, variation in the 
EU's credibility can also limit the EU's leverage over applicant states (Kelley, 2004: 
52-53 ; Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005: 13-14). Related with JHA, the EU's impact on 
applicant states may vary across different internal security policies due to the 
invol vement of EU -level and domestic security agencies. 
Determinacy of the EU requirements (External factor) 
It is assumed that ambiguity about the EU incentives and lack of accession conditions 
limit the EU impact on candidate states. If the requirements are determined clearly, 
states will not avoid or manipulate the rules by interpreting them in accordance with 
their desires. If the target governments are aware of their obligations and the rewards, 
they will be more willing to adopt given rules. Additionally, the EU will be bound by 
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its demands and promises in the course of the enlargement process (Grabbe, 2002: 
317). 
In order to qualify candidate states for EU membership, the EU uses a strategy to 
ensure the alignment of the domestic policies and administrative structures of 
applicant states with EU standards (Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005: 11). In Accession 
Partnership documents and Commission progress reports, the EU outlines accession 
requirements. In the Accession Partnership documents, the EU priorities are listed as 
short-term and medium-term priorities. Through the progress reports of the European 
Commission, the EU further clarifies accession conditions. In the progress reports, 
accession requirements are outlined in more detail than in the Accession Partnership 
documents. 
The Commission reports address a wide range of issues, including immigration, 
asylum, terrorism, organised crime and drugs, to be met by applicant states under 
JHA. Annually, the Commission summarizes domestic developments and addresses 
further requirements such as the ratification of a convention, adoption of the EU 
acquis, strengthening administrative structures and the facilitation of international 
cooperation. Each accession state prepares a National Programme for Adoption of the 
acquis. In national programmes, states determine a timetable for implementing the 
EU acquis and achieving the institutional standards of the EU. 
In the course of the accession process, the EU also clarifies accession conditions 
through training programmes and exchange of best practices. That way, it introduces 
the EU norms and values at the domestic level. Assessment visits, committee 
meetings and institutional interactions are also used to clarify the accession 
requirements in the JHA domain. It is pointed out by an interviewee from the 
European Commission that, 
"Study visits performed between officials of applicant and member 
states' institutions help exchange best practices for international 
cooperation. JHA sub-committee meetings held between candidate states 
and relevant EU commission bodies are also used as platforms to make 
[an] assessment of implementation in candidate countries. In JHA sub-
committee meetings, the EU presents recent developments in the EU 
acquis. Besides, officials from applicant countries present what [has] 
been done to comply with the EU requirements over the past year" 
(Interview#9,20ll). 
In the JHA domain, the EU acquis does not ask for the development of a common 
criminal and law enforcement system within the EU. Rather, wide variety of the 
acquis linked with JHA leaves room for states to decide the exact measures to be 
used in their domestic criminal law (Monar, 2007c: 3). The EU sets up a threefold 
agenda to be met by the applicant countries in the accession process. First, the EU 
calls for adoption of the EU acquis and ratification of relevant international 
conventions for alignment of minimum standards in national criminal laws. The EU 
acquis envisages the harmonization of definitions of offences and procedures in the 
criminal laws of applicant states. 
Second, the EU asks for administrative capacity development and the foundation of 
new institutions which are capable of implementing the EU acquis under JHA. 
Accession states are also required to establish certain institutional structures for 
strengthening international police cooperation through such measures as the 
regulation of cross-border pursuit, liaison offices and controlled delivery. For 
institution-building and capacity-development, the EU offers pre-accession financial 
and technical assistance. 
Third, the EU demands the development of institutional links between domestic 
institutions and the EU agencies for internal security cooperation. Accession states 
are required to take necessary measures for the pooling of data and for information 
exchange to contribute to Europo)'s 'computerized system of collected information'. 
the Schengen Information System and Customs lnfonnation System (Anderson et aL 
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2002: 4). In that sense, candidate states are required to sign cooperation agreements 
with Europol, Eurojust and other relevant EU agencies for information exchange and 
sharing best practices. 
Credibility of conditionality (External factor) 
In the enlargement process, the EU uses incentives and monitoring mechanisms to 
stimulate policy transition in applicant states. EU membership is given as the key 
incentive and ultimate goal for applicant countries if they meet the EU requirements. 
On the contrary, the EU threatens to apply sanctions and withholds rewards in case of 
non-compliance. The EU incentives, monitoring and sanctions accompanying the 
accession conditionality convince governments of the need for compliance with EU 
demands. However, the effectiveness of the EU instruments used for stimulating 
domestic policy transition could be constrained if the EU incentives and threats 
associated with conditionality are not credible (Anastasakis et al., 2003: 16). 
The credibility of the EU incentives and sanctions could suffer due to vanous 
reasons. Primarily, ambiguity about delivery of the EU rewards could diminish 
credibility. Controversy in the EU about membership of an applicant country could 
raise doubts in applicant countries. Changes in EU promises and threats of sanctions 
could also diminish the EU's credibility. Domestic decision makers could be unsure 
about the possibility of accession, although they comply with the EU requirements. 
After getting candidacy for the EU membership the candidate countries are expected 
to meet political conditions. They are required to make progress in meeting 
democratic, liberal and economic standards of the EU to be able to start accession 
negotiations. In this next stage, negotiations start for further integration of applicant 
states to the EU. The candidate states are required to adopt and implement the EU 
acquis to be able to join to the EU. Therefore policies of the EU are categorised into 
35 chapters in the negotiation process. JHA issues are gathered under the chapter 24. 
However, uncertainty could occur when candidate states propose to pass to a next 
stage in the accession process. Rise of a candidate country to an advanced stage 
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without satisfying progress could send inconsistent messages and decline credibility 
of conditionality in other candidate states. High domestic expectation of achieving 
EU rewards, even without fulfilment of the EU conditions, could also weaken 
credibility in that candidate state. Governments of applicant countries may therefore 
act reluctantly if they become uncertain about achieving the next stages of the 
accession process. 
Furthermore, the limited capacity of the EU to monitor adoption of the EU rules 
could make applicant countries less willing to comply with them. Due to deficits in 
the monitoring capacity of the EU, target governments may cover up a lack of 
progress at the domestic level (Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005: 15). In the JHA domain, 
lack of credibility may result in the unwillingness of national institutions to cooperate 
with the internal security organisations of their EU counterparts. 
Adoption costs (Domestic factor) 
In applicant states, the adoption of EU rules and financial assistance for capacity 
development results in administrative change in various policy domains. On the 
domestic level, EU conditionality affects the redistribution of executive powers of 
domestic actors and the duties of public institutions (Heritier et aI., 2001: 287-288). 
Consequently, state elites and formal and informal organisations could raise 
opposition to domestic change to preserve their political or economic powers (Borzel 
et aI., 2000: 1; Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005: 16). 
The adoption of EU rules in JHA affects the duties and administrative structures of 
domestic security institutions. In some cases, even institution-building or capacity-
development driven by the EU conditionality may result in the foundation of new 
security institutions and a change of actors within the institutional setting of a state. 
Establishment of new institutions and change in internal security policies could 
generate domestic resistance among public policy makers and senior officials in 
domestic institutions. A mismatch between EU policies and national practices and 
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changes in the administrative status quo could mcrease opposition to the EU 
demands among domestic actors. 
In companson with other policy fields of the ED, JHA is considered sensitive 
because of national sovereignty considerations, as law enforcement is considered as 
one of the main responsibilities of states in their national territories (Gregory, 2001; 
Monar, 2006: 14). Thus, the ED emphasizes information exchange and practical 
collaboration rather than developing a uniform criminal and law enforcement regime 
between member states. 
However, unlike member states, applicant countries could not alter or negotiate 
membership requirements. They are obliged to implement the JHA acqllis as with 
other accession conditions. Applicant countries are excluded from the decision-
making process and they could not pursue their security interests (Lavenex, 1999: 
109). The ED requirements could be considered as costly by the applicant 
governments because of national sovereignty considerations. 
Furthermore, the asymmetric relationship between applicant states and the EU may 
cause political concerns about state sovereignty (Grabbe, 2002: 301). Involvement of 
an external actor in national security issues is likely to result in domestic opposition. 
Domestic elites and senior officials in security institutions (including the military) 
could resist the ED requirements about revisions in national security policy. 
Consequent to increasing pressures and costs on governments, rule adoption could 
slow down. 
Therefore, the EU empowers domestic institutions through financial assistance, new 
institutional links and security cooperation to overcome domestic resistance. In the 
long run, financial assistance for capacity development and institutional cooperation 
yields positive results to lessen opposition to EU demands. 
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In addition to financial assistance from the EU, the benefits of internal security 
cooperation decrease adaptation costs at the domestic level. Decision makers and 
senior officials in domestic security institutions may consider adoption of the EU 
rules as an opportunity to strengthen the internal security of the state. Thus, domestic 
actors would be willing to maintain institutional links with the EU and to intensify 
international cooperation against transnational crime. 
Convergence of threat perceptions between Turkey and the EU 
(Domestic factor) 
Internal security measures of states are configured to eliminate perceived security 
threats to public order. In response to threat perceptions, states allocate enforcement 
powers to security institutions and enact criminal legislation. In addition, security 
institutions cooperate with foreign security agencies and international institutions 
against cross-border crimes. Countries therefore develop domestic security policies to 
tackle internal and external threats and to maintain stability within their borders. 
Within the context of the fight against transnational cnme, common threat 
perceptions between the EU and applicant states play an important role in the 
adoption of EU policies. Consensus on threat perceptions and shared internal security 
objectives would legitimise EU conditionality at the domestic level. The legitimacy 
and resonance of the EU policies with domestic norms, values and identities makes 
rule adoption more likely in JHA. On the other hand, divergent threat perceptions 
would limit EU influence on domestic security policies and slow down security 
cooperation with non-member states. 
In the case of divergence between EU interests and domestic practices, the EU 
provides training programmes and shares best practices between domestic institutions 
and EU counterparts to overcome dissimilarities between policy preferences 
(Tomalova et aI., 2007: 384-385). In the long run, internal security collaboration, 
institutional interactions between domestic actors and their counterparts in member 
state institutions initiate a learning process, which contributes to the development of 
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common threat perceptions at the domestic level (Kirisci, 2007: 14, 19), Twinning, 
training programmes and the arrangement of mutual study visits increases awareness 
of EU policies. Engagement between security institutions through training 
programmes would mediate domestic threat perceptions and legitimise EU 
conditionality in applicant states. However, at the domestic level, other factors 
besides the EU could also mediate threat perceptions. For instance, changing social 
attitudes, like increases in the illicit use of drugs, relations with other international 
organizations or extreme terrorist attacks may affect the threat perceptions of states. 
At the national level, threat perceptions and security policies are constructed through 
a social and political process (Buzan et aI., 1998: 23-33). Traditions and cultural 
legacies set up a basis for the development of threat perceptions. Identification of the 
security threats in the countries calls for extraordinary measures and legitimizes the 
use of force to combat this threat. In general governmental authorities are considered 
as the main actors that shape the security policies of the state (ibid: 40). However, 
professionals in security institutions, media, and private risk management agencies 
could also take part in the construction of security policies (Bigo, 2008: 11-12; 
(Buzan et aI., 1998: 40). Particularly, threat assessment reports and official 
documents issued by security institutions classify and prioritise security threats. After 
construction of threat perceptions, states introduce new security policies and start to 
implement new internal security measures. Briefly, the identification and sequence of 
perceived threats point to the development of national security policies. 
In the study, threat perception IS taken as one of the mediating factors for 
investigating the underlying conditions of the EU impact in the field of lHA. 
Variation in the perception of threat and the level of convergence between Turkey 
and the EU approach is observed to evaluate the causal relationship among this factor 
and conformance to the EU requirements. In this respect, the "concomitant \'ariation 
method" is preferred because of the difficulty of precisely specifying presence or 
absence of the perception and convergence (George et a/., 2004: 153), According to 
this methodology, variation in the mediating factors are rated as "High"', "Medium" 
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or "Low" instead of saying "Absent" or "Present". 
The perception of threat in the EU and in Turkey is measured through a review of 
official documents and interviews with officials in public institutions. Particularly, 
threat assessment reports of security institutions have provided invaluable 
infonnation about the priorities of law enforcement agencies over the time. In threat 
assessment reports security institutions make analysis of the security situation and 
put forth the significance of internal security threats. Besides, strategy documents, 
action plans, and specific reports on drugs, terrorism and organised crime provide an 
overview for identifying perceived levels of threat both in Turkey and in the EU. 
Finally, semi-structured interviews perfonned with experts in public agencies have 
provided further insight into identifying the extent of threat perceptions in the EU 
and in Turkey. In the interviews, officials from security agencies prioritized specific 
security threats. They also evaluated current security conditions and their level of 
significance. Interviewees also gave infonnation about the importance of security 
cooperation between Turkey and the EU on combatting transnational crime. 
2.3. Conclusion 
The European Union generates vanous types of external policies to pursue its 
economic, environmental and security interests or objectives in the international 
system. From the governance perspective, the EU's leading role in its region in the 
post-cold-war order has been a key motivator for the development of external 
relations with Central and Eastern Europe. As an international actor, it is considered 
as a supranational power, which is accountable for maintaining democracy and 
stability in Europe. The EU's internal security objectives justify its involvement in 
the transition process of CEECs. Attributed to its capability and security objectives, 
the EU has disseminated its legal and institutional security standards to non-member 
states through enlargement. 
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In the enlargement process, applicant states are obliged to adopt the ED acquis and 
institutional templates in order to be granted ED membership. For this purpose, the 
ED operates channels for alignment during accession negotiations. However, the 
EU's leverage upon candidate states changes across sectors, time and states. Similar 
factors generate different outcomes for different states and policy sectors. Due to 
domestic and ED-level factors, some of the accession requirements of the EU face 
strong resistance in one candidate state whilst being swiftly adopted in another. In 
this study the concepts of rational choice and sociological institutionalism are taken 
into account to explain the conditions for the impact of the EU on applicant countries. 
The adoption of the EU's internal security policy relies on a number of mediating 
factors. Having links with incentives and social norms, different domestic and 
external factors could be seen as determinants of the EU impact on applicant 
countries. 
3. The external dimension of JHA: Relations with 
applicant countries 
3.1. Historical background 
The rise in transnational crimes III the last two decades has altered security 
understandings worldwide. The cross-border nature of terrorism, organised crime, 
illegal immigration and drug trafficking has made international cooperation between 
states an indispensable requirement. To prevent cross-border crimes, states have 
begun to seek cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries and with states 
which are located in criminal activity zones (Pastore, 2002: 60). Especially after 
9111, ED member states became aware of foreign security relations and international 
cooperation with third states. 
Bigo argues that in this new security environment, armies, secret services and police 
forces have begun to search for enemies inside borders, in neighbouring countries or 
on a different continent (Bigo, 2000: 171). In other words, new threat perceptions 
and the rise of transnational criminal activities have blurred the distinction between 
internal and external security (Anderson et.al, 2002: 2; Pastore, 2001: 1). 
In similar vein, the rise of transnational crime has changed the prospect of internal 
security in the ED. Policy makers and law-enforcement agencies of the ED-member 
states began to perceive illegal immigration, transnational crime and ethnic conflicts 
as primary threats to their internal security. In consequence, the EU has intensified 
internal security cooperation between member states under Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) since the Treaty of Maastricht came into force in 1993. 
Over this time, a wide range of instruments was adopted by the European Council to 
advance internal security cooperation between member states. Basically, JHA 
foresees civil and criminal cooperation under ·'Justice" and internal security 
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cooperation under "Home Affairs" including the fight against transnational crime, 
the policing of public order, border control, immigration and asylum. Under JHA, the 
Europol, Eurojust and the European Police College (CEPOL) agencies were 
established to facilitate information exchange and collaboration within the EU. 
In 1993, a special agreement between member states created the Europol Drugs Unit 
(EDU), which was the initial model for Europol. In 1995, the JHA Council decided 
that each member state should send liaison officers to the headquarters of the 
Europol Drugs Unit and establish a contact office in The Hague. These offices were 
considered as sovereign territories of member states. Furthermore, liaison officials 
were authorized for collaboration between each other where necessary. However, 
activities of the liaison officials were limited in certain areas. For instance, for data 
protection purposes, using personal details of individuals was prohibited. 
Additionally, due to being a contact point, participation in operational activities was 
not permitted. 
After the formation of the Europol Drugs Unit and liaison offices in The Hague, 
internal security collaboration between national law enforcement agencies of EU 
member states increased considerably. EDU and liaison officers began to exchange 
information, not only on drug trafficking but also on various other types of cross-
border crimes, such as terrorism, organised crime, racism, human trafficking and 
fraud. 
In October 1998, a convention was signed by member states to establish Europol. It 
is tasked to support law enforcement authorities of member states in combating 
international crime. It deals with different forms of cross-border crimes including, 
terrorist activities, unlawful drug trafficking, money-laundering activities, trafficking 
in nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal immigrant smuggling, trade in human 
beings and motor vehicle crimes. In order to assist national law enforcement units, 
Europol processes EU-level criminal information. This data is transmitted through 
Europol National Units in member states. Member states also put data into the 
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Europol infonnation system through National Contact Units. Europol supports 
national law enforcement agencies in their operations but Europol itself does not 
have an operational functionality. 
In the Europol Convention, Europol is allowed to conclude fonnal agreements with 
third states. In this regard, the European Council and the Europol Management Board 
are responsible for preparing conditions of cooperation and its procedures. Europol's 
external relations with third states are based on fonnal agreements between Europol 
and third states. In practice, Europol' s first fonnal external relations were launched 
by a Council Decision in March 2000 (European Council, 2000a). Council prepared 
a list of countries and third bodies with which Europol could enter into negotiations. 
Concerning the selection of states, it is implied from the Council decision that 
priority is given to the security requirements and safeguarding internal security of the 
EU in parallel with the EU's external JHA policy. Additionally, in the selection of 
countries, priority was given to the states with which the EU and member states have 
established a structured dialogue. Thus, all EU candidate states were considered as 
parties to collaboration, through Europol, against transnational crime in Europe. 
Eurojust was established as a result of the decision of Tampere European Council of 
October 1999. In the Council decision it was concluded that to reinforce fight against 
organised crime in the EU and for exchange of criminal evidences a new unit should 
be set up. Accordingly in December 2000 a provisional judicial cooperation unit was 
set up with appointment of prosecutors, magistrates, and police officers from the 
member states. Later in 2002 Eurojust was legally founded to improve coordination 
between judicial authorities of the member states. It is authorized to process personal 
data that are suspected of having committed a criminal offence within the 
competency of Eurojust. In this regard Eurojust is being concerned with cross-border 
crimes including terrorism, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of 
children, drug trafficking, fraud, corruption, money laundering and cyber crimes 
which are liable to at least 5 years prison sentence. At the international level Eurojust 
is allowed to sign cooperation agreements with third states and international 
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organizations for exchange of judicial infonnation and personal data (European 
Council, 2002a). 
Another EU agency deals with JHA issues, the European Police College (CEPOL), 
was founded in 2005. It aims to encourage international cooperation against 
transnational crime. It functions as a network for training of senior police officers of 
the member states. It helps development of common standards among police officers 
of Member State agencies through exchange of best practices (European Council, 
200Se). CEPOL also provides training programs for third countries to exchange 
knowledge and experience against cross-border crime. 
The progress under JHA has helped in the development of common security 
perceptions and increased interdependence between the law enforcement institutions 
of member states. Threat assessment reports, action plans and strategy documents 
adopted by EU institutions identified key security challenges for the EU and 
introduced new security measures to be implemented by member states. In that 
sense, terrorism, drugs, cross-border organised crime, ethnic conflicts and illegal 
immigration are listed as the most important security threats to the internal security 
of the EU. 
The progress in JHA was boosted with the introduction of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
in 1997, which has formed an 'Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice' (AFSJ). Since 
this treaty, the European Council has adopted various provisions to maintain internal 
security within the borders of the EU. Besides, member states became aware of 
international cooperation and foreign relations with non-EU states. In this evolving 
security regime, the EU's neighbourhood was referred to as having an 'unsafe 
outside' (Monar, 2001: 762). Consequently, the EU has started to consider 
cooperation against terrorist activities, organised crime, and illegal immigration not 
only inside but also beyond its borders. The idea proposes improving internal 
security standards of non-member states and international security cooperation as a 
way of minimizing possible security risks for the EU. 
56 
In October 1999, the Tampere European Council conclusions underlined the 
importance of external action as a part of JRA. It emphasized the hannonization of 
internal and external security policies and stronger external action to tackle internal 
security threats. The council decision underlined that: 'all competences and 
instruments at the disposal of the Union, and in particular in external relations, must 
be used in an integrated and consistent way to build the area of freedom, security and 
justice. Justice and Home Affairs concerns must be integrated in the definition and 
implementation of other union policies and activities'. In the Tampere conclusions, 
the fight against organised crime and the promotion of democracy were referred to as 
particular policy objectives in the external dimension of JHA. Readmission 
agreements with non-member states and assistance through the use of Europol were 
counted as instruments of cooperation (European Council, 1999c). 
As a complement to the Tampere conclusions, the Feira European Council of June 
2000 identified political priorities for external action in JHA and emphasized the 
importance of foreign relations in achieving EU internal security objectives and 
priorities (European Council, 2000b). Integration of JHA issues into the EU's 
external action was given as a requirement to strengthen the AFSJ. The Council also 
listed drugs, terrorism and trafficking in human beings as key challenges to the 
internal security of the EU. 
Parallel with the recognition of the external dimension of JHA in the Tampere and 
Feira Council meetings, emphasis was placed on the external aspect of internal 
security threats in the European Security Strategy of 2003. The strategy identified 
terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime as the principal 
security challenges for the EU. The means of external action under JHA proposed the 
involvement of the EU in the resolution of security problems in third countries and 
cooperation with the UN, the CoE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and other regional 
organizations (European Council, 2003c). 
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In the EU, identification of internal security risks has led to the differentiation of 
structures, methods and practices under rnA. According to the security priorities of 
the EU, Europol signed cooperation agreements with third countries (Rees, 2005: 
218, 223). That way, the EU enabled the transfer of expertise for capacity 
development in non-member states. In operational terms, the EU agencies started to 
exchange information in combating cross-border crime. 
On the fight against transnational crime, the Hague Council Summit of November 
2004 adopted the Hague Programme for the development of capacity between 
member states. The programme also touched upon security cooperation with other 
states to prevent the rise of transnational crime in Europe (European Council, 
2004b). 
Eventually, following the Hague Programme, the EU Commission prepared a 
strategy on the "External Dimension of lHA' in October 2005, which was approved 
by the European Council in November 2005. The strategy determined the core 
objectives of external action under lHA as: 'enhancing internal security by creating a 
secure external environment and promoting the democratic values of the EU and the 
rule of law towards third countries' (European Council, 2005d). 
In this strategy, terrorism, organised crime, and illegal immigration were listed as 
primary threats to the internal security of the EU. Counter terrorism, the fight against 
organised crime, drug trafficking, migration, border management, human rights and 
access to justice were noted as key issues that need to be addressed by the EU's 
external relations. The strategy highlighted the causal relationship between criminal 
activities, state failure and weak governments. It counted lax law enforcement 
institutions and corruption as the catalyst for criminal activities in third countries. It 
emphasized drug trafficking and poverty as underlying factors for organised crime. 
Concerning illegal immigration, the strategy referred to the attraction of the EU's 
economic and social life as a cause of immigration and highlighted the necessity of 
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promoting legal immigration and the improvement of the conditions of immigrants in 
their home countries (European Council, 2005d). 
In 'The strategy on the external dimension of JHA,' political engagement with third 
countries was counted as one of the main instruments influencing the internal 
security policies of these states. The strategy addressed the need for information 
exchange and coordination between all countries against terrorism. Furthermore, it 
mentioned judicial cooperation with third states in criminal and civil matters. As a 
policy instrument, it emphasized enhancing border controls, travel document 
security, law enforcement and judicial cooperation against smuggling and human 
trafficking as well as the signing of readmission agreements with third countries 
(European Council, 2005d). With an emphasis on interaction between JHA, and 
external relations of the EU, the strategy stressed peace operations and support for 
development policies in third countries as a way of tackling ethnic conflicts and 
failed states. 
From a geographical perspective, the strategy identified the Mediterranean region, 
Western Balkans, Africa, the US and Russia as targets of external action in JHA. 
Associated with its security priorities, the EU has intensified institutional cooperation 
between member states and with third countries in different regions to tackle internal 
security threats. At the present time, the EU seeks to prevent the root causes of illegal 
immigration, terrorism and organised crime in third countries. For Western Balkan 
states and Turkey, the EU operates its enlargement policy for the dissemination of its 
internal security practices. For states which do not have a possibility of membership, 
the ED employs the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), African Development 
Policy, and 'Partnership' agreements to intensify internal security cooperation and 
assist enforcement against transnational crime. 
Parallel with these developments, JHA has been a key policy field within the EU's 
external relations. Within the ENP, the African Development Policy and in its 
-Partnership' relations, the EU has concluded operational contacts and readmission 
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agreements against transnational crime and illegal immigration. Through these policy 
frameworks, the EU has started to support capacity-development and institution-
building for law enforcement institutions of third states. For this purpose financial 
and technical assistance programmes were allocated in various sub-policy domains 
of JHA (Wichmann, 2007: 20; Wolff, 2006: 6). 
In that sense, enlargement policy has been the most effective EU policy so far for the 
extension of the principles of rnA to non-member states. As part of the pre-
accession process of CEECs, the EU had triggered substantial domestic change 
through membership requirements and incentives. The EU provided legal and 
institutional alignment and maintained security in Central and Eastern Europe. 
3.2. Extension of JHA towards CEECs: EU instruments for domestic 
transition 
In the early 1990s, the influence of the EU on CEECs was substantially increased. 
These states' strong membership expectations and assistance provided by the EU 
facilitated their alignment in rnA. In the CEECs' pre-accession period, the EU was 
able to become involved in their post-communism transition process. The EU 
instruments used to pursue domestic transformation in the CEECs have resulted in 
them experiencing significant changes. 
The eastern enlargement has also been an opportunity for the EU to spread its 
internal security regime and its practices vis-a-vis non-member states. Particularly 
against transnational organised crime, the EU was able to enhance security 
cooperation with CEECs and Cyprus during the pre-accession period (Mitsilegas 
et.al, 2003: 130, 133). 
However, the CEECs' inclusion within the Schengen regime brought a potential for 
increased cross-border criminal activity within the EU borders. Therefore, adoption 
of the EU requirements associated with JHA was considered as crucial during eastern 
enlargement. For two underlying reasons, JHA was strongly emphasized. First, the 
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EU became more vulnerable to cross-border crime with the Schengen abolition of 
internal borders, which, whilst allowing the free movement of goods, persons and 
services, facilitated the mobility of criminals across member states ((Mitsilegas et al., 
2003: 127). Particularly, in Western Europe, organised crime groups originating from 
Russia, East Europe, the Balkan states and Turkey were able to spread illicit 
activities. Drug trafficking, exploitation of women and children for sexual abuse, 
small arms trade, organised robbery, car theft, cyber crimes and fraud became the 
typical cross-border security challenges to be tackled by the EU member states 
(Paoli, 2002: 60). 
Second, since the early 1990s, political instability and transition to a free market 
economy had resulted in legal and structural deficits in Eastern European countries. 
Corruption and deficient law enforcement agencies constrained capacity to prevent 
cross-border crime in these states. The rapid transition to a liberal economy also 
triggered social inequalities and high unemployment. This unstable environment 
prepared suitable grounds for recruitment by organised crime groups (Rees, 2003: 
113). 
To overcome the security risks of eastern enlargement, the EU put forward various 
accession requirements and used policy instruments within the membership 
conditions. Foremost, the EU asked for adoption of the acquis under JHA. Provisions 
adopted by the European Council and key UN and CoE conventions in combating 
transnational crime were legal obligations expected of CEECs. Furthermore, the EU 
asked for institutional-capacity development and international cooperation to 
enhance domestic security infrastructures against transnational crime and for 
implementation of the acquis. That way, the EU aimed to line up the legal and 
administrative infrastructures in CEECs and to maintain security in its 
neighbourhood against intensifying transnational crime in Europe (Rees, 2005: 220-
221; Smith, 2005: 272-273). 
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From the CEECs' point of view, JHA rules and standards were seen as appropriate to 
fix structural deficits in the transformation process (Grabbe, 2002: 304). However, 
alignment with the EU's internal security was not an easy task because of the 
complex requirements of the EU. CEECs experienced considerable pressure from the 
EU to implement rapid developments in JHA. Particularly following the introduction 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the AFSJ, the Council adopted a 
considerable number of measures within the context of JHA. 
Due to the complex requirements of the EU, JHA was one of the most challenging 
policy fields of the accession process. Initially, the EU asked for fulfilment of 
political conditions for preparing a basis for alignment in JHA. The adoption of 
political conditions were considered as an important step to safeguard the rights of 
individuals and deliver a balance between human rights and the administrative 
practices of national security institutions. 
Later, the EU envisaged the legal approximation of criminal law and procedures, the 
adjustment of national security institutions and operational cooperation before the 
accession of non-member states to the EU. To achieve these requirements, the EU 
used various instruments including financial and technical aid, twinning, mutual 
cooperation agreements, and monitoring mechanisms. 
By usmg these instruments, the EU triggered considerable domestic change in 
Eastern Europe during the eastern enlargement. The EU's adaptation pressures and 
incentives mobilized domestic transformation in CEECs. Legal and Institutional 
deficits in CEECs also facilitated the alignment with the EU standards in JHA. 
European Agreements and structured relations 
To provide a liberal market economy, stable democracy and security in its immediate 
neighbourhood the EU started to conclude bilateral negotiations with Eastern 
European States in 1991. As the first step, the EU concluded Europe Agreements 
(Association Agreements) with Hungary, Poland (1991), Romania, Bulgaria, the 
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Czech Republic (1993), Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia (1995) and Slovenia 
(1996). Along with these agreements, the EU launched a "structured dialogue" with 
ten Eastern European countries about their EU membership. During this initial 
period, JHA were not included within the context of the bilateral dialogues (Lavenex, 
1999: 112). Originally, European Agreements and bilateral relations focused on 
issues of trade and economic cooperation rather than internal security. 
At the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the European Council stressed its intention of 
accepting Eastern European states as members of the ED when they met the 
economic and political membership conditions. With respect to political conditions, 
CEECs were asked to develop stable institutions capable of guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (European 
Council, 1993). 
Related with these conditions, the EU initiated joint meetings with interior ministers 
and law enforcement representatives of Eastern European states beginning in the mid 
1990s. For the first time, JHA was included in a structured dialogue (Lavenex, 1999: 
113). The ED institutions, member states and CEECs established a platform for the 
consideration of different ED policies as well as JHA. Through these meetings and 
platforms, the ED and CEECs outlined their intention to collaborate over common 
security interests. 
The Corfu Council of June 1994 instructed the Commission to prepare a strategy to 
strengthen integration of CEECs into the ED standards. The Council also 
recommended arranging a conference with the CEECs in the fight against drugs, 
organised crime and terrorism during the German Presidency (European Council, 
1994c). 
Later, the European Commission prepared an "accession strategy" in July 1994 
regarding the political, administrative, and economic needs of the CEECs as stressed 
at the Corfu Council. The strategy involved a "structured dialogue" to support 
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cooperation III vanous policy fields of the EU. In the strategy, scheduled joint 
meetings were recommended as a method of communication to enhance cooperation 
on internal security. Therefore, the strategy document invited rnA Ministers of the 
member states to have regular joint meetings with their counterparts in CEECs to 
consult and inform them about JHA issues (European Commission, 1994a; 1994b). 
In official meetings addressing rnA issues, greater emphasis was given to the fight 
against organised crime, drug trafficking, border management and adoption of 
restrictive measures to limit illegal immigration (Lavenex, 1999: 117). During the 
bilateral meetings under the structured dialogue, member states consulted CEEC 
interior and justice ministers about the provisions of the EU to provide legal 
approximation and development of administrative structures in CEECs. However, 
adoption of the EU acquis on JHA was not put forward as a requirement. 
In December 1994, the Essen Council called for the Commission to prepare a 
proposal about the progress of integration of CEECs into JHA. The Council also 
made financial aid for administrative developments available through the PHARE 
Programme (European Council, 1994b). 
Concerning the alignment of Eastern European States in JHA, an intergovernmental 
conference on drugs and organised crime was held in Berlin in September 1994. In 
the conference declaration, the EU and seven Eastern European states (Bulgaria, 
Poland, Rumania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) decided to tackle 
organised crime and drug addiction through precise steps. In the conference, 
participants were committed to intensify operational cooperation and integration. 
Ministers of the EU member states agreed to the preparation of guidelines on EU 
legislation and the administrative practices of member states. In addition, parties 
were committed to take concrete measures against cross-border crime. It was decided 
to improve cooperation through liaison officers and experts for the transfer of 
expertise and technical developments; improving border controls and the visa regime 
and the introduction of provisions against smuggling. In the conference, organised 
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crime and drug trafficking were considered as primary internal security threats to be 
dealt with by applicant states (European Council, 1994a). 
Pre-Accession pact on combating organised crime 
To tackle transnational crime in Europe, an important step was taken on 28 May 
1998. The EU and CEECs concluded the Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime 
which addressed legal and institutional deficiencies in candidate states and gave 
importance to the implementation of the EU acquis in combating organised crime. 
Furthermore, the pact emphasized law enforcement cooperation between the EU and 
CEECs. 
In the pact, organised crime, drugs and international arms trafficking, confiscating 
the proceeds of crime and money laundering were listed as the main security 
challenges to be faced by the EU and CEECs. To stimulate cooperation under JHA, 
the EU asked for the development of an efficient police and judicial infrastructure, 
technical capacity for enforcement, satisfactory legal bases for combating corruption 
and a consistent implementation (European Council, 1998). 
The pact also proposed security cooperation between applicant states and the EU. In 
this regard, Europol was assigned as the primary channel for information exchange 
and for the transfer of expertise to domestic security institutions in the CEECs. The 
EU and candidate states also agreed to mutual assistance between national law 
enforcement institutions, Europol and the national judicial authorities of applicant 
states. For approximation of criminal rules and procedures, the pre-accession pact 
referred to a range of international conventions adopted by the EU against organised 
crime, drugs, human trafficking and terrorism. 
Accession partnerships 
Accession negotiations between the EU and CEECs began in 1998. The EU prepared 
"Accession Partnerships" and listed the requirements in the context of JHA 
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(Misilegas et aI, 2000: 130). The Accession Partnership Documents defined short-
and long-term goals parallel with the gaps in the internal security infrastructures of 
applicant states. To ensure alignment in JHA, Accession Partnership documents 
asked for the adoption of the ED acquis on immigration and asylum, the fight against 
organised crime and terrorism, border management, Schengen, law -enforcement and 
judicial cooperation. It also put forward institution-building and administrative-
capacity development to maintain internal security in accession states. Meanwhile, 
CEECs prepared a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis. In national 
strategy papers, accession states determined their national plan for implementing the 
ED acquis and associated standards. 
To evaluate domestic practices m CEECs, the European Commission undertook 
screening visits to the candidate states and released reports before arranging the 
accession partnership. Through these reports, the ED precisely specified the context 
of the negotiations for each state. Despite the variation in state infrastructures, the 
accession partnerships of CEECs were framed around a pre-determined enlargement 
strategy, the so called "Agenda 2000", prepared by the European Commission in 
1997 (Soveroski, 1998: 18). In this comprehensive document, the European 
Commission precisely determined accession requirements for each specific EU 
policy field, including JHA. 
In the field of JHA, "Agenda 2000" underlined institution-building as a pre-condition 
for implementation of the ED acquis in combating transnational crime and illegal 
immigration. Thus, it proposed an exchange of best practice through interactions 
between the security institutions of applicant states and relevant member states' 
institutions and touched upon the need for practical cooperation and information 
exchange. "Agenda 2000" also addressed the EU Treaty and the EU acquis as well as 
relevant international conventions to be implemented by the applicant states as a 
necessary condition of cooperation (European Commission, 1997). 
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After the 9/11 attacks, the alignment of CEECs with the EU standards in JHA 
became prominent in the enlargement process and counter-terrorism became an 
important policy objective along with actions against organised crime, drugs and 
illegal immigration (Occhipinti, 2003: 13). In addition, institutional cooperation 
between member states and CEECs was boosted through Europo1 and Eurojust. As of 
2003, Europol signed operational cooperation agreements with CEECs. 
Monitoring 
To enforce domestic transformation in accession states, the EU used monitoring to 
assess compliance with EU rules and EU standards during the enlargement process. 
In the JHA domain, the EU evaluates the effectiveness of national law enforcement 
authorities and implementation of criminal rules and procedures. 
To assess the adoption of EU requirements by candidate states, the Council 
established a monitoring mechanism in June 1998. This so-called "Collective 
Evaluation Working Party" consisted of delegations of member states and was to 
prepare evaluation reports on JHA issues. The Working Party categorized JHA under 
five issue areas: asylum, migration, border management, police and judicial co-
operation (European Council, 2002c). 
For the preparation of evaluation reports, experts from member states were appointed 
to collect data on domestic developments in CEECs. The reports outlined the level of 
implementation of the acquis and convergence in specific categories of JHA. The 
Expert Group collected relevant information from experiences of member states' 
officials during the study visits, from other relevant EU bodies and embassies during 
their mutual relations with candidate states (European Council, 2006b). 
Collective Evaluation Working Groups prepared regular evaluation reports for the 
European Council. These reports set out the level of implementation of, and 
cooperation over, JHA in applicant states and were taken as a reference for 
arrangements for the enlargement strategy. Reports of the evaluation groups were 
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also taken into account by the Commission for the preparation of the progress 
reports. 
Apart from Collective Evaluation Group Reports, the European Commission 
prepared annual progress reports for each candidate state beginning in 1998. These 
reports assessed the adoption of the EU acquis, including JHA, and clarified 
conditionality on JHA. In the progress reports the EU underlines reforms in JHA and 
calls for internal security cooperation for deepening relations with the candidate 
countries (Knelangen, 2007: 89). 
Institutional-capacity development in the JHA domain 
To pursue administrative developments in the CEECs, the EU used a number of 
political and financial instruments during the eastern enlargement. In that sense, 
financial assistance and training had been important instruments to transfer EU 
models to CEECs. To facilitate implementation of the EU acquis under JHA and to 
maintain cooperation over cross-border crime, the EU allocated financial support 
through financial assistance programs and encouraged the exchange of best practice 
through training schemes. Monitoring instruments were also used to pursue domestic 
transformation in JHA. 
Financial assistance: PHARE 
The PHARE programme was created in 1989 to enhance public administration in 
Poland and Hungary. It has been extended to other Eastern European countries since 
1993 to support alignment with the EU. According to the priorities of the EU 
identified for each of the CEECs, JHA issues have been integrated into the PHARE 
since 1998. Financial assistance was made available for the transposition of the EU 
standards and for exchange of expertise to strengthen institutional infrastructures in 
accession countries. 
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On combating cross-border crime, assistance projects were undertaken until 2003 on 
a range of issues including drug trafficking, fraud, terrorism, organised crime and 
law enforcement cooperation. On the whole, E500 million was allocated to CEECs 
between 1997 and 2001 for institution-building and to facilitate convergence with the 
ED acquis (European Council, 2002). 
Furthermore, the ED afforded financial support through specific programmes for 
institution-building and capacity-development in the CEECs. The ED offered 
practical support to the candidate states for investigations and operations, training 
and consultancy. For instance, for stimulating common practices against different 
forms of organised crime between candidate states, the ED initiated specific 
programmes under JHA such as Octopus II, OISIN, Grotius, STOP, Odysseus and 
Falcone. 
Twinning and TAIEX 
During the eastern enlargement, technical support was given to strengthen CEECs' 
administrative structures. Therefore, experts from institutions of member states were 
appointed to work at equivalent institutions in candidate states. That way, member 
states were able to introduce best practice and institutional models for the 
implementation of the acquis in CEECs (Tomalova et aI., 2007: 380). 
During eastern enlargement, twinning has been a significant instrument for the 
transfer of expertise and institutional structures under JHA. By the end of 2006, 367 
of the 1,674 twinning projects involved JHA issues (Wichmann, 2007: 10). As an 
alternative to the use of political pressures on accession country governments, the ED 
promoted transposition of the ED norms through engagement between the 
institutions of member and candidate states. Member state experts and institutions 
were able to consult with their counterparts in CEECs in the context of JHA. 
Through twinning projects, a network of domestic institutions was established for the 
transfer of knowledge (Tomalova et al., 2007: 387). Domestic institutions m 
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beneficiary countries were able to communicate with the EU and report their 
difficulties during the project period (European Commission, 2006). From the EU 
side, the institutions of member states were able to engage with their counterparts in 
candidate states and strengthen mutual dialogue about internal security cooperation. 
As a result, not only did the EU provide consultation over domestic institutions but 
also ensured that the EU perceptions and priorities in combating cross-border crime 
were acknowledged by the CEECs. 
Along with twinning projects, Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 
(T AlEX) has been an important instrument for the extension of JHA norms towards 
CEECs. It was introduced for the first time in 1995 under PHARE. Short-term 
training programmes, such as study visits, seminars, and workshops, addressed a 
wide range of JHA issues. These were carried out using EU T AlEX funds. As a 
short-term instrument, T AlEX had been a complementary instrument to Twinning 
projects. To facilitate transposition of JHA in CEECs, training seminars and 
workshops were used to guide the implementation of the EU practices on JHA. 
3.3. An overview of the impact of the EU on the internal security of 
Turkey 
It is widely admitted that Turkey's candidacy for EU membership has boosted 
domestic transformation in many policy domains since 1999 (Keyman et al .. 2007: 
71; Schimmelfennig et al., 2005: 41-42; Tocci, 2007: 71). Declaration of Turkey's 
candidacy in the Helsinki Council Decision of 1999 enabled the EU to exert 
influence on Turkey in the context of JHA. With the start of a structured relationship 
between Turkey and the EU, accession conditionality on JHA was introduced by the 
EU. 
As had happened in the CEECs' pre-accession period, Turkey's alignment with the 
EU on JHA was considered as a prominent issue. In the Accession Partnership 
documents and in the Commission's progress rep0l1s issued for Turkey since 1999, 
the EU put forward adoption of the EU acquis on JHA, institutional-capacity 
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development and internal-security cooperation as requirements to ensure that the 
internal security of Turkey met EU standards. Thus, the EU aimed to prevent cross-
border crime before awaiting the conclusion of the lengthy enlargement process with 
Turkey. 
However, the high volume and dynamic nature of JHA, extensive use of non-binding 
measures, and domestic sovereignty considerations against the hierarchy of the EU 
make JHA a sensitive domain (Monar, 2007c: 4). Thus, adoption and implementation 
of JHA practices is a long, complicated and difficult task in the enlargement process 
for Turkey (Dokos, 2007: 5). Especially long frontiers and distinctive geographical 
setting of Turkey between East and West pose further challenges for combating 
transnational crime and illegal immigration (Apap et al., 2004: 17; Mannaert, 2003: 
5). As a result, the difficult-to-manage extensive borders and coastline of Turkey 
raise doubts in some EU member states whether Turkey's membership could result 
in lower standards of internal security within the EU. 
The literature examining Turkey'S domestic transformation has been a growing field 
after it became a candidate state in 1999. Studies analysing the impact of the EU on 
Turkey have mostly focused on Turkey'S democratisation process, the civil-military 
relationship, the transition of Turkey's foreign policy and issues of military security 
(Bac, 2007; Buharali, 2007; Emerson, 2004; Keyman et al., 2007; Schimmelfennig et 
a/., 2005). However, only a handful of studies have touched upon the EU-Turkey 
relationship within the context of JHA. 
Studies considering JHA issues in Turkey's EU accessIOn process have mainly 
analysed the influence of the EU on Turkey'S immigration and asylum policy and the 
transition of its border control infrastructure (Apap et al., 2004; Cicekli, 2004; Keser, 
2006; Kirisci, 2002, 2007). On the other hand, a few studies have focused on Turkey-
EU relationships vis-a.-vis the Kurdish question and touched upin combating drugs 
and organised crime (Bovenkerk et al., 2004; Gunter, 1998; Pek et aI., 2007; Robins, 
2005, 2008; Tocci, 2007) Within this latter group of studies, analysis of the 
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conditions within which the EU has exerted influence has remained limited. Rather, 
they have focused on the ways in which Turkey is combating cross-border crime, and 
the effectiveness of enforcement. In the following sections, key arguments in the 
literature are given by looking at the transposition of JHA into Turkey during the EU 
accession process. 
Immigration and asylum policy 
It is widely claimed in the literature that the prospect of EU membership has 
increased the credibility of the EU preconditions and the willingness of Turkey to 
adopt the EU requirements on asylum, immigration and visa policy (Cicekli, 2004: 1; 
Keser, 2006: 126; Mannaert, 2003: 11). The EU membership incentive offered in 
1999 increased the enthusiasm in Turkey to align itself with the EU's JHA regime 
(Kirisci, 2002: 9). As a result, Turkey used constructive language in its first National 
Plan for Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) in 2001, despite the reservations of the 
security institutions on the modification of Turkey's asylum and immigration regime. 
Yet, sovereignty considerations, the high economic burden and administrative 
difficulty were addressed as likely domestic veto points in the context of asylum, 
visa and immigration policy (Mannaert, 2003: 13). 
It is claimed that the EU requirements on border control and the adjustment to the 
visa regime are considered as rather costly for Turkey, although Turkey has pledged 
to align with the EU asylum regime and to lift reservations on the Geneva 
Convention. The adoption of the EU requirements are considered as a burden, as visa 
restrictions to neighbouring countries and tight border controls were seen as a risk to 
small-scale, cross-border trade and tourism especially in Turkey's eastern provinces 
(Keser 2006: 128). 
Alternative to cost-benefit calculations, normative factors are put forward as 
determinants of domestic developments in Turkey's immigration and asylum policy. 
The EU accession process is presented as a powerful tool for transferring European 
norms, and practices to Turkey. It is claimed that the EU pressures integrated within 
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the accession process not only change domestic policies and structures but also 
provide an understanding in Turkey of the refugee regime of the EU (Kale, 2005: 4). 
The EU accession process maintains suitable grounds for an exchange of views 
between national institutions. iliA sub-committee meetings and training seminars 
organised by the EU increase the interactions between domestic institutions and help 
develop commonsense solutions to the implementation of EU practices within iliA. 
Along with the engagement of domestic institutions with the EU counterparts, 
international cooperation with the UN, CoE and International Organization for 
Migration (10M) help develop an awareness of trafficking in human beings at the 
national level (Kale, 2005: 270). 
The Kurdish question and Turkey's counter-terrorism policy 
Adoption of political criteria has resulted in indirect consequences for Turkey's 
counter-terrorism policy since the granting of EU candidate status in 1999. Political 
reforms introduced in Turkey since 1999 have constrained the excessive security 
measures to prevent PKK terrorism in Southeast Turkey. Especially, the EU 
conditions on the extension of fundamental human rights and strict control of torture 
and ill-treatment have affected the balance between liberties and counter-terrorism 
measures for Turkish security forces. 
Overall, political conditionality is perceived in Turkey as costly since democratic and 
human-rights conditions have consequences for Turkish counter-terrorism policy. 
Although Turkey made satisfying progress to meet political criteria, progress on 
counter-terrorism policy had been limited while the EU demands were perceived as a 
threat to Turkey's integrity and internal security (Schimmelfennig et al .. 2005: 43). 
Along with adaptation costs, the credibility of the conditions is addressed as another 
condition for the adoption of EU rules. The impact of the EU is identified as weak in 
the face of low credibility. Alterations in the EU commitments and unequal treatment 
between applicant states are given as grounds for the low credibility 
(Schimmelfennig et al., 2005: 16). However, when compared with credibility, the 
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adaptation cost is presented as dominant factor in persuading domestic decision-
makers to conform to the ED requirements. High credibility is considered 
insufficient, when the adaptation cost is high. 
Based on this assumption, it is claimed that the adoption of the democratic and 
human rights principles of the ED in Turkey are associated with the presence of ED 
incentives and the extent of domestic adaptation costs. Turkish decision makers are 
observed to be reluctant in adopting the ED requirements when adoption costs are 
high. For instance, the ED requirement for the abolition of the death penalty was 
passed by the Turkish Parliament in 2002 as adoption costs were low at the time 
(Schimmelfennig et at., 2003: 508). Domestic actors considered that the ED 
requirement to abolish the death penalty was a necessary price that should be paid for 
the opening of accession negotiations (Bac, 2005: 20; Tocci, 2007: 69). 
It is also claimed in the literature that, domestic adaptation costs have increased on 
countering terrorism since 2005 because of the uncertainty on the future of Turkey-
ED relations and the resumption of PKK attacks in Southeast Turkey. In this 
environment, nationalists and conservatives find suitable grounds to voice 
Eurosceptic opinions claiming that the ED has double standards against Turkey and 
do not want to accept Turkey as a member state (Kaliber et ai., 2010: 202). 
Competing with the arguments about the role of adaptation cost and the EU 
incentives, the impact of the EU on Turkey's Kurdish question is also attributed to 
the socialization of EU norms and values in Turkey. Domestic transition is seen as 
likely if the ED norms resonate with domestic beliefs and historical practices. It is 
claimed that the ED maintains a dialogue with civil society and formal institutions 
for the diffusion of ED norms and legitimacy. Institutional interactions between 
Turkey and the EU modify perceived interests and norms which are attributed to 
political conditionality. In the long run, the alteration of domestic beliefs, purposes 
and perceptions results in domestic transformation (Tocci, 2007: 16). 
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It is claimed that, the EU requirements on counter-terrorism policy have faced 
objections in Turkey, as they were seen as competing with national sovereignty, 
domestic norms, traditions and the integrity of the state (Tocci, 2007). The EU's 
advocacy of a political solution to the Kurdish problem raised doubts in Turkey 
about whether the EU wanted to weaken the territorial integrity of Turkey. 
Therefore, the EU requirements for the extension of Kurdish cultural rights were 
considered as attempts to undermine the unity state by making concessions to 
terrorism (Bac, 2005: 23). 
Combating drugs and organised crime 
Turkey is one of the major licit poppy-producing countries in the World. Legal 
poppy production was seen as a significant source of income at the domestic level. 
Therefore, international pressures increased in the 1970s to ban legal poppy 
cultivation in Turkey attracted strong resistance. Consequently, in the 1990s, Turkey 
and the UN agreed on the development of a regime to control poppy production on 
an annual basis under United Nations Drugs Control Programme. As a result of 
intensifying interactions with UN, Turkey ratified key UN conventions in combating 
drugs at the global level (Robins, 2007: 22). 
However, implementation of the conventions and cooperation with European states 
in combating drugs had been limited in Turkey over the 1990s. Due to mounting 
PKK attacks in this decade, combating drugs trafficking and illegal manufacturing 
were considered as a secondary challenge to Turkey's internal security (Robins, 
2008: 636). In consequence, combating drugs was overlooked in Turkey until the end 
of the 1990s. 
Meanwhile, cooperation with Turkey in combating organised crime and drugs is 
essential for the EU (Dokos, 2007: 6). Turkey is an important hub of the heroin route 
between Afghanistan and Europe. The vast majority of the heroin delivered in 
Europe has a Turkish connection. Turkish/Kurdish, kin-based, organised crime 
groups smuggle raw narcotics from Turkey's eastern borders and refine them in 
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hidden laboratories in Turkey. It is then transferred to Europe by Turkish organised 
crime groups (Robins, 2002: 635). 
Terrorism and Turkey's extensive borders provide suitable grounds for tightly-
organised smuggling organizations. Some local clans from Southeast Turkey and the 
PKK profit from heroin production. Besides, in Europe, low socio-economic status 
and cultural marginalization motivate immigrants to become involved in drug 
trafficking. Kin-based relationships between members of organised crime groups and 
the difficulty of translation from the local languages make enforcement problematic 
for European security agencies (Paoli et a/., 2008: 22-26). 
In Turkey, combating drugs and organised crime shows substantial progress since the 
end of the 1990s. The relationship with the ED in combating drugs has been 
intensified after the ED granted Turkey candidate status in 1999. Some notorious 
organised crime groups were dismantled and corruption minimized. Robins (2005) 
claims that Turkey's willingness to undertake security cooperation in combating 
heroin is not well recognized by the ED. Disagreements between Turkey and the EU 
on the Cyprus problem, cultural differences and the uncertainty on ED membership 
increase the vulnerability of the security relationship. A downturn in Turkey-EU 
relations is given as a possible handicap to the efforts to combat hard drugs in Europe 
(Robins 2005). 
In the following parts, the impact of the ED conditions on the internal security of 
Turkey will be scrutinized with reference to three case studies. 
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4. The impact of the EU on combating organised crime 
in Turkey 
4.1. Introduction 
Since the end of 1990s, transnational organised crime has become a growing security 
concern in the EU. It has been perceived as a challenge to the liberal economy, the 
functions of the state, the rule of law and the integrity of society (Kirchner et ai., 
2007: 2). Two underlying factors have led to the development of this perception in 
the EU. First, the EU became more vulnerable to transnational organised crime with 
the creation of the Schengen Area. Following the abolition of internal borders, free 
movement of goods, persons and services in Europe has increased the mobility of 
criminals and facilitated cross-border criminal activity across the Schengen 
countries. Particularly, in Western Europe, organised crime groups from Russia and 
Eastern Europe, as well as from the Balkan states and Turkey, were able to extend 
their illicit activities such as drug trafficking, exploitation of women and children for 
sexual abuse, the trade in small arms, organised robbery, car theft, cyber crimes and 
fraud. These typical offences need to be tackled by the member state authorities. Free 
movement of goods and services has also enabled perpetrators of organised crime to 
veil their illicit commodities. Assets of criminal activities have been legitimised 
under the cover of legal industries such as transport, finance, estate, hotel and night-
clubs (Paoli, 2008: 47). 
Second, after the end of the communist regimes, political instability and the 
transition to a free market economy in Eastern Europe provided a suitable 
environment for the growth of organised crime in the states of the region. Legal and 
structural deficits in post-communist states enabled organised crime groups to 
commit illicit activities. Corruption and management gaps constrained the capacity 
of law enforcement agencies to prevent organised crime in these states. Besides, the 
rapid transition to a liberal economy triggered social inequalities and high 
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unemployment that allowed organised crime groups to recruit members from low-
income groups (Rees, 2003: 113). 
By the end of the 1990s, fears that serious crimes would spill over into Western 
Europe persuaded ED member states to intensify internal security cooperation to 
prevent transnational organised crime. In the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), 
combating organised crime was counted as an objective in the field of ffiA. With the 
creation of the AFSJ, the European Council issued a range of legal instruments to 
facilitate law enforcement and judicial cooperation between member states. The ED 
institutions Europol, CEPOL and Eurojust also contributed to criminal and judicial 
cooperation between member states. 
Parallel with the attempts to increase coordination between EU member states, the 
EU has started to exert influence on candidate states to prevent organised crime 
through the 1998 pre-accession pact on organised crime. Later, cooperation with 
third countries was identified as a requirement for maintaining security within the 
EU in the Tampere Council conclusions of 1999, the European Security Strategy of 
2003 and in the strategy for the External Dimension of JHA of 2005 
In partnership with the Council of Europe, the UN and other regional organizations, 
the ED started to provide assistance to strengthen the law enforcement capabilities of 
candidate countries. Parallel to increasing external action under JHA, the EU has 
become more engaged in initiatives by the UN, the CoE, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) and the 10M to support the security policies of third countries against 
organised crime. 
Enlargement policy has been an instrument for the EU to stimulate effectiveness in 
combating organised crime in its neighbourhood. Through accession conditionality 
the EU maintained legal alignment and administrative capacity development in 
applicant states. The EU also ensured internal security cooperation with applicant 
states to prevent transnational organised crime in Europe. 
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Alignment of Turkey with the EU standards in combating organised crime is seen as 
one of the objectives of the EU in the accession process of Turkey. Turkey's 
geographical location between Asia and Europe makes it a convenient hub for 
transnational trafficking networks. Additionally, the huge Turkish immigrant 
community living in European countries and the involvement of some Turkish 
nationals in organised crime groups makes international cooperation with Turkey 
important for the EU to increase the effectiveness of enforcement against organised 
crime groups in Europe. 
Related to the developments above, this chapter analyses the scope of the impact of 
the EU in combating organised crime in Turkey in the period from 1987 to 2010. 
Since organised crime covers a broad field, this chapter concentrates on specific 
types of organised crime; trafficking in human beings, money laundering and 
cybercrime. It analyses legal and institutional developments, as well as international 
cooperation to uncover the EU's impact in Turkey. It considers four variables to test 
the EU's role in domestic transition in Turkey: Determinacy of the EU requirements, 
credibility of conditionality, domestic adoption costs and convergence of threat 
perceptions between Turkey and the EU. In order to clarify this phenomenon, the 
analysis begins with an attempt to give a definition for organised crime. 
4.2. Definition of organised crime 
Both in the academic literature and in practice, there is no consensus on a definition 
of organised crime. However, agreement on a definition is considered important 
since diverse definitions lead to different threat assessments in different states for 
similar situations (Lampe, 2008: 2). For instance, an alteration in the minimum 
number of offenders in criminal law, or the inclusion of an element, such as the use 
of violence, as a pre-condition for the classification of organised crime, could change 
crime statistics significantly. Variation in crime rates and threat assessments could 
alter security priorities and threat perceptions thereby differentiating national security 
policies and limiting international cooperation against organised crime. 
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Two central elements are widely integrated by lawmakers and scholars to 
characterize organised crime. First, provision of illegal goods and services is taken as 
the key element to distinguish organised crime from ordinary crimes. This approach 
considers organised crime as an "illegal business" which is committed by a group of 
criminals. These activities are sometimes referred to as "the crime industry" or 
"illegal enterprise" (Finckenauer, 2005: 66; Paoli, 2002: 53). Illegal activity 
committed by organised crime groups aim to achieve profit and/or power. Drug 
trafficking, money laundering, racketeering, exploitation of women or children for 
sexual purposes constitute the most common types of organised crime. In that sense, 
organised crime groups are distinguished from terrorist groups, as they pursue 
material benefits rather than particular political agendas or ideologies. 
Second, a criminal structure engaged in criminal activity with a specific collective 
identity and division of work among its members is considered as a key element that 
differentiates organised crime from ordinary crimes (Lampe, 2001: 103). This 
element refers to the networking capacity and structural characteristics of organised 
crime groups. The number of members in a criminal group, the method of 
coordination and hierarchy, the length or frequency of their companionship are 
considered as core factors to identify organised crime groups from single offenders. 
In that sense, kin-based smuggling networks in the Western Balkans and in Turkey, 
the Mafia in Italy, street drug dealers or prostitution networks in some European 
countries are seen as typical organised crime groups (Lampe, 2008: 2, 3). 
Despite the lack of consensus on the definition, organised crime could be roughly 
determined as crimes committed by a group of persons in a continuous and organised 
fashion, for the purpose of getting profit and/or power. Additionally, the extension of 
their criminal activities across more than one state could lead to them being defined 
as "Transnational Organised Crime". 
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In the United Nations' Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo 
Convention) of December 2000, an organised crime group was defined as: "a 
structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in 
concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences, to obtain 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit" (UN, 2000). 
In similar vein, the EU definition of organised crime complies with the UN definition 
and emphasizes the structured nature of organised crime groups and their purposes of 
getting material benefit and power. In a Framework Decision of 2008, organised 
crime is outlined as: "a structured association, established over a period of time, of 
more than two persons acting in concert with a view to committing offences which 
are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least 
four years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit" (European Council, 2008c). 
4.3. Conditions shaping the impact of the EU in combating 
organised crime in Turkey 
Four mediating factors are taken into account to determine the scope of the influence 
of the EU in combating organised crime in Turkey. They are categorized under the 
Rational Choice and Sociological Institutionalism theoretical approaches. 
"Determinacy of the EU requirements", "credibility of conditionality", and 
"domestic adaptation costs" are attributed to the rational choice viewpoint because of 
their links with cost-benefit calculations and incentives related with EU membership. 
Alternatively, "convergence of threat perceptions" is considered under sociological 
institutionalism as it takes domestic traditions, beliefs and norms into account as 
principal constituents of policy transition. 
Determinacy of the EU requirements 
The EU requirements for the fight against organised cnme were undefined for 
Turkey in the period from 1987 to 1999. Two factors account for this lack of clarity. 
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First, the EU did not have a concrete approach against organised crime before the 
creation of the AFSJ in 1997. Although the EU's first strategy for the prevention of 
organised crime was adopted by the Council in April 1997, progress in combating 
organised crime was limited until the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force in 1999. 
Second, the EU did not set out the conditions for Turkey's accession before it 
achieved candidate status in 1999. The Customs Union agreement of 1996 had been 
the main platform between Turkey and the EU before the start of their intensified 
relationship in 1999. The relationship between Turkey and the EU in this period 
concentrated on customs integration and the development of mutual trade rather than 
internal security cooperation. Thus, the EU did not put forward requirements to 
harmonise Turkey'S internal security policy despite it having signed the pre-accession 
pact on organised crime with the CEECs and Cyprus. 
The EU requirements on organised crime have gradually become concrete since 
1999. First, different from the situation before 1999, the fundamentals of the EU 
policy in combating organised crime have been clarified. Creation of the AFSJ under 
the Treaty of Amsterdam has boosted harmonization of criminal procedures and 
internal security cooperation between member states. The Tampere, Hague and 
Stockholm programmes intensified internal security cooperation in the EU. The 
Council issued various legal instruments to bring into line criminal definitions and 
the administrative procedures of member states against organised crime. 
Furthermore, the external aspect of JHA has been part of the EU's policy towards 
non-member states. Financial and technical assistance was allocated to strengthen the 
capacity of third countries in combating organised crime. 
Besides, the EU-Turkey relationship has evolved to a structural basis since 1999, as 
conditionality for Turkey was set out through the Accession Partnership Documents 
of2001, 2003, 2006 and 2008. In these AP documents, short-term and medium-teml 
requirements were outlined to prepare Turkey for accession. Concurrently, since 
1999 the European Commission has started to monitor progress in Turkey and has 
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prepared Annual Progress Reports in which the EU requirements m combating 
organised crime in Turkey have been further clarified. 
Credibility of conditionality 
The credibility of the EU requirements was low before 1999, as the EU did not offer 
EU membership to Turkey. Although Turkey had made an EU membership 
application in 1987, before the CEEC states and Cyprus, it was excluded from 
Eastern enlargement. In this period, the EU and Turkey signed the Customs Union 
Agreement of 1996 and the EU committed to provide financial assistance to support 
its implementation in Turkey. However, after ratification of the agreement, 
considerable funds that had been allocated to Turkey were not released due to 
Greece's veto. Consequently, the credibility of the EU policies appeared to be low in 
Turkey until 1999. 
However, the situation changed when the Helsinki Council of 1999 accorded Turkey 
candidate status and allowed it to benefit from pre-accession financial assistance and 
to join EU programmes and agencies (European Council, 1999a). Turkey's 
candidacy for EU membership and the delivery of EU financial assistance for 
administrative capacity-development increased the credibility of the conditions 
involved in Turkish accession after 1999 (Keyman et aI., 2007: 71, 74; 
Schimmelfennig et al., 2005: 42). To become a member of the EU and to secure the 
benefits this offered, the Turkish government adopted various requirements in the 
field of JHA. The security institutions under the Ministry of the Interior also 
increased security cooperation with the EU agencies and member state institutions. 
Nevertheless, credibility has started to decline since 2005 for two primary reasons. 
First, the political debate in the EU on Turkey's membership has increased 
uncertainty in Turkey. Turkey's big population and geographical proximity to the 
Eastern world raised questions in the EU about the negative consequences of 
Turkey's accession. Germany, France and Austria started to discuss alternatives to 
full membership for Turkey. Opponents of Turkey put forward the EU's absorption 
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capacity and inability to take new member states. Furthermore, controversy on 
Turkey's membership was reflected in EU documents. In some Council and 
Commission documents negotiations with Turkey were called an "open-ended 
process" (European Commission, 2004a; European Council, 2005a). The Council 
and the Commission also referred to the EU's ability to take new member states as a 
pre-condition for Turkey's accession. 
Second, the isolation of Turkish Cypriots and the accession of Cyprus to the EU 
raised questions about the fairness of the EU's attitude to Turkey. Despite the refusal 
of the UN reunification plan by the Greek Cypriots in a referendum in April 2004, 
the EU admitted the Greek Cypriot administration as the legitimate authority for the 
whole island and disregarded the Turkish administration in Northern Cyprus. Later, 
Cyprus was granted EU membership in 2004. In response to the economic and 
political isolation of Turkish-Cypriots, Turkey has refused to open its harbours to 
Cypriot vessels, despite the EU requests (Ulusoy, 2008: 318). As a result of the 
controversy between Turkey and the EU since 2005, the EU partially suspended 
negotiation process with Turkey in 2006. 
Domestic adaptation costs 
Due to the complex nature of organised crime offences, various domestic institutions 
in Turkey engage in action against organised crime. Domestic institutions in Turkey 
not only perform enforcement against organised crime, but also assist domestic 
policy-making through consultation mechanisms. According to a senior official in 
the Ministry of Justice; 
"Due to being technical issues, security institutions contributes the policy 
making process of internal security. Representatives of relevant 
institutions gathered in commissions under the Ministry of Justice can 
give their opinions on the provisions which are drafted by the 
Government. During this policy-making process, security assessment 
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reports and the proposals of security agencies are also taken into account 
to detennine domestic policies" (Interview#2, 2009). 
As a result of the involvement in the decision making process, senior officials in 
domestic security institutions are considered as important actors that could facilitate 
or limit compliance with the EU requirements for the fight against organised crime in 
Turkey. Overall, security agencies dealing with combating organised crime tend to 
support the EU requirements. Although sovereignty considerations have a place in 
JRA matters, officials in Turkish security agencies did not oppose the EU 
requirements on organised crime since it was considered at the domestic level that, 
"Turkish institutions benefit from institutional links with the EU agencies 
and operational cooperation. Moreover, exchange of best practices and 
mutual dialogue between Turkish and member state officials help 
development of common sense to prevent transnational crime in the 
regIOn. Interactions between institutions facilitate international 
cooperation to tackle cross-border crimes effectively" (Interview#3, 
2009). 
Adoption of EU practices and the acquis are seen as chances to enhance the 
capabilities of the institutions in the fight against organised crime. Therefore, the EU 
assistance for capacity development and international cooperation with member 
states have been incentives for Turkish officials. In other words, financial assistance, 
training programmes and operational cooperation with the EU agencies stimulate 
domestic support for the adoption of the EU conditionality. 
Convergence of threat perceptions: Domestic resonance and 
legitimacy of EU approach 
As in the EU, the fight against organised crime in Turkey evolved to become a 
particular policy field since the end of the 1990s. Organised crime started to be 
perceived as a serious security threat to public order, the legal economy and society. 
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Parallel with this domestic awareness, a number of measures were taken to prevent 
organised crime in Turkey. Since it was seen as a serious threat, Turkish 
governments issued a range of measures to prevent organised crime since the end of 
the 1990s. A special law designed to tackle organised crime passed through the 
Turkish Parliament in 1998. In this regard, the use of special investigation techniques 
was allowed to detect organised crime and specialized departments were established 
in the Turkish security agencies. 
In Turkey, the construction of the perception of the threat from organised crime 
accounts for both domestic and international factors. First, on the domestic level, the 
principal formal norm - the Turkish Constitution of 1982 - obliges Governments to 
ensure the security and welfare of society and of individuals living in Turkey 
(Constitution, 1982). With reference to the Constitution, protecting citizens against 
serious crimes is perceived as an essential duty for decision makers and enforcement 
agencies of Turkey. In that sense, the fight against organised crime made it the duty 
of Turkish governments to remove the social, political and economic obstacles that 
could restrict the fundamental rights of Turkish citizens. 
Further to the constitutional norms, another domestic factor - the Susurluk road 
accident of November 1996 - has helped to construct the domestic threat perceptions 
against organised crime. The accident revealed evidence about the engagement of 
high-ranking security officials and politicians with mafia organizations. It was 
exposed by the accident that some officials, politicians and mafia members 
established a special organization for fight against the PKK. However, it was also 
revealed that they ran illicit businesses including drug trafficking, gambling, 
racketeering, intimidation etc. to make profits for themselves (Bovenkerk et al., 
2004: 585; Robins, 2008: 150). 
As a result of the revelations, mass demonstrations were organised throughout 
Turkey to complain about the state-mafia connections and the failure to tackle 
organised crime. The connections of some officials with mafia members became the 
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subject of media coverage and public criticism in the following months. In big cities, 
citizens started to tum off their residence lights for one minute at 9.00 pm every day 
to protest the state-mafia relationship in Turkey (Bovenkerk et aI., 2004: 587). This 
intense reaction aroused within civil society put organised crime onto Turkey's 
agenda as a serious threat in the following years. Consequently, the Turkish public's 
awareness of, and antipathy to, the mafia and other organised crime groups was 
increased. So, "combating organised crime groups", (Cetelerle mucadele) has been a 
motto of politicians and a priority in party programs (AK Party, 2011; Sabah, 1998). 
Second, as happened in the EU, alterations in the perception of security threats post-
cold-war have influenced threat perceptions in Turkey. Since the 1990s, transnational 
organised crime and terrorism have become the principal security threats in the 
world, as the end of cold war diminished in importance of military threats. Despite 
existence of ethnic conflict in Balkans, it was not perceived as a military threat to the 
whole Europe (Bigo, 2000: 173; Kirchner et aI., 2007: 120; Rees, 2003: 112 ). 
International Conventions, the UN, CoE, and the EU programmes on organised 
crime, money laundering, drugs, and trafficking in human beings have further 
increased domestic awareness of organised crime. Institutional interactions with the 
UN and the EU on the exchange of best practices and operational cooperation 
familiarise international cooperation among Turkish officials and brought domestic 
threat perceptions in line with the EU and UN approaches (Interview#3, 2009). 
Turkey has ratified the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime, additional protocol of 2000 to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, and the 1990 Council of 
Europe Convention on the Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime (Strasbourg Convention) and other key international 
conventions in the fight against organised crime. 
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4.4. The EU policy in the fight against organised crime 
International cooperation has been a constitutional objective in the EU since the 
Treaty of Maastricht came into force in 1993. Although the term 'organised crime' 
was not used in the Treaty, it resulted in indirect consequences for the fight against 
organised crime. Primarily, police cooperation in the EU has been an objective with 
the creation of the Third Pillar. Combating serious international crimes forms part of 
the duties of Europol within article Kl (Treaty of Maastricht, 1993). 
In the legal field progress has started since the mid 1990s. In the Dublin Council 
Summit of December 1996, the EU member states agreed to build up a common 
approach and coordinate action against transnational organised crime. As a result, 
the "EU Action Plan to combat organised crime" was adopted in April 1997 
(European Council, 1997). 
The action plan has been a milestone for future policies of the EU. The plan outlined 
30 recommendations and 15 political guidelines to strengthen cooperation against 
organised crime in the EU. Overall, this document put the emphasis on 
harmonization of the criminal law of member states and greater coordination 
between national law enforcement and judicial bodies. It also called for cooperation 
with non-member countries and other international institutions including the UN, 
Interpol, the CoE and the Financial Action Task Force. Concerning candidate states, 
an action plan called for the ratification of Council of Europe agreements and other 
relevant United Nations conventions as part of the EU acquis in combating 
transnational crime (European Council, 1997). 
Corresponding with the principles of the action plan of 1997, the European Council 
took another important step and issued a definition of organised crime with a joint 
action of 1998. In the joint action, the EU adopted the UN approach to advance the 
harmonization of criminal legislations against organised crime. Complying with the 
UN provisions on definition of organised crime, the EU joint action identified 
organised crim inals as a "structured association". established for a period of time, of 
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more than two persons, which have intention to commit offences for obtaining 
material benefits (European Council, 1998). 
In the following years, the EU approach to the fight against organised crime has 
gradually evolved to a more comprehensive mode with improvement of EU internal 
security regime. The EU policy against organised crime has been based on two 
features. First, in the legal field, the EU initiated the hannonization of the definitions 
of criminal offences and criminal procedures between member states. Binding 
regulations (framework decisions, fonnal positions and conventions) introduced in 
the period have established limits for national criminal legislation through 
maintaining minimum standards, penalties and a mutual recognition of judicial 
procedures. The EU started to set up targets to speed up the implementation of the 
EU objectives through action plans, strategies and specific programmes. 
Second, international cooperation against organised cnme has become more 
institutionalized (Longo, 2003: 158). The EU institutions Europol, Eurojust and 
CEPOL have become instruments of practical and judicial cooperation. To 
strengthen enforcement action against organised crime, Europol, and CEPOL started 
to provide assistance to member state institutions through infonnation and technical 
exchange. Besides, Eurojust has been part of judicial cooperation through the 
exchange of judicial evidence. 
As a part of the progress under AFSJ. the Council issued -'The Prevention and 
Control of Organised Crime: A Strategy for the beginning of the New Millennium"' 
in May 2000. In the strategy, the dynamic nature of organised crime groups and their 
external links outside the EU territory are pointed out. The strategy called for a 
further coordinated response from member states and listed a range of political 
guidelines and recommendations based on the principles of the Action Plan of 1997. 
The strategy underlined a multidisciplinary approach and focused on both the 
prevention of organised crime and its enforcement in the EU. The strategy invited 
national institutions to develop annual assessment reports on organised crime, the 
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exchange of information and best practices and to mcrease the effectiveness of 
Europol. 
In addition to growing security cooperation within AFSJ, the Council outlined the 
1999 Tampere, 2004 Hague and 2009 Stockholm programmes to intensify 
cooperation under JHA. In the programmes, organised crime was set as one of the 
security threats along with terrorism, illegal migration and drugs. The programmes 
introduced detailed actions and timetables to monitor the implementation of specified 
measures to combat organised crime (European Council, 2004b). 
The prevailing constituents of the ED action on organised crime were outlined in the 
Council's conclusion of 2009. According to this document, drug trafficking, 
trafficking of human beings, fraud, corruption and money laundering are considered 
as priority fields in the fight against organised crime (European Council, 2009). 
Furthermore, an increasing role of non-ED-based - particularly Russian - organised 
crime groups in criminal activities, investment of profits in Western European states, 
misuse of legal businesses and technology by organised crime groups are highlighted 
as principal focus areas for enforcement in the ED. 
Further to domestic policy-making within the ED, the external features of JHA have 
also been brought to the ED agenda since 1999. The ED policy in the fight against 
organised crime became a part of the EU's foreign policy interests in the European 
Security Strategy of 2003. In the strategy, organised crime was listed as a serious 
threat to Europe together with terrorism and regional conflicts. Cross-border 
trafficking in drugs, women, illegal immigrants and small arms were listed as 
security threats that have external links to third states (European Council, 2003c). 
4.5. Domestic dynamics of Turkey concerning the fight against 
organised crime 
The fight against organised crime in Turkey has made continuing progress since the 
late 1990s. In the legal field, the Turkish parliament passed legislation to tackle 
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different types of organised crime. The anti-organised crime law of July 1999 had 
been the backbone of Turkish anti-organised crime policy until 2005. Similar to 
international trends, the anti-organised crime law of 1999 created an increased 
number of offences for organised crime groups. The law authorized the use of special 
investigation techniques to stimulate the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies. 
Turkish governments issued a range of secondary regulations to maintain 
administrative procedures to prevent organised crime and to strengthen judicial 
procedures. Later, the Turkish Penal Code of 2005 and Code on Criminal Procedures 
of 2005 revised the anti -organised crime law of 1999. The updated legislation has 
extended the scope of organised crime offences and made use of special investigation 
techniques to combat various forms of organised crime offences. 
International cooperation against transnational organised crime represents one of the 
dynamics within the fight against organised crime. Organised crime groups tend to 
use the new trends of globalisation to establish cross-border alliances with other 
criminal groups. Parallel with the increasing economic and social interactions 
between states, organised crime groups use different regions of the world to carry out 
their criminal activities. In that sense, due to its geographical location between Asia 
and Europe, Turkey has been a convenient destination for transnational criminal 
groups (KOM, 2006). Drugs, small arms, human traffickers and illegal immigrant 
smuggling groups are active across Turkey's borders. Turkey has also been a 
destination country for trafficking in human beings sourced from post-Soviet 
countries. Thus, international cooperation against transnational organised crime 1S 
perceived as an element of Turkey's anti-organised crime policy. 
Over the period, Turkey has ratified the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime additional protocol to 'prevent, suppress and punish 
trafficking in persons, especially women and children' in 2003; the Council of 
Europe Convention: 'laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds 
from crime' (Strasbourg Convention) in 2001; and other key international 
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conventions in the fight against organised crime. It has also concluded mutual 
agreements with more than 70 countries on internal security. 
Turkey maintains cooperation with the UN, EU, and CoE against cross-border crimes 
(MfA, 2011). Specifically, since the start of Turkey's candidacy in 1999, EU 
institutions and member states have established various programmes to bring the 
fight against organised crime in Turkey into line with EU practices. A strategic 
agreement between the Europol and Turkey came into force in July 2004. Turkish 
and member state law enforcement agencies have also intensified operational 
cooperation to tackle cross-border organised crime groups. 
In addition, Turkey cooperates with international orgamsations to prevent organised 
crime. The Anti-smuggling and Organised Crime Department of the Turkish 
National Police (KOM) works as one of the key institutions to implement UN 
programmes in Turkey. In this respect, the Turkish International Academy against 
Drugs and Organised Crime (T ADOC) was founded in 2000 as a common project of 
Turkey and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (UNODC, 
2000). UN programmes carried out in collaboration with T ADOC organize training 
for both Turkish and neighbouring countries' law enforcement officials for capacity 
development. 
To prevent trafficking in human beings, Turkey has been a member of the 
International Organisation for Migration (10M) since November 2004 and maintains 
international cooperation with countries that are the source of trafficking in human 
beings. Turkey undertakes a range of programmes and common projects with the EU 
and 10M to accelerate alignment with the EU and increase public awareness about 
people-trafficking (10M, 2010). 
Furthermore, in the fight against money laundering, Turkey is involved in FATF 
programmes and has cooperated with the EGMONT Group since the late 1990s. 
EGMONT Group was founded in 1995 as an informal organization to facilitate 
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international cooperation between financial intelligence units of the states. It holds 
regular meetings for information exchange, training and for exchange of expertise 
between national financial intelligence units. With involvement in the activities of 
FATF and EGMONT the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) of Turkey 
under Ministry of Finance undertakes international cooperation against money 
laundering (MASAK, 2008: 25). 
Due to the complex characteristics of organised crime, the institutional setting in 
Turkey comprises a range of public institutions. Police and gendarme forces, customs 
authorities, the National Intelligence Service (MIT), MASAK, the Turkish 
Communication Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and judicial authorities are 
the domestic institutions that deal with organised crime. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish National Police so-called Directorate General of Security 
(EGM) under the Ministry of the Interior is the central law-enforcement organization 
tackling organised crime in Turkey. The EGM has a specialized central branch in 
Ankara and local units in all provinces of Turkey to focus exclusively on organised 
cnme. The special branch in Ankara - the so-called Anti-smuggling and Organised 
Crime Department (KOM) - was founded in February 1998. This unit has sub 
divisions that have expertise in narcotics, smuggling, financial crimes, and cyber 
crimes. In total, the KOM has 6,500 personnel, including its local units. The KOM 
also has a training department (T ADOC) that provides education about organised 
crime for officials of national and international law enforcement agencies. 
In rural areas, the General Command of the Gendarmerie is the law enforcement 
institution responsible for dealing with organised crime. It was founded in 1983 and 
is affiliated to the Ministry of the Interior. Similar to the institutional structure of the 
EGM the General Command of the Gendarmerie has an anti-smuggling and , 
organised crime division and a narcotic crimes department. It has local units in 81 
provinces of Turkey with 817 officers in total. 
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The Turkish Coast Guard and Customs authorities also have enforcement duties in 
the fight against organised crime. The Turkish Coast Guard Command functioning 
under the Ministry of the Interior has responsibility for enforcement along the coast 
of Turkey (JGK, 2009). Customs authorities in this regard are also mandated to take 
necessary measures against illicit trafficking. 
In addition to law enforcement institutions, the MASAK founded in 1997, works 
exclusively in the fight against money laundering. It examines suspicious 
transactions to identify money laundering and supports judicial procedures. MASAK 
also conducts research into trends of laundering the proceeds of crime, and on the 
methods of detecting and preventing them. In consequence, it contributes to the 
development of policies and strategies to prevent money laundering and terrorist 
financing (MASAK, 2011). 
4.6. Accession conditionality concerning the fight against 
organised crime in Turkey 
The EU conditionality in the fight against organised crime in Turkey has been in 
place since 1999. The conditionality maintained over the period concentrated on 
three issue areas: legal alignment with EU acquis, institutional capacity development 
and international cooperation with EU institutions and member states in combating 
organised crime. 
In the legal field, the accession conditions concerning organised crime comprise the 
ratification of key conventions and the adoption of the EU acquis. UN Conventions 
and CoE conventions to prevent organised crime are considered as being within the 
EU's legal framework. At the institutional level, the EU requirements emphasize the 
development of administrative structures, coordination between national institutions 
and the technical expertise among security agencies and judicial authorities to further 
the fight against organised crime. Finally, the conditions for international 
cooperation put forward requirements to prepare suitable grounds for the exchange of 
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information for operational purposes. Cooperation on organised crime also comprises 
exchange of best practices at the technical level. 
The European Council endorsed the first Accession Partnership (AP) document in 
March 2001 and laid down principles, priorities, and intermediate objectives for 
Turkey in the fight against organised crime. In the short term, the AP of 2001 
emphasized the need for stronger enforcement against organised crime and money 
laundering. In the medium term, the 2001 AP underlined the adoption and 
implementation of the EU acquis and the intensification of international cooperation 
(European Council, 2001). Later, the Council endorsed a revised Accession 
Partnership in May 2003, for the period 2003-2004. In the revised AP, the EU 
counted the fight against organised crime, drugs, trafficking in persons, fraud, 
corruption and money-laundering as particular offences to be dealt with. It asked for 
legal alignment, institutional capacity development and international cooperation as 
short- and medium-term priorities (European Council, 2003a). 
After the start of accession negotiations in 2005, the European Council endorsed the 
third AP for Turkey in January 2006. In this document, Turkey was called upon to 
adopt a national strategy on organised crime, strengthen enforcement measures 
against drugs, trafficking in persons, fraud, corruption and money-laundering as 
short-term priorities. In the medium term, the EU called for the protection of the 
EU's financial interests. It underlined the need to adopt and implement the acquis in 
the fields of corruption, the fight against drugs, organised crime, money laundering 
and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters (European Council, 2006). 
Following the change in financial instruments used to assist candidate states, the 
Council endorsed a final AP document in February 2008 which asked for the 
implementation of a national strategy on organised crime and a stronger fight against 
organised crime, drugs, trafficking in persons, fraud, corruption and money-
laundering (European Council, 2008a). 
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Further to the AP documents, the European Commission has prepared annual 
progress reports on meeting the EU's conditions. Overall, progress reports pointed to 
the need to strengthen efforts against organised crime through legislative alignment, 
capacity development and with cooperation between domestic and international law-
enforcement agencies. On the fight against organised crime and trafficking in human 
beings, the reports underlined the need for ratification of UN Conventions and the 
criminalization of trafficking in human beings under the Turkish Penal Code 
(European Commission, 1999). Progress reports addressed the development of the 
technical and forensic investigation capacities of Turkish security bodies (European 
Commission, 2002, 2003). In the field of money laundering, progress reports asked 
Turkey to sign CoE agreements and to comply with F ATF recommendations to 
criminalize the proceeds of crimes in Turkish criminal law. Progress reports pointed 
to the need for a revision of the banking law and capacity development for the 
MASAK (European Commission, 2004b, 2005b). Further to legal and structural 
issues, progress reports addressed the necessity of cooperation between national 
institutions. In this sense, the Commission required the adoption of a national 
strategy and action plans on different forms of organised crime. At the international 
level, cooperation between Turkish institutions, the EU and UN bodies as well as 
with CoE, F ATF and the 10M, were also emphasized as a requirement. 
Table: EU requirements in AP documents linked with the fight against organised crime 
Task to be undertaken Document Date and Timescale 
Enhance the fight against organised crime, drugs trafficking 200 1 Accession 
and corruption and strengthen capacities to deal with money partnership - Short Term 
laundering. 
Adopt and implement the EU acquis in the field of corruption, 200 1 Accession 
the fight against drugs, organised crime, money laundering partnership - Medium Term 
and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters; further 
intensify international cooperation in those fields. 
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Continue to strengthen the fight against organised cnme, 2003 Accession 
drugs, trafficking in persons, fraud, corruption and money- partnership - Short Term 
laundering, particularly through legislative alignment, 
improved administrative capacity and enhanced cooperation 
between different law-enforcement bodies, in line with EU 
standards. 
Adopt and implement the acquis in the fields of the criminal 2003 Accession 
law, protection of the Euro and of the Community's financial partnership -Medium Term 
interests and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters 
as well as the fight against corruption, drugs, organised crime 
and money-laundering. Further increase administrative 
capacity, cooperation between the different law enforcement 
bodies and intensify international cooperation in these fields. 
Adopt and implement a national strategy on organised crime. 2006 Accession 
Strengthen the fight against organised crime, drugs, Partnership -Short Tenn 
trafficking in persons, fraud, corruption and money-
laundering. 
Adopt and implement the acquis in the fields of corruption, 2006 Accession 
the fight against drugs, organised crime, money laundering, Partnership -Medium Tenn 
and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, criminal 
law protection of the Euro and of the Community's financial 
interests. 
Implement the national strategy on organised cnme. 2008 Accession 
Strengthen the fight against organised crime, drugs, Partnership -Short Tenn 
trafficking in persons, fraud, corruption and money-
laundering. 
4.7. Outcome: Assessment of the EU's involvement 
In the following sections, the influence of the EU in combating organised crime in 
Turkey is scrutinized across three periods. The first phase covers the period from 
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1987, when Turkey made an official membership application to the ED, to 1999, 
when the Helsinki Council admitted Turkey as a candidate state. The second phase 
covers the period from 1999 to 2005 in which the ED initiated structured relations 
with Turkey through conditionality and started accession negotiations in 2005. The 
last phase covers the period from 2005 to 2010 in which accession negotiations were 
maintained. In these selected periods, the study considers four selected variables to 
identify causal relationships between domestic transition and EU conditionality. 
Table: Mediating factors of domestic transition and the outcome 
Period 1987-1999 1999-2005 2005-2009 
Low (Lack of High (Accession High (Accession 
Determinacy of conditionality, limited Partnership Partnership 
the EU progress in the EU Documents, progress Documents, progress 
requirements against organised reports, assessment reports) 
crime) visits) 
Low (No membership High (Candidacy, Low (Uncertainty on 
Credibility of perspective and other delivery of financial delivery of EU 
conditionality incenti ves) assistance, promises, Cyprus 
institutional links) issue) 
Low (due to benefits Low (due to benefits Low (due to benefits 
Domestic of internal security of internal security of internal security 
adaptation costs cooperation and cooperation and cooperation and 
financial assistance) financial assistance) financial assistance) 
High (Formal norms, High (Formal norms, 
Convergence of Low (No concrete Susurluk incident, Susurluk incident, 
threat policy yet, developing institutional institutional 
perceptions threat perceptions in interactions with EU, interactions with EU, 
between Turkey Turkey and in the EU) relations with UN, relations with UN, 
and the EU CoE, FATF, rOM) CoE, FATF, 10M) 
Outcome No policy outcome Compliance Compliance 
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Phase 1: 1987-1999 
Due to the geographical proximity of Turkey, between Asia and Europe, Turkey has 
been used as a convenient hub for cross-border criminal activities for many decades. 
Not only foreign offenders but also Turkish criminal groups carry out cross-border 
human and arms trafficking, money laundering, fraud and counterfeit money crimes, 
using the same route since the early 1980s. However, organised crime was not seen 
as a particular concern in Turkey until the end of 1990s, although it has been used as 
an active location for cross-border criminal networks. 
It was confirmed by a high-ranking security official in Turkey that, 
"due to the significant increase in terrorism throughout the 1990s. 
Turkish security agencies concentrated on countering terrorism. 
Enforcement against serious crimes had been perceived as a secondary 
problem within Turkey's internal security policy. Therefore. human and 
technical resources of Turkish security agencies were not allocated on 
fight against drug trafficking, organised crime or other cross border 
crimes" (Interview#5, 2010). 
Terrorism was perceived as the principal security challenge in Turkey over this 
period. Extreme law enforcement measures were adopted in the fight against the 
PKK. Therefore, a concrete policy against organised crime was not constructed until 
the end of the 1990s. 
Increasing terrorist attacks and counter terrorism measures, mainly implemented by 
the Turkish military until the end of 1990s, prepared suitable grounds for 
Turkish/Kurdish kin-based organised crime groups in Southeast Turkey (Robins, 
2002: 635). State repression and instability have been driving forces for the 
development of organised crime networks in the region. 
99 
To fight against the PKK, members of some local clans were employed as 
paramilitary forces (Village Guards). These paramilitary forces from local clans were 
enabled to perform enforcement duty against the PKK. Having links with the security 
forces, they were granted a level of immunity in their regions. Accordingly, some of 
the village guards abused their powers and started to conduct illicit businesses 
(Cumhuriyet, 2004). Empowered clan members and corrupt security officials became 
involved in anns smuggling, drug trafficking and heroin manufacturing (UNODC, 
2000). For instance, a criminal organization, the so-called Yuksekova Gang, was 
revealed in 1996. A group of village guards, security officials and PKK informers 
were associated with counter terrorism whilst also being engaged in drug trafficking 
in addition to their "official" duties (Milliyet, 2010). 
Mafia groups in the big cities of Turkey also established links with some officials 
and politicians over the 1990s. Having connections with politicians and senior 
security officials, some Turkish mafia groups expanded their effectiveness until the 
end of 1990s. "Mafia" or so called "underworld" criminal organizations had engaged 
in a wide range of illicit businesses including, racketeering, gambling, intimidation, 
drug and arms trading, corruption and tax fraud crimes. For instance, uncovering of 
Soylemez Brothers gang in 1998 exposed the links between senior officials, an MP, 
and some judges. 25 Members of this gang were arrested on suspicion of murders, 
extortion, drug and arms trafficking (Gunter, 1998: 127; Radikal, 1999). 
Instability and state repression in Southeast Turkey also had negative consequences 
for European states concerning organised crime. Tensions in Turkey had led to an 
increase in the number of asylum seekers and immigrants in European states where, 
due to social and economic disadvantages, an unskilled immigrant community lived 
on low incomes and in poor living conditions. Over the time, cultural differences 
induced some of these immigrants to become involved in organised crime (Paoli et 
aI., 2008: 22). Eventually, Turkish and Kurdish family-based groups started to 
dominate the heroin trade and trafficking of human beings in Europe (Europol, 2008: 
21,34,39). 
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In the period, the influence of the EU in the fight against organised crime was absent 
because of two underlying reasons. First, before 1999, the EU had not yet developed 
a specific organised crime policy. The first concrete attempt to advance EU 
cooperation against organised crime had been the adoption of an action plan against 
organised crime in 1997. Later, in 1998, the European Council began joint action on 
the definition of organised crime and requested member states to adopt a common 
definition for organised crime to make use of the legal instruments against it. 
However, due to slow progress in the implementation of JHA instruments, the EU 
policy against organised crime had remained superficial until the Treaty of 
Amsterdam came into force in 1999. 
The second reason that accounts for the lack of influence of the EU on Turkey before 
1999 is the absence of a structured relationship between the EU and Turkey. The 
relationship between Turkey and the EU was not based on inclusive grounds until the 
Helsinki Council decision of 1999. Since Turkey was not admitted as a candidate 
state until 1999, the EU did not set out membership conditions for Turkey. 
Consequently, the engagement of the EU in Turkey'S domestic policy-making 
remained limited. 
The Customs Union agreement of 1996 and the EU assistance to maintain economic 
relations with Turkey had partly convinced Turkish governments to comply with 
certain EU demands over the period. However, the EU requirements during that 
period concentrated on Turkey's human rights records and asked for revisions in its 
counter terrorism strategy. The EU did not ask for a specific requirement for internal 
security cooperation against organised crime. Accordingly, the EU was not able to 
engage with the development of Turkey's anti-organised crime policy until 1999. 
In the period, domestic dynamics in Turkey initiated the perception of threat from 
organised crime. Disclosure of a mafia-state relationship with a car accident 
happened in 1996 has been an important factor in the development of the domestic 
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perception of organised crime (Robins, 2002: 637). The Turkish Interior Minister 
resigned because of his alleged links with the criminal gang unearthed with the 
accident. 
Soon after, the Turkish Parliament established a special commission to investigate 
associations with criminal organizations and to prevent the rise of organised crime in 
Turkey (TBMM, 1997). Parallel with the fmdings of the commission, the 
government prepared a draft bill in 1998 in the fight against organised crime. 
Gambling and casinos were banned in Turkey. Security officials linked with 
organised crime were dismissed from their official duties. A specialized branch 
dealing exclusively with organised crime was established under the Turkish National 
Police in 1998. Later the Anti-Organised Crime Law no 4422 was approved by the 
parliament in July 1999. This law provided a definition of organised crime as a 
structured and hierarchical organization which aims to get profit from illicit activities 
through the use of power and intimidation and introduced enforcement measures to 
dissolve such organizations. The law introduced a penalty of up to 8 years for 
founders and members. It permitted law enforcement agencies to intercept telephone 
calls, engage in surveillance and use under-cover agents with the consent of a court. 
However, since the government did not adopt secondary regulations to allow the use 
of special investigation techniques to detect organised crime groups, implementation 
of the legal measures was hampered until 2000. 
In addition to domestic dynamics, interactions with international initiatives had 
started domestic developments against transnational crime. Turkey's membership of 
the FA TF against money laundering in 1991 and interactions with the UN against 
drugs stimulated progress against drug trafficking and money laundering in Turkey. 
Under the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), Turkey has provided 
training programmes on the enforcement of action against illicit drugs to the law 
enforcement agencies of Central Asian countries since 1998 (UNCT, 2001: 28). 
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As a result of intensifying relations with the UN since the mid-1990s, Turkey ratified 
the 1988 United Nations Convention against illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances in 1996. Soon after, the Turkish government adopted a 
regulation in December 1997 to allow "controlled delivery" operations against drug-
trafficking. In order to discover the perpetrators or evidence of criminal activity, 
Turkish law enforcement agencies are authorized to allow trafficking of illicit goods 
and their assets until it reaches its target. The controlled delivery regulation 
authorizes the Directorate General of Security (Turkish Police Agency), 
Gendarmerie, Coast Guard, and Customs Enforcement agencies to perform 
operations at national and international levels. Concerning national and international 
collaboration, the regulation underlines communication and mutual understanding 
between agencies rather than establishing a mechanism (Council of Ministers, 1997). 
In the field of money laundering, Turkey's membership of the Financial Action Task 
Force (F ATF) in 1991 has led to the development of domestic policies. However, 
under Turkey's criminal legislation, money laundering was not described as an 
offence until the mid 1990s. The Turkish Parliament passed a law on the prevention 
of money laundering in November 1996 and recognized it as an offence. The 
MASAK was established in 1997 under the Ministry of Finance to monitor 
transactions linked with laundering the proceeds of crime. MASAK became a 
member of the EGMONT Group in 1998 and intensified international cooperation 
against money laundering through information exchange, training and sharing of 
expertise. However, in fact, international cooperation in combating money 
laundering remained superficial until 1999, as Turkey did not ratify the Council of 
Europe and UN conventions on money laundering. 
In brief, domestic pressures on the Turkish government after the Susurluk accident of 
1996, initiated the threat perceptions on organised crime in the late 1990s. As a result 
of increasing domestic pressures after the Susurluk, the Government passed the Anti-
Organised-Crime Law no 4422 in July 1999. A specialised department was formed 
under the Turkish National Police in 1998. However, the implementation of legal 
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measures remained limited as the Government did not adopt administrative 
procedures to strengthen the effectiveness of enforcement. Turkey also did not ratify 
key international conventions on money laundering in this period. 
Phase 2: 1999-2005 
Turkey was officially declared to be a candidate state in the Helsinki Council of 1999 
and EU-Turkish relations then moved onto a more complex basis. Along with other 
candidate states, Turkey was granted the benefit of pre-accession financial assistance 
and allowed to join EU programmes and agencies (European Council, 1999a). 
Subsequently, with the start of its candidacy and with the delivery of EU financial 
assistance, the credibility of conditionality was substantially increased in Turkey 
(Keyman et at., 2007: 71). 
With the endorsement of the Accession Partnership documents of 2001 and 2003, the 
EU formally set out conditions for Turkey'S accession. Further to the Accession 
Partnership documents, the European Commission started to monitor Turkey's 
progress with respect to EU requirements. Thus, the EU has been able to engage with 
the domestic security policy of Turkey on a wide range of issues since 1999. 
Although conditionality mainly focused on the implementation of political criteria 
throughout the period from 1999 to 2005, implementation of the JHA acquis and 
institutional capacity development to prevent transnational organised crime was also 
included in the accession conditions for Turkey. 
It was pointed out by an interviewee from the European Commission that; 
"Turkey's cooperation with the EU is important to increase the 
effectiveness of combating organised crime in Europe. First, Turkey's 
geographical location makes internal security cooperation crucial for the 
EU. Turkey has common borders with two EU member states. It locates 
on the Balkan trafficking route and is used as a hub for cross-border 
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criminal activities targeting Europe from the East. Second, in Europe 
there is a huge Turkish immigrant community which has close 
relationship with their relatives in Turkey. It is a known that some 
Turkish nationals resident in the EU member states are involved in illicit 
businesses and have active participation in kin-based organised crime 
groups located in Turkey and in Europe" (Interview#8, 2011). 
In that sense, the EU requirements in the fight against organised crime comprised a 
wide range of issues. In the AP documents of 2001 and 2003, the EU put an 
emphasis on the adoption of the EU acquis and international conventions as well as 
institutional capacity development related to drugs trafficking, corruption, fraud, 
trafficking in persons and money laundering as short-term priorities under JHA 
(European Council, 2001, 2003a). 
In the initial stage of the candidacy process, an assessment visit took place to Turkey 
in September 2000 to identify Turkey's competence and deficits in the field of lHA. 
The assessment was performed across five issue areas including organised crime, 
asylum, migration, border management and police cooperation and training. The EU 
experts held meetings with Turkish security officials to elaborate on the state of play 
in Turkey'S fight against organised crime (Maffre, 2001: 40). 
During this visit, attention was paid to drugs trafficking, money laundering and 
trafficking in human beings as priority areas for combating organised crime. In the 
final report of the visit, it was concluded that the long borders of Turkey with the 
East and West, as well as the difficult geographical characteristics of Turkey, made it 
difficult to prevent cross-border crime effectively. Additionally, technical 
weaknesses and limited coordination between national institutions constrained 
enforcement. However, Turkish security agencies tended to show willingness to 
advance cooperation with EU agencies and member states. The report recommended 
that the EU should address institutional deficiencies within Turkey and provide 
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assistance to strengthen the effectiveness of enforcement of the fight against 
organised crime (Maffre, 2001: 51). 
The assessment visit was the first concrete step in the development of internal 
security cooperation between the EU and Turkey. Parallel with the suggestions raised 
in the assessment visit, the EU began various training programmes for Turkish 
officials and endorsed pre-accession fmancial assistance in 2002. Until 2005, four 
Twinning projects were initiated to assist combating organised crime in Turkey 
(ABGS, 2008). These projects concerned action on organised crime, drugs 
trafficking, money laundering and human trafficking. Overall, the projects were 
designed to advance the law enforcement capacity of Turkey and the implementation 
of the EU acquis. Relevant domestic institutions and member state agencies gathered 
to share best practices to increase the effectiveness of Turkish institutions. 
Programmes also introduced legal aspects of the EU approach in the fight against 
organised crime and promoted alignment with the EU acquis (Interview#4, 2010). 
The EU assistance programmes established under JHA were used as important 
instruments to line up domestic security policy of Turkey. Exchange of best practices 
through mutual study visits and training programmes supported by the EU raised 
awareness in combating organised crime among Turkish officials and helped the 
domestic threat perception of Turkey to resonate with the EU approach. Specifically, 
twinning programmes performed with the participation of EU member state 
institutions increased the legitimacy of EU practices among Turkish officials 
(Kirisci, 2007: 14). Consequently, EU requirements asked for Turkey'S alignment in 
combating organised crime were seen as appropriate by Turkey's decision makers 
and domestic institutions. 
In addition to being compatible with Turkey's threat perceptions, the EU 
requirements on organised crime were considered as rational by decision makers in 
Turkey. While Turkey was admitted as a candidate state, anticipation of receiving 
the benefits of EU membership increased greatly in Turkey. Decision makers in 
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Turkey in that period were eager to anchor institutional links with EU agencies to 
deepen relations with the EU. Officials in the Ministry of the Interior were also 
willing to establish institutional links with EU agencies. 
The EU conditionality on organised cnme was not confronted by domestic 
opposition in this period. It was considered by Turkish security officials that, 
"Turkey will be able to advance law enforcement against transnational 
crime, if it establishes institutional links with EU agencies and acquires 
EU assistance" (Interview#l, 2009; Interview#6, 2010). 
As a result of positive conditions for alignment, the anti-organised crime policy of 
Turkey has made gradual progress since the early 2000s. The ANASOL-M Coalition 
Government issued a regulation in January 2000 to set up administrative procedures 
for the surveillance of organised crime groups. Corresponding with the law in the 
fight against organised crime of 1999, the regulation set up administrative procedures 
and conditions for the use of surveillance, interception of communication and the use 
of secret agents to detect and investigate organised crime groups. 
After the elections of November 2002, the Justice and Development Party has 
intensified efforts to comply with EU requirements on organised crime. Turkey 
ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (the Palermo 
Convention) in January 2003; the UN Convention against Corruption was signed in 
December 2003 and the CoE Convention against Corruption was ratified in January 
2004. Turkey has also joined the Council of Europe's Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO) in 2004. 
The Turkish Penal Code and code on criminal procedures were updated in June 
2005. New procedures were introduced to tackle organised crime. Inspired by the EU 
provisions, the new legislation extended the scope of organised crime offences and 
the use of special investigation techniques by law enforcement agencies. 
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In addition to legal developments, capacity development and institutional 
cooperation with the EU was intensified in this period. Anti-smuggling and 
organised crime departments were established under the Gendarme General 
Command in 2001. Gendarme forces were authorized to detect and investigate 
organised crime groups in rural areas where police forces do not exist. With the 
participation of relevant domestic institutions, a study group was established in 2004 
to coordinate national institutions in the fight against organised crime. Members of 
relevant public institutions gathered to coordinate enforcement practices and to 
prepare a national strategy against organised crime. 
Regarding international cooperation, the Directorate General for Security (EGM) -
Turkish police organization- under the Ministry of the Interior was authorized to 
cooperate with Europol. Representatives from the EGM participated in a meeting 
with Europol in April 2000 as a first step of cooperation. Europol established a 
Liaison Office in 2003 in the Headquarters of the EGM in Ankara. Later, Turkey and 
Europol signed a strategic cooperation agreement in 2004. In this context, Europol 
has started to provide technical assistance to the Turkish police in the fight against 
organised crime. 
Along with the launch of structured relations with the EU, financial and technical 
assistance has been allocated under the EU's pre-accession financial programme of 
2002. In this regard, a twinning project on organised crime was started in 2004 to 
advance Turkey's legal and institutional alignment with the EU in the fight against 
organised crime. Throughout the project, training seminars were given to officials of 
the EGM, the Ministry of Justice, the General Command of the Gendarmerie, Coast 
Guard Command and the Under-secretary of the Customs (ABGS, 2008). 
A senior official at the Ministry of Interior in Turkey pointed out in an interview that, 
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'The organised crime twinning project allowed exchange of best practice 
between Turkish security agencies, judicial authorities and their 
European counterparts. Training programmes focused on the use of 
special investigation surveillance techniques, interception of 
communication, the use of secret agents, intelligence analysis, witness 
protection and prevention of corruption to increase the effectiveness of 
Turkey's institutional infrastructure (Interview#7, 2010)". 
As a part of Turkey's organised cnme policy, transition In domestic policy 
concerning the fight against money laundering had been an EU requirement in this 
period. However, Turkey's progress against money laundering had been relatively 
slow until 2003. The EU requirements in that phase comprised revision of the 
definition of laundering crimes in the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering 
of 1996, to conform to FA TF recommendations, and institutional capacity 
development to investigate and prosecute money laundering (European Commission, 
2002, 2003, 2004b). 
Turkey had signed the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on the Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Strasbourg 
Convention) in September 2001. It was ratified by the Turkish Parliament in June 
2004. With the entry into force of the Turkish Penal Code in June 2005, Turkey 
changed the money laundering legislation of 1996. Corresponding with the EU 
practice, the new penal code has introduced toughened confiscation provisions for 
money laundering. The new penal code of 2005 has authorized law enforcement 
agencies to use special investigation techniques for the detection and investigation of 
money laundering. 
Apart from legal adjustments, the Turkish government extended the mandate of the 
MASAK to comply with EU requirements and FATF recommendations. With a 
government decree adopted in November 2002, financial institutions were obliged to 
appoint a coordinator to report suspicious transactions to MASAK. Additionally, 
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MASAK was allowed to request documents and information from fmancial 
institutions without any secrecy limitations. However, the technical and 
administrative capacity of MASAK still needed to be improved throughout the 
period. Therefore, a twinning project was approved by the Commission to be started 
in 2006 under the EU pre-accession fmancial assistance programme of2003. 
Turkey is one of the destination countries for victims of human trafficking (Harrison, 
2007: 2). However, trafficking in human beings was not considered as a specific 
offence before 2002. Parallel with intensifying relations with the EU, the fight 
against trafficking in human beings became part of Turkey's internal security policy 
as a new security challenge (MfA, 2006). In Turkey, this phenomenon is frequently 
seen as the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation. In many cases it was 
revealed by Turkish security agencies that, 
"organised crime groups employ women workers from Ukraine, Russia, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Romania to work in legitimate 
businesses in Turkey. However, these persons are then intimidated and 
forced into prostitution" (Interview#6, 2010). 
Trafficking in human beings became a criminal offence by an amendment made to 
the Turkish Penal Code in 2002. Corresponding with the EU requirements, offenders 
involved in human trafficking became liable to imprisonment for from 5 to 10 years. 
Later, Turkey ratified the Additional Protocol of the UN Palermo Convention to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and 
Children, in March 2003. With a law adopted in 2003, foreign workers were required 
to obtain work permits to prevent illegal employment and forced labour. 
Furthermore, in 2003, Turkey adopted its first strategy in combating trafficking in 
human beings. Parallel with the 2005 EU strategy on Human Trafficking, the 
minimum penalty for human trafficking crimes was raised to 8 years in the new 
penal code of 2005. In the Criminal Procedure Law of 2005, law enforcement 
110 
agencies were entitled to apply undercover investigation and surveillance methods in 
the fight against the trafficking of human beings. 
Due to the transnational nature of the trafficking in human beings, Turkey has also 
intensified international cooperation with third countries and international 
organizations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was appointed as the principal 
institution to maintain coordination at the international level. As of 2003, Turkey 
signed a cooperation agreement with Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Moldova, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
in the fight against human trafficking. Turkey has been a member of the 10M since 
November 2004. 
In brief, the start of Turkey's candidacy in 1999 and its benefits increased domestic 
support for policy change among senior officials in public institutions. Compatible 
threat perceptions between the EU and Turkey over the fight against organised crime 
have further facilitated the adoption of the EU requirements. The EU acquis in the 
fight against organised crime had been taken as a suitable framework to fix the 
deficits of Turkish anti-organised crime policy. Although some delays happened in 
the fight against money laundering, Turkey had complied with the EU requirements 
from 1999 to 2005 for the fight against transnational organised crime. 
Phase 3: 2005-2010 
After Turkey fulfilled the political conditions of the EU, accession negotiations 
began in 2005. In this phase, the EU clarified the accession requirements through 
Accession Partnership documents and progress reports. The EU conditionality was 
revised through the Accession Partnership Documents of 2006 and 2008. Overall, the 
EU requirements in that phase comprised the need for the adoption of the EU acquis, 
capacity development and internal security cooperation for the enforcement of 
measures against organised crime (European Council, 2006; European Council, 
2008a). 
III 
On the other hand, the credibility of conditionality has declined since 2005 because 
of two underlying factors. First, controversy in the EU over Turkey's accession 
resulted in uncertainty in Turkey about the possibility of EU accession. It was 
claimed by Germany and France that Turkey's membership of the EU would result 
an immigration flow into Western European countries which would be detrimental to 
cultural integration (Onis et aI., 2009: 14; Pahre et aI., 2009: 360). This issue was 
also reflected in official documents of the EU. In the opening statement of the 
European Council and Commission proposals on starting negotiations with Turkey, 
the negotiation process is described as an "open-ended process" and a long period 
was foreseen before the conclusion of negotiations (European Commission, 2004a; 
European Council, 2005a). The documents also touched upon the EU's absorption 
capacity as a pre-condition for the admission of new member states. It was argued 
that the EU may not be able to absorb Turkey because of its population, geographical 
size and cultural differences. Although absorption capacity is counted as one of the 
conditions in the Copenhagen Criteria, it has not been a matter for an accession state 
before (Kirisci, 2007: 8). 
Second, the accession of Cyprus to the EU and the isolation of North Cyprus further 
increased controversy with the EU. Turkey refused to open harbours to Cypriot 
vessels unless the isolation of North Cyprus was abandoned. Subsequently, the 
negotiation process was suspended in 8 chapters as Turkish harbours remained 
closed to Cypriot vessels. Parallel with increasing tensions and uncertainty in Turkey 
over the delivery of EU promises, alignment with the EU slowed down in many other 
policy domains. Only one chapter of the negotiations was concluded in the period 
from 2005 to 2010. An official from the European Commission commented about the 
situation that, 
"In recent years, overall progress in Turkey is far below the EU 
requirements. It seems that Turkey do not want to be a member of the EU 
anymore (Interview#8, 2011). 
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Although, the progress is slow in many policy domains, Turkey has continued to 
comply with the EU acquis and practices in the fight against organised crime. Cyprus 
and other political problems did not overshadow security cooperation between the 
EU and Turkey on organised crime. An official from the European Commission DG 
Enlargement claimed that; 
"Political debate between Turkey and the EU did not have negative 
implications for rnA issues. Credible EU policies are crucial for 
successfully accomplishing domestic change in candidate states, but in 
the field of JHA, security priorities are also important. Although political 
problems exist between the EU and Turkey, both parties could always 
find suitable grounds for internal security cooperation" (Interview#9, 
2011). 
Despite the decline in the credibility smce 2005, convergence of the threat 
perceptions between Turkey and the EU on fight against organised crime has been 
the driving factor for compliance with the EU requirements. In annual threat 
assessment reports from Turkish security agencies and in official documents issued 
since 2005, organised crime is addressed as an important threat to the legal economy 
and public order. In the Turkish Organised Crime Strategy of 2007, alignment with 
EU practices and international cooperation were established as strategic objectives 
for combating organised crime in Turkey. In the strategy, compliance with the EU 
provisions and international cooperation is given as one of the strategic objectives 
(KOM, 2008, 2010). 
Since security officials contribute to the policy-making process in Turkey through 
consultation mechanisms and assessment reports, adoption of the EU requirements 
and international cooperation with the EU member states were not confronted by 
opposition. As the officials in Turkish security agencies considered alignment with 
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the EU requirements and institutional cooperation as an advantage to Improve 
internal security in Turkey (Interview#l, 2009; Interview#6, 2010). 
The first strategy of Turkey to tackle organised crune was approved by the 
Government in February 2007. It was prepared to cover a period from February 2007 
to the end of 2009. The narrative of the strategy included compliance with the EU 
practices as one of the main objectives. In a legal context, the strategy suggested the 
harmonization of criminal law to strengthen deterrence and the capabilities of law 
enforcement to prevent organised crime. Concerning enforcement, the strategy 
emphasized national and international coordination between law enforcement units 
and the extension of liaison offices in European countries and within Europol. It 
underlined the need for specialized training for public prosecutors and other judicial 
authorities to strengthen the effectiveness of judicial procedures (Interview#4, 2010). 
Corresponding with the objectives outlined in the strategy, the Turkish government 
passed an anti-smuggling law in March 2007. The new law has introduced a penalty 
of up to five years imprisonment for offenders engaged in illicit trafficking and 
increased sanctions for members of organised crime groups. It permitted the Turkish 
Coast Guard and Customs Authorities to use controlled delivery operations to 
investigate cross-border trafficking activities. Concomitantly, the Turkish 
government revised the 1996 controlled delivery regulation in April 2008. The 
regulation established procedures for coordination between national law enforcement 
agencies during controlled delivery operations. Furthermore, witness protection law 
was passed by parliament in January 2008 to strengthen the effectiveness of judicial 
procedures against organised crime. The law set up procedures to protect the identity 
and guarantee the safety of witnesses during criminal procedures. 
New steps were also taken to strengthen institutional structures in combating 
organised crime. The Turkish Telecommunication agency was appointed as the 
coordinating institution in 2008 to monitor and supervise the technical surveillance 
activities of law enforcement bodies. A witness protection department was 
114 
established under the National Police Agency in 2008 and had been extended to sixty 
provinces of Turkey by 2010. A special National Police unit to investigate criminal 
proceedings of organised crime and smuggling was established in 2008. 
The government then approved a second strategy and action plan in 2010 after the 
conclusion of Turkey's first strategy in 2009. The strategy identified Turkey's 
priorities for combating organised crime for the period from 2010 to 2015. Similar 
with the first strategy, the new strategy emphasized alignment with the ED as one of 
the strategic objectives. 
International cooperation against organised crime also advanced in the period. 
Turkish law enforcement officials undertook study visits to see witness protection 
practices in Europe. A twinning project was concluded in March 2007 to increase the 
capability of Turkish police for tracing and investigating the financial sources of 
crime and to undertake confiscation of the proceeds of crime. As a result of the 
project, a specialized unit was founded under the Anti-Smuggling and Organised 
Crime Department of the Turkish police to fight against laundering the assets of 
crimes. Two twinning projects were also approved under the ED's 2008 financial 
programme on "Strengthening the Forensic Capacity of Turkey" and "Strengthening 
the Investigation Capacity of the Turkish National Police and Gendarmerie against 
Organised Crime" (ABGS, 2008). However, cooperation with Europol was 
constrained to the strategic level, as Turkey did not establish a data protection 
regime. In the period, Turkey has increased the number of its liaison officers in 
European states from two to five (KOM, 2008, 2010). 
Against money laundering, legal and administrative changes were made in Turkey to 
comply with the EU requirements. In progress reports, the ED addressed the 
institutional deficits of the MASAK, though it confirms the legal alignment against 
money laundering (European Commission, 2008, 2009, 2010). In the legal field, 
Turkey has revised its anti-money-laundering regime through the adoption of a new 
law in October 2006. Complying with the EU anti-money-Iaundering regime and 
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F ATF recommendations, the new law introduced prOVISIons on customer 
identification, suspicious transaction reporting, disclosures to Customs, and the 
duties and powers ofMASAK. Following the adoption of the anti-money-Iaundering 
law, in 2007 and 2008 the government issued regulations to supplement its 
implementation. The regulations obliged the financial sector to coordinate with 
MASAK to prevent laundering and fmancing terrorism. In consequence, the number 
of reports on suspicious transactions substantially increased in 2007 and 2008. 
Turkey signed the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism in 
March 2007. 
Turkey's international cooperation with the F ATF and the EU has continued 
throughout the period. For institutional capacity development, a twinning project was 
started with the financial assistance of the EU in 2006 and concluded in 2007. The 
technical capacity of MASAK has been strengthened through the project (MASAK, 
2008: 37). Additionally, Turkey's strategy and action plan in the fight against money 
laundering was prepared as an outcome of the EU project. In the strategy and action 
plan, alignment with the EU practices and FA TF guidelines fonned one of the 
objectives to prevent laundering the proceeds of crime. 
In the field of the fight against trafficking in human beings Turkey has also made 
progress to comply with the EU requirements (European Commission, 2007, 2008). 
Provision in the Turkish Penal Code was revised in 2006 and trafficking of human 
beings for sexual purposes has been included in Turkish criminal law. The Turkish 
government has introduced a number of administrative measures with the 
amendment to increase awareness at the domestic level and support victims of 
traffickers. An emergency help line was established, legal assistance and temporary 
residences were allocated for victims of traffickers. Turkey signed the Council of 
Europe Convention on action against trafficking in human beings in March 2009. 
Numbers of arrested traffickers and prosecutions increased from 2004 to 2009. Over 
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the period, 1,111 victims of human traffickers were identified and offenders were 
prosecuted in Turkey (10M, 2010). 
International cooperation against trafficking in human beings also advanced. An EU 
twinning project was started in 2006 to strengthen the legal and structural capacity of 
Turkey against trafficking in human beings and concluded in 2008 (ABGS, 2008). 
Complying with the EU requirements, the National Task Force on Human 
Trafficking has started to collect data and issue activity reports on trafficking in 
human beings in Turkey. 
In coordination with the EU, alignment with the EU acquis and structural capacity 
development was supported by the 10M. In cooperation with the 10M, a range of 
programmes was initiated to align Turkey's practices with the EU approach. 
Voluntary return programmes were established for the victims of traffickers. In order 
to accelerate alignment and public awareness in Turkey against trafficking in 
persons, the Turkish Ministry of the Interior and the 10M Turkish office executed 
various EU funded projects from 2007 to 2009 (MfA, 2007: 9). 
Compliance with EU requirements in combating Cybercrime has been a developing 
field since 2005. The Turkish Penal Code of 2005 introduced unauthorized access to 
computers and the use of personal data, blocking or sabotage, fraud and the misuse 
of credit cards as cybercrime offences. The law introduced up to six years 
imprisonment as a sanction. Further to the Penal Code, the Turkish Government 
passed a Law in May 2005 to tackle crimes performed through the Internet. The law 
introduced administrative measures to prevent child pornography, prostitution, 
gambling and the encouragement of drug abuse and suicide. The law permits the 
Telecommunication Agency to ban harmful web pages or harmful contents and 
implies duties for the service providers to control harmful content. 
Over the period, international cooperation was intensified parallel with the increase 
in cybercrime. The EU and CoE have established common projects to strengthen the 
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fight against cybercrime and promote the ratification of the 2004 CoE Convention on 
Cybercrime. In that sense, a workshop was organised in September 2008 in Turkey 
with the support of the EU and CoE. Later, Turkey was involved in an EU-CoE 
regional cooperation programme to strengthen capacities in the fight against 
cybercrime. The programme is designed to line up the legal and structural capacities 
of the Western Balkan countries and Turkey with the EU practices. The project is 
funded by the 2010 financial assistance programme of the EU and is planned to be 
concluded in 2013 (Council of Europe, 2011a). As an outcome of these efforts, 
Turkey signed the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime in November 2010. 
In brief, it could be asserted that, due to the decline in the credibility of the EU 
promises since 2005, compliance has slowed down in Turkey in many policy fields. 
However, this was not the case in the fight against organised crime in Turkey. 
Although the credibility of conditionality has declined since 2005, the progress in 
combating organised crime has been compatible with the EU approach and practices. 
Over the period, the EU policy and practices against organised crime have 
corresponded with Turkey'S threat perception. Frequent interactions between 
member state institutions and domestic law enforcement agencies have legitimised 
the EU practices among Turkish officials and increased the likelihood of the 
adoption of EU requirements. As a result, domestic decision makers were convinced 
of the need to align Turkey's legal and administrative settings with those of the EU. 
4.8. Conclusion 
Although Turkey has been an active location for cross-border criminal networks, 
organised crime was not seen as a specific security challenge in Turkey until the end 
of the 1990s. Alternatively, terrorism had been the primary security concern for 
Turkey over the period. Counter terrorism measures and terrorist attacks had resulted 
in instability in the Southeast part of the country for over two decades and prepared 
suitable grounds for Turkish/Kurdish kin-based organised crime groups in the area. 
Due to a significant increase in terrorism throughout the 1990s, organised crime and 
mafia were considered as secondary internal security problems. 
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Domestic dynamics in Turkey initiated the perception of threat from organised crime 
since the end of 1990s. Disclosure of a mafia-state relationship in Turkey has been an 
important factor in the development of the domestic perception of organised crime. 
Mass demonstrations were organised throughout Turkey to complain about the state-
mafia connections and the failure to tackle organised crime. Intense reactions 
aroused within civil society put organised crime onto Turkey's agenda as a serious 
threat in the following years. 
On the other hand, the EU did not set out membership conditions for Turkey, as it 
did not admit Turkey as a candidate state until 1999. Consequently, the engagement 
of the EU in Turkey's domestic policy-making in combating organised crime had 
been limited over the 1990s. The start of structured relations with the EU, combating 
organised crime became part of the EU conditionality. The EU put forward legal 
alignment, structural capacity development and internal security cooperation as 
requirements to strengthen enforcement action against organised crime. The EU also 
required ratification of UN and CoE conventions as a part of the EU acquis. It 
encouraged interactions with FATF on money laundering and with 10M on 
trafficking in human beings. 
Turkey's candidacy for EU membership increased the EU's credibility and boosted 
alignment with the EU model to tackle organised crime since 1999. In the period 
from 1999 to 2005, Turkey conformed to the EU conditionality in combating 
organised crime. Compatible threat perceptions between the EU and Turkey and low 
adoption costs also facilitated compliance. Domestic opposition appeared to be low 
as Turkish institutions benefited from institutional links with EU agencies and 
operational cooperation. 
Following the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005, the credibility 
of accession conditionality has declined in Turkey. Controversy raised by some EU 
member states over Turkey's membership increased uncertainty in Turkey over the 
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possibility of EU accession. Furthennore, negotiations are partially suspended with 
Turkey because of the political problems with the EU related with Cyprus. 
However, Turkey's threat perception in combating organised crime has been still 
compatible with the EU approach since 2005. In Turkey, training seminars and 
mutual study visits perfonned as a part of twinning and T AIEX programmes have 
legitimised adoption of the EU requirements and international cooperation among 
Turkish law enforcement officials. Since security officials contribute to the policy-
making process in Turkey through consultation mechanisms and assessment reports, 
adoption of the EU requirements and international cooperation with EU member 
states was facilitated at the domestic level. As a result, although the credibility of 
conditionality has declined since 2005, Turkey has continued to adopt the EU acquis 
and practices in the fight against organised crime until 2010. 
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5. The impact of the EU on countering terrorism in 
Turkey 
5.1. Introduction 
In this part of the thesis, the influence of the ED on Turkish counter terrorism policy 
is assessed. The study scrutinizes the answers to the following questions: "Which 
factors mediate the influence of the ED on countering terrorism in Turkey? To what 
extent does the EU have an impact?" To explore the answer to these questions the 
analysis focuses on domestic developments between 1987 and 2010. Over this 
period, the PKK was considered as the primary terror threat in Turkey in terms of 
size and effectiveness with the vast majority of terror incidents being linked to them. 
Consequently, Turkey's counter terrorism policy was driven by the need to eliminate 
the PKK. Hence, in the study, the fight against the PKK has been the subject of the 
analysis. 
In the period between Turkey's application for EU membership in 1987 until 2010, 
terrorism was considered as the primary security challenge in Turkey. Terrorist 
attacks carried out by the PKK and over counter measures implemented by the 
security forces have claimed over thirty thousand lives across the country (Rodoplu 
et aI., 2003: 152). Due to intense security measures and insecurity, social and 
economical disparities have occurred between the East and the other regions of 
Turkey. Especially, in Southeast Turkey, where the majority of the Kurdish 
population lives, law enforcement measures and insecurity have slowed down socio-
economic development and nourished tensions between the state and the local 
population. 
Due to the extent of the struggle against the PKK, the Turkish military has been an 
important domestic actor for countering the PKK. Along with the government, top 
military commanders were explicitly engaged in the development of Turkey's 
121 
counter terrorism policy until the end of 201 O. In periodic National Security Council 
(MGK) meetings, the internal security policy of Turkey was mostly constructed from 
a military perspective until the adjustment ofMGK legislation in 2003. As a result of 
military influence in the decision-making process, the use of military measures was 
constantly chosen as an important instrument against the PKK. 
On the whole, Turkey had opted for extreme enforcement measures and political 
repression as the principal counter terrorism strategy. Counter terrorism strategy 
against the PKK comprised the use of military force, restrictions on fundamental 
liberties and cultural rights, and control of political activities. Anti-terrorism law no 
3713, the State of Emergency (OHAL) and the Village Guard System have been 
main instruments of Turkey's counter terrorism policy until late 2010. 
The integrity of the state and national homogeneity clauses within the Turkish 
Constitution of 1982 were used as a justification for restrictions on liberties and 
cultural rights. Specifically, the declaration ofa State of Emergency (OHAL) in up to 
13 provinces of Southeast Turkey by 2002 had legalised implementation martial law 
and excessive security measures (Gemalmaz, 1997: 37). 
On the other hand, the strategy of Turkey on countering terrorism has been a 
controversial issue between Turkey and the EU. The EU has diverse perceptions and 
policy preferences concerning the tensions in Southeast Turkey. Unlike Turkey'S 
threat perception and policy instruments to end the PKK, the EU identifies the 
tensions in Southeast Turkey as a Kurdish ethnic problem and so considered it within 
the context of minority rights. The EU also addressed the need for balance between 
security measures and civil liberties. In that sense, the EU has frequently emphasised 
the need for a political settlement and recognition of Kurdish cultural rights, respect 
for human rights and socio-economical development as a means of ending terrorism 
(Tocci, 2007: 66). 
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In the following sections, the study outlines a conceptual framework for the 
conditions of the impact of the EU on countering terrorism in Turkey. It then extracts 
the dynamics of the EU in the fight against terrorism and domestic conditions in 
Turkey. Finally, the study investigates the outcome of the EU's requirements across 
three periods with reference to four mediating factors: Determinacy of the EU 
requirements, credibility of conditionality, domestic adoption costs and convergence 
of threat perceptions between Turkey and the EU. 
5.2. Conditions shaping the impact of the EU on Turkey's counter-
terrorism policy 
In the chapter, the determinants of domestic policy transition are classified under two 
theoretical approaches: Rational Choice and Sociological Institutionalism. It is 
assumed under the rationalist argument that adaptation pressures and incentives 
integrated in accession conditionality are important factors to provoke policy 
transition at the domestic level. Alternatively, sociological institutionalism claims 
that domestic traditions, beliefs and norms that exist at the domestic level constitute 
preconditions for norm-transfer and policy change in applicant states. In this regard 
"determinacy of the EU requirements", "credibility of conditionality", and "domestic 
adaptation costs" are attributed to rational choice institutionalism because of their 
links with cost-benefit calculations of domestic actors. On the other hand, 
"convergence of threat perceptions" is considered within the context of sociological 
institutionalism as it takes domestic traditions, beliefs and norms into account as 
principal constituents of policy transition. 
Determinacy of the EU requirements 
After end of the Cold War, maintaining democracy, human rights, and the rule of law 
in Eastern European has been an important objective for Western European states to 
safeguard security in Europe. In order to line up legal and administrative 
infrastructures of the post-communist states to EU model and to ensure peace and 
stability in Europe the EU utilized enlargement policy after 1990. The EU has set up 
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political conditions "Copenhagen Criteria" for applicant states and listed 
fundamental principles to be a member of European Union. That way, the EU has 
aimed to propose democratization and respect of human rights in applicant states. On 
the other hand the external dimension of JHA was not perceived as a particular 
concern within the EU's external relations until the late 1990s. The EU did not have 
precise objectives to transfer JHA policies to non-member states. Integration of 
CEEC states with JHA has been part of the EU's agenda since 1998 (Grabbe, 2005: 
126). 
On the other hand, the Customs Union agreement signed in 1996 had been the first 
concrete platform to voice the EU requirements related with the counter terrorism 
policy of Turkey. Although the agreement was designed for the alignment of customs 
procedures between parties, it had been used as an instrument by the EU to induce 
Turkey to use softer measures against secessionist terrorism. Throughout the 
negotiations of the Customs Union Agreement, the EU had questioned Turkey's 
counter terrorism strategy and asked Turkey to respect fundamental human rights and 
the rule oflaw. 
In the period, the European Parliament (EP) has been the main EU institution to raise 
concerns on human rights violations in Turkey. During the Customs Union 
negotiation process, the EP asked the Council to put forward political conditions on 
Turkey because of human rights violations. Emphasising the prohibition of Pro-
Kurdish political parties, the European Parliament called for the modification of the 
Turkish Constitution and Turkish anti-terrorism law. The EP also demanded the 
extension of cultural rights and changes to Article 8 of the anti-terror law no 3713 for 
extension of freedom of expression (Zanon, 2005: 2-3). 
After being admitted as a candidate state in 1999, EU-Turkey relations were 
intensified and evolved to a more structured form. Similar to other candidate states, 
the EU asked for fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria as a primary condition for the 
opening of accession negotiations. The European Council endorsed the first 
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Accession Partnership (AP) in 2001 and detennined a fonnal agenda to be adopted 
by Turkey. In AP documents issued in 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2008, the EU did not 
have a separate section on counter terrorism within the JHA domain. However, in AP 
documents and in annual progress reports, the requirements on political 
conditionality have set up an agenda for Turkey that has consequences for countering 
terrorism in Turkey. 
Overall, in the 2001,2003,2006 and 2008 AP documents, the EU asked for legal and 
constitutional modifications to strengthen freedom of assembly, freedom of 
expression, cultural rights and elimination of torture. With reference to the 
Copenhagen Criteria, the EU has obliged Turkey to comply with the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. In the AP documents, 
Turkey was called on to abolish the death penalty and State of Emergency (OHAL) 
in Southeast Turkey. The EU requirements within political conditions tended to 
emphasise a political solution and settlement for the ethnic conflict in Southeast 
Turkey. 
Parallel with the AP documents, in annual progress reports the EU has repeatedly 
called on Turkey to implement a softer counter terrorism strategy through the 
extension of cultural rights and strengthening of the rule of law and human rights. 
Particularly in the fight against the PKK, progress reports again emphasised a 
political settlement as an alternative to the use of military force and asked for 
confonnation with EU political conditions while combating terrorism. 
Credibility of conditionality 
The EU and Turkey signed the Customs Union Agreement in 1996 and the EU 
promised to give financial assistance to support its implementation in Turkey. 
However, considerable amounts of funds that were allocated for Turkey were not 
released because of human rights violations in Turkey. Since the EU commitments 
were not delivered and the prospect of Turkey'S membership seemed distant, the EU 
requirements put forward before 1999 were not considered as credible in Turkey. 
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After Turkey's admission as a candidate state in 1999, the credibility of the EU 
increased. Membership prospects grew with the arrival of financial assistance and 
speeded up policy transition. To comply with the EU requirements, Turkey has 
gradually relaxed security measures in the Southeast Turkey. The State of 
Emergency (ORAL) was abolished and constitutional changes were introduced. 
However, since 2005, controversy in the EU on Turkey's EU membership has again 
increased pessimism in Turkey about joining the EU and diminished the credibility 
of accession conditionality. The Cyprus problem has been one of the constituents of 
the decline in the EU credibility (see. the previous discussion in chapter 4). The EU 
suspended negotiations with Turkey in eight chapters in 2006. The postponement of 
negotiations has further diminished the credibility of the EU accession conditionality 
(Ulusoy, 2008: 319). In Turkey, support for EU membership among public opinion 
has fallen from 74% in 2002 to 45% in 2008 (Eurobarometer, 2008). 
Domestic adaptation costs 
In Turkey, the military is considered as the primary institution to ensure security 
against terrorism. In article 35 of the Military Internal Service Code and in the 
Ministry of Defence White Paper the military'S role is affirmed as to protect and 
maintain constitutional order, national presence and integrity of the state against any 
kind of internal or external threat (Lecha et aI, 2006: 11; MoD, 2000: 2). Attributed 
to these formal norms, the Turkish military has assumed the role of guardian of the 
state. The military does not only retain a role in eliminating terrorism but is also 
involved in the formulation of Turkish counter terrorism policy. 
Until structural changes were made by the National Security Council (MGK) in 
2003, the MGK was used as a platform by top military officials to intervene in 
security policies. Although it has been a consultation organ, Turkish governments 
tended to comply with the MGK decisions. Until 2003, military commanders and 
members of the government had been in an equal position in MGK meetings. 
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In periodic MGK meetings, the internal security policy of Turkey was mostly 
constructed from a military perspective until the adjustment of the MGK legislation 
in 2003. As a result of military influence on the MGK, the use of military measures 
was constantly preferred as the main solution. The State of Emergency (OHAL), 
deployment of troops to Southeast Turkey and cross-border military operations in 
North Iraq to eliminate the PKK have been the principal instruments of Turkey's 
counter terrorism strategy (MGK, 2010). 
On the other hand, governments were not able to develop long-term policies to 
eliminate the PKK until the end of the 1990s. First, in the period between 1993 and 
2002, there had been short-term coalition governments in Turkey. Due to frequent 
cabinet changes, it had not been possible to implement long-term strategies or the EU 
requirements to end violence in Turkey. On the contrary, rapid reactions against the 
PKK attacks and use of military force remained as Turkey's only strategy on 
countering terrorism. 
Second, the adoption of peaceful measures and compliance with the EU requirements 
on counter terrorism had been rather costly because of high civilian and military 
casualties in Turkey. In the last three decades, terrorist attacks and counter terrorism 
measures have claimed many lives across Turkey. Since the start of PKK activity in 
1984, terrorist attacks had reached the highest levels in the 1990s. In 1996 alone, 
2,516 persons reportedly were killed because of PKK related events (Rodoplu et al., 
2003: 157). 
However, adaptation costs moderately declined when the PKK leader Ocalan was 
apprehended in Kenya in 1999. Following his detention, a unilateral ceasefire was 
declared by the PKK for the period between 1999 and 2004. This long-standing 
ceasefire led to the assumption in Turkey that the violence in Southeast Turkey was 
over. Consequently, domestic opposition to the EU conditionality on the Kurdish 
issue was relatively reduced. 
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Nevertheless, the resumption of the PKK attacks in 2005 dealt a blow to this 
optimism and increased the government costs of domestic adaptation. Although the 
change to the MGK legislation in 2003 diminished the MGK's influence on the 
government, the Turkish military maintained its influence on counter terrorism 
policy until 2010. The resumption of the PKK attacks led to an increased military 
presence in Southeast Turkey. Concomitantly, the military strengthened its role as an 
actor in Turkish counter terrorism policy since 2004 and became critical of non-
military solutions. 
Convergence of threat perceptions: Domestic resonance and 
legitimacy of EU approach 
Turkey's perception on terrorism and preferred counter terrorism measures have 
differed from the EU's approach and policy preferences since Turkey made its EU 
membership application in 1987. The divergence between perceptions of the EU and 
Turkey on terrorism concerns two points: first, the identification of the source of the 
problem and second, the measures adopted by Turkey to prevent separatism. 
Foremost, regarding the causes of the tensions, Turkey and the EU have different 
perspectives. In Turkey, the source of tensions in the Eastern part of the country was 
not considered as an ethnic conflict or cultural problem. The state elites had 
identified the tensions as a "terror problem", "underdevelopment" or a "security 
issue" rather than an issue of identity or culture (Celik et al., 2006: 212). 
As a reflection of the need to protect the national homogeneity of the state, cultural 
differences were ignored by governments until 2010. The Kurdish population living 
in Turkey was referred to as part of the Turkish Community. Domestic demands for 
Kurdish cultural rights were considered as separatist propaganda and linked with the 
PKK. It was believed that terrorism in Turkey is supported by third countries that 
want to weaken Turkey through ethnic divergence and terrorism (Cornell, 2001). 
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Turkish decision makers also considered the tensions in East Turkey as an 
underdevelopment problem. It was pointed out by a researcher in Turkey that, 
"For decades Turkey has refused to identify the source of the tensions in 
Southeast Turkey. It had perceived that low income and lack of 
investment in Southeast Turkey sustained terrorism. It was believed that 
unemployed and less-educated populations were likely to be deceived 
and recruited by the PKK with promises for a better future" (Interview#5, 
2009). 
On the other hand, different from Turkey's standpoint, the situation in Southeast 
Turkey is perceived as state oppression and denial of the Kurdish minority's cultural 
rights (Cornell, 2001) since the Kurdish population living in Turkey is considered as 
an ethnic minority. Therefore, in the Commission's annual progress reports and in the 
AP documents for Turkey, the Kurdish issue was considered within the section on 
minority rights. In contrast to the Turkish approach, the tensions in Turkey were 
identified as a matter of ethnic conflict that could only be overcome through full 
respect for Kurdish identity and extension of liberties (Tocci, 2007: 53). 
The second divergence between the EU and Turkey's approach is seen in selected 
policy instruments to eliminate terrorism. Overall, Turkey's policy instruments in the 
fight against terrorism do not correspond with the EU's proposed policy preferences. 
With the escalation of the PKK attacks in Turkey after 1984, separatist terrorism was 
perceived as the main security threat to the integrity of Turkey. For the unity of 
Turkey to survive, use of military force, political repression, long detention periods 
and limits on basic human rights were adopted as security measures. A State of 
Emergency (OHAL) had been set up in 13 provinces of Turkey before 2002. In the 
State of Emergency zones, local governors were entitled to restrict basic human 
rights including freedom of assembly, propaganda and travel. Throughout 1984 to 
1998, some villages were displaced to prevent logistic support for the PKK from 
local populations (TBMM, 1998). 
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The temporary village guard system was established in 1986 to protect rural 
settlements from the PKK attacks. Under this scheme, the state has employed village 
guards from local Kurdish tribes and licensed them to carry firearms. Furthermore, 
with the adoption of anti-terrorism legislation freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly were restricted for nearly two decades. In anti-terrorism legislation, broad 
defmitions had been set up for terrorist propaganda crimes. 
Contrary to Turkey's preference for the use of tough security measures, the EU has 
been a supporter of a softer approach to prevent the conflict in Turkey. This issue 
was commented upon by an interviewee from the European Commission that, 
"combating the PKK is not felt to be in the security interest of the EU, 
although it was accepted as a terror organisation by the EU" 
(Interview#8, 2011). 
In European Parliament resolutions and in the Commission's annual progress reports, 
the EU frequently criticised Turkey's counter terrorism measures and called for a 
peaceful settlement and political resolution. Furthermore, the EU asked for respect 
for individual human rights and freedom of expression as well as for socio-economic 
development in East Turkey (European Commission, 2001 b, 2002, 2003; Zanon, 
2005: 3). The EU questioned the use of torture, displacement of villages, long trials 
and detention periods for terror-related crimes and criticised the village guard system 
in Turkey. 
As a consequence of the divergence between Turkish and EU perceptions of 
accession conditionality related to Turkey's counter terrorism policy the EU 
approach has not been legitimised at the domestic level. The EU demands for the 
extension of political and cultural rights and non-military solutions were seen as a 
threat against the unity of the Turkish community and the integrity of Turkey. 
Although Turkish governments have made some modifications to the anti-terrorism 
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legislation and extended human rights and cultural liberties, these modifications did 
not touch the essence of Turkey's counter terrorism strategy until 2010. Use of 
military force against the PKK finds considerable support from domestic actors and 
the political decision makers of the state. 
5.3. The EU policy on countering terrorism 
Cooperation against terrorism among European States dates back to the 1970s. After 
the terrorist attacks at the Munich Olympics in 1972, 12 EC states inaugurated a 
coordinating committee, Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extn!misme et Violence 
Intemationale (TREVI) , against terrorism. TREVI has worked as an 
intergovernmental body without having links with the European Council and the 
Parliament. However, it was used as a channel for information exchange, operational 
cooperation and for training between national counter-terrorism units of member 
states until the end of 1990s (Bunyan, 1993: 1). Later, with the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Maastricht of 1993, counter terrorism was counted in police cooperation 
under the Justice and Home Affairs policy. In the Treaty of Maastricht TREVI was 
also integrated into Europol and the EU level coordination against terrorism was 
given as one of the duties of Europol (Treaty of Maastricht, 1993). 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) generated a more comprehensive approach under 
JHA and established the AFSJ. In the treaty, combating terrorism was counted as one 
of the objectives to maintain internal security within the AFSJ. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam emphasized the implementation of minimum rules and sentences 
between member states and developed a basis for internal security cooperation 
through police and judicial collaboration (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). However, 
due to different perceptions of terrorism, the ED states did not agree on a common 
definition of terrorism until the 9111 terrorist attacks on the US (Keohane, 2005: 13). 
Soon after the 9/11 attacks and the uncovering of the role of an AI-Qaeda plot based 
in Hamburg, Germany, the ED member states have been aware of the cross-border 
terrorist threat in Europe. The ED has adopted a number of legal and operational 
131 
instruments to tackle terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. To prevent terrorist activities 
in Europe, the EU has tried to maintain a multidimensional approach, including both 
prevention and combating terrorism. In this regard, member states have intensified 
information exchange through Europol and set up a counter terrorism task force for 
operational cooperation. Furthermore, in the judicial field, Eurojust was set up to aid 
member states' judicial investigations on transnational crimes. With the adoption of 
the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant of 13 June 2002, the 
prosecution and extradition of terrorist offenders have been accelerated between the 
EU member states. 
Information exchange and operational cooperation also intensified through the 
Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams of 13 June 2002, the Council 
Decision on the Implementation of Specific Measures for Police and Judicial 
Cooperation to Combat Terrorism of 19 December 2002, the Council Decision on the 
Exchange of Information and Cooperation Concerning Terrorist Offences of 
20 September 2005, the Council Decision on the Exchange of Infonnation Extracted 
from the Criminal Record of 21 November 2005 and the Framework Decision on 
Simplifying Exchange of Information and Intelligence Between Law Enforcement 
Agencies of 18 December 2006 (Monar, 2007b: 275). 
In the Framework Decision of June 2002, terrorism is identified as a threat against 
the core values of the EU including universal values of human dignity, liberty, 
equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
democracy and the rule of law. Terrorism was defined as certain acts that aim at 
intimidating populations or compelling governments to perfonn their duties, or 
seriously destabilize or destroy social, economic, political and constitutional 
structures of countries and international organizations. It counts directing a terrorist 
group or participation by supplying information, material, funds or knowledge to 
contribute to its activities as terrorist offences. The framework decision also set up 
the minimum penalties for offenders of terrorist organizations fifteen years for 
directors and eight years for members (European Council, 2002b). 
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Strategy documents and action plans of the EU also contribute to the construction of 
a common perception on countering terrorism in the EU. In the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) of 2003, terrorism is perceived as a key internal security threat 
against the security of the EU. In the strategy, the EU is considered as both a target 
and a base for religious extremist terrorism. The ESS not only touched upon the 
coordination in the EU, but also addressed external cooperation with third states. 
With an emphasis on the linkage between terrorism and state failure, organised crime 
and regional conflicts, it called for coordination between the EU's external relations 
and Justice and Home Affairs (European Council, 2003c). 
Instead of the ESS, the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy of November 2005 and the 
Action Plan on Countering Terrorism of February 2006 helped the construction of 
the perception in the EU on terrorism. Parallel with the ESS, the strategy counted 
extremist religious terrorism as a security threat against the EU's values, rights and 
liberties. It addresses openness, free movement of people and goods as vulnerabilities 
of the EU (European Council, 2005c; Monar, 2007a: 297, 302). 
5.4. Domestic dynamics of Turkey concerning fight against 
terrorism 
Terrorism has been a primary security problem for Turkey for over three decades. 
Terror organisations with diverse ideological backgrounds and purposes have taken 
many lives in the country since the 1980s. In the Turkish Constitution of 1982 "unity 
of the state" is a core value that shall be protected against internal and external 
security threats. In the Constitution, this issue is stated as ""no protection shall be 
afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principles 
of the integrity of Turkey, Turkish historical and moral values, or the nationalism, 
principles, and reforms of Ataturk and his embracement of values of contemporary 
civilization". FUlihermore, in the Constitution, the fundamental aims and duties of 
the state are detined as ""to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish 
Nation, the unity of the country, the republic and democracy" (Constitution, 1982). 
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Consistent with the Turkish Constitution, separatist terrorism is perceived as one of 
the main internal security threats in Turkey. In Ministry of Defence threat assessment 
reports issued in 1998 and 2000 and in regular press releases from the National 
Security Council (MGK), terrorism is considered as the main internal security 
problem in Turkey because of its targeting of the integrity of the republican regime 
of the state (MGK, 2010; MoD, 2000: 2). 
The PKK has been considered to be the largest terror organization in Turkey in terms 
of size and effectiveness. During the 1990s, the PKK recruited nearly 8,000 militants 
and extended attacks across Southeast Turkey (Rodoplu et al.. 2003: 157). It has also 
extended its effectiveness in Turkey's neighbourhood and gained an international 
dimension. In Syria and in Iraq, it has established training camps to sustain terrorist 
activities in Turkey. Especially after the US invasion of Iraq in 1991, Northern Iraq, 
where the PKK has gained support from local Kurdish tribes, has been a safe haven 
for the PKK militants due to instability in the region. 
The PKK aims to establish autonomous Kurdish governance in Turkey. It has used 
armed struggle or so-called "guerrilla war" against the Turkish State since it began 
its attacks in 1984 (Indictment, 1999). The PKK still conducts attacks against 
security forces. It is estimated that it has nearly 5,000 militants mainly based in 
North Iraq (MfA, 2010). 
Further to armed struggle, the PKK uses legal organisations to disseminate its 
objectives among the Kurdish population in different countries. The Kurdish 
Diaspora and lobby activities of the PKK aim to legitimise the PKK ideology in 
Europe and increase the international pressure on Turkey concerning its anti-terror 
policy (Tocci, 2007: 57). 
Turkey has adopted tough security measures across the country since the start of 
PKK activity in 1984. Over the three decades, these measures have led to restrictions 
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on civil liberties in the country. Until the end of the 1990s, Turkey had chosen 
repression as an instrument to erode the legal dimensions of the PKK (Lecha et at., 
2006). 
Throughout the 1990s, extreme measures had been enacted for terror crimes under 
anti-terrorism law no 3713. The law restricted verbal and written propaganda and 
assembly that could be against the unity of the state. It had set up a number of strict 
measures including long detention periods and special security courts for terrorist 
offenders. On the other hand, for enforcement forces, the anti-terror law had brought 
some immunity, such as restrictions for detention of officers during the prosecution 
of crimes, in which they are involved during the course of their duty. Turkey's anti-
terrorism law has still been subject to criticism by the EU due to restrictions on 
freedom of expression and assembly (European Commission, 2008, 2009). 
In the political field, strict measures have limited political activity. Due to alleged 
links with the PKK and conspiracy on their political agenda against the unity of the 
state, four pro-Kurdish parties were prohibited in 1993, 1994, 2003 and 2009. Pro-
Kurdish People's Labour Party (HEP) was banned in 1993. Followers of HEP later 
founded another pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) in 1993 but the Constitutional 
Court also banned it in 1994. Furthermore, immunity of 13 Kurdish MP's was lifted 
because of alleged links with PKK and speaking in Kurdish during a ceremony in the 
Turkish Parliament. In Turkey, two further pro-Kurdish Parties were also banned in 
2003 and in 2009. In all court rulings, it was alleged that party members had links 
with PKK and they were following a strategy against the unity of the state (Tocci, 
2007: 58). 
To eliminate the PKK attacks, counter terrorism measures have involved "the use of 
military force", "State of Emergency (OHAL)" and "the Temporary Village Guard 
System". To legitimize the use of extreme security measures, between 1987 and 
2002, the State of Emergency was declared in 13 provinces. As a result of increasing 
PKK attacks the military campaign not only intensified in Southeast Turkey but also 
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troops were deployed to Northern Iraq. During the period between 1990 and 2008, 
Turkey concluded nearly 50 military operations to destroy the PKK presence in 
Northern Iraq (AA, 2008). 
In the ORAL period, security measures were tightened and military control on civil 
administration had been increased. Top military commanders in OHAL provinces 
were entitled to take over the duties of governors in urgent situations. In the State of 
Emergency zones, local governors were also mandated to restrict basic human rights 
including freedom of assembly, propaganda and travel, to prevent terrorism. Between 
1984 and 1998, over three thousand villages were displaced in Southeast Turkey to 
prevent the local population supporting the PKK (TBMM, 1998). Due to torture and 
extra-judicial executions, Turkey was convicted many times in the European Court 
of Human Rights (Council of Europe, 2005). Finally, in November 2002 OHAL was 
completely abandoned. 
Additionally, to protect rural settlements from terrorist attacks and to prevent 
logistical support for the PKK, the "Village Guard System'" was created in 1986. 
Civilians from local Kurdish tribes are employed as "village guards" to protect rural 
settlements from terrorist attacks and to prevent logistic support to the PKK. They 
were licensed to possess firearms and allowed to use them when tackling the PKK. 
By 2008, the number of village guards had been increased to 60,000. Village guards 
are charged to fight against the PKK alongside military forces. So far, the village 
guard scheme has been gradually extended to 35 provinces in Eastern Turkey. 
However, this system has also brought pitfalls and raised international criticism 
about Turkey's counter tetTorism policy. They have sometimes been accused of 
using excessive force on the local population and being involved in human rights 
abuses (Uslu, 2008). 
In brief, Turkey's counter terrorism policy has comprised the use of extreme 
measures. Although modifications were made, in legal and political terms the 
measures adopted have brought restrictions on fundamental human rights and 
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attracted criticism from the EU. Due to the extensive use of military force, the 
military has been an influential actor in Turkey's counter terrorism policy. 
5.5. Accession conditionality concerning countering terrorism in 
Turkey 
After Turkey was accredited as a candidate state for EU membership, the European 
Council adopted the fIrst Accession Partnership document in 2001. In this document, 
the EU did not openly touch upon Turkey's counter terrorism policy under short- or 
medium-term obligations. However, human rights and the rule of law had required 
Turkey to establish a balance between liberties and counter terrorism measures. 
Under short-term political conditions, the EU demanded respect for fundamental 
human rights, prevention of torture, the abolition of the death penalty and structural 
changes in Turkey's judicial system. Furthermore, Turkey was called on to remove 
restrictions on broadcasting in non-Turkish languages and to reduce regional 
disparities in Southeast Turkey. Turkey was also asked to lift the State of Emergency 
and to extend cultural rights (European Council, 2001). 
In annual progress reports, the EU requirements linked with Turkey'S counter 
terrorism policy were listed under the political conditions. Under the JHA domain, 
emphasis is given to the prevention of terrorist financing and the ratification of 
relevant international conventions to support the fight against transnational crime. 
Finally, in the chapter on Foreign, Security and Defence policy, the fight against 
terrorism is considered as a part of Turkey's neighbourhood relations and within the 
context of international cooperation against terrorism (see. the reports of European 
Commission 1999,2002,2003,2005,2007,2009). 
Since the beginning of Turkey's candidacy for EU membership, in regular progress 
reports, which date back to 1998, the EU asks for peaceful solutions and a civilian 
settlement to end separatist terrorism. The EU condemns the PKK attacks and 
identifIes the PKK as a terrorist organization. However, as a pre-condition of the 
fight against separatist terrorism, the EU simultaneously requests respect for human 
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rights and protection of cultural rights. With emphasis on the difficult SOCIO-
economic situation in Southeast Turkey, the EU calls on Turkey to develop a 
peaceful strategy focusing on economic and social development for the Kurdish 
population. 
In progress reports since 2004, the EU has started to consider the Kurdish ethnic 
problem within the context of minority rights. Regarding the extension of cultural 
rights, the EU criticizes the lack of progress and asks for further efforts to facilitate 
the use of languages other than Turkish in broadcasting, in political life and in public 
services (European Commission 2007). In progress reports, the EU also frequently 
questions the use of torture, displacement of villages, long trials and detention 
periods in the fight against terrorism and asks for the abolition of the village guard 
system in Turkey. 
Table: EU requirements in AP documents linked with Turkish counter terrorism policv 
T ask to be undertaken Document Date and Timescale 
Strengthen legal provisions and undertake all necessary 2001 Accession 
measures to reinforce the fight against torture practices, and Partnership - Short Term. 
ensure compliance with the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture. Remove any legal provisions 
forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue 
in TV/radio broadcasting. Develop a comprehensive approach 
to reduce regional disparities, and in particular to improve the 
situation in the south-east, with a view to enhancing 
economic, social and cultural opportunities for all citizens. 
Strengthen freedom of expression in line with Article 10 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights. Strengthen the 
right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly and 
encourage the development of civil society. 
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Lift the remaining state of emergency in the Southeast. Ensure 2001 Accession 
cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights for all citizens Partnership - Medium Term. 
irrespective of their origin. Any legal provisions preventing 
the enjoyment of these rights should be abolished, including in 
the field of education. Abolish the death penalty. 
Ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights for all 2003 Accession 
citizens irrespective of their origin. Ensure effective access to Partnership - Short Term. 
radio/TV broadcasting and education in languages other than 
Turkish through implementation of existing measures and the 
removal of the remaining restrictions that impede this access. 
Intensify efforts to develop a comprehensive approach to 
reduce regional disparities and, in particular, to improve the 
situation in the Southeast, with a view to enhancing economic, 
social and cultural opportunities for all citizens. In this 
context, the return of internally displaced persons to their 
original settlements should be supported and speeded up. 
Develop a comprehensive approach to reducing regional 2006 Accession 
disparities, and in particular to improve the situation in Partnership -Short Term. 
Southeast Turkey, with a view to enhancing economic, social 
and cultural opportunities for all Turkish citizens, including 
those of Kurdish origin. Abolish the village guard system in 
the southeast. Clear the area of landmines. Pursue measures to 
facilitate the return of internally displaced persons to their 
original settlements. Ensure that those who have suffered loss 
and damage as a result of the security situation in the 
southeast are fairly and speedily compensated. 
Continue implementation of the law on the compensation of 2008 Accession 
losses due to terrorism and the fight against terrorism. Ensure Partnership -Short Term. 
fair and prompt compensation of victims. Abolish the village 
guard system in the Southeast. 
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5.6. Outcome: Assessment o/the EU1s involvement 
In the following sections, the influence of the EU on Turkish counter terrorism 
policy is scrutinized across three phases. The first phase covers 1987-1999. In 1987, 
Turkey made an official membership application to the EU. In 1999, the Helsinki 
Council admitted Turkey as a candidate state. The second phase covers 1999-2005 in 
which the EU initiated structured relations with Turkey through conditionality and 
began accession negotiations in 2005. The last phase covers 2005-2010 in which 
accession negotiations have taken place. In these selected periods, the paper 
addresses four salient factors that could have a causal relationship for the transition 
of domestic policies in Turkey. 
Table: Mediating (actors for transition o[Counter Terrorism Policv 
Period 1987-1999 1999-2005 2005-2009 
High (Accession High (Accession 
Determinacy of Low (Lack of Partnership Partnership 
the ED membership incentive documents, progress documents, progress 
requirements and conditionality). reports, assessment reports, assessment 
visits). visits ). 
Low (debate in the EU 
Low (Lack of High (Candidacy, on Turkish accession, 
Credibility of membership prospects delivery of financial alternative 
conditionality and financial assistance, membership 
assistance). institutional links ). proposals, Cyprus 
issue). 
Medium (Due to five High (Due to 
High (Due to years unilateral PKK resumption of the 
Domestic extensive PKK attacks cease fire, the EU PKK attacks, 
adaptation costs and military candidacy, decline in problematic 
casualties). military influence on negotiation process 
politics). with the EU). 
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Low (Diverse Low (Diverse Low (Diverse 
Convergence of approaches to the approaches to the approaches to the 
threat Kurdish problem, Kurdish problem, Kurdish problem, 
perceptions different instruments different preferences different preferences 
between Turkey to end tensions in to end tensions in to end tensions in 
and the EU Southeast Turkey). Southeast Turkey). Southeast Turkey). 
Outcome Non-compliance Non-compliance Non-compliance 
Phase 1: 1987-1999 
PKK terrorism had peaked in Turkey throughout this period. It had increased attacks 
against security forces not only in Southeast Turkey but also on the Turkish Riviera 
and in big cities like Ankara and Istanbul. In 1996 alone, nearly 3,000 people were 
killed because of terrorism-related events. Furthermore, Turkey initiated cross-border 
military operations against the PKK training camps based in Northern Iraq and 
established temporary posts there (AA, 2008). 
In this tumultuous period, the PKK attacks and counter terrorism measures of Turkey 
had resulted in breaches of human rights, unsolved murders, the displacement of 
civilians and villages and the assassination of activists and journalists in the country 
(Gemalmaz, 1997: 38). 
Accompanying the use of military measures, Turkey had sometimes used softer 
measures in the early stages of countering PKK terrorism. The former Prime Minister 
and President, Turgut Ozal, had questioned Turkey's coercive counter terrorism 
strategy and looked for a civilian settlement for Turkey's terror problem when he 
was in charge between 1983 and 1993 (Ataman, 2002: 128). 
1.+1 
Ozal had sought to end terrorism through maintaining a balance between human 
rights and enforcement measures. He addressed the root causes of separatism and 
considered Kurdish identity as an ethnic part of Turkish society (Cakmak, 2003). 
Ozal's Government passed a bill in the Turkish Parliament in 1991 to abandon 
restrictions on the use of any languages, in either speech or writing that were not 
recognized as the official language of the state. Turkey signed the International 
Human Rights Conventions and ratified the European Convention for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1988. In the same 
year, Turkey ratified the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Parallel with ratifying these international 
agreements, Turkey recognized the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights in 1990. 
However, the PKK attacks and resulting casualties increased domestic opposition to 
these modifications. Particularly, the Turkish military and state elites objected to 
civilian measures and favoured a military campaign against the PKK. Therefore, an 
extension of cultural rights was rather costly to the Government. Later, the 
unexpected death of Ozal in 1993 and a change of Government made this process 
fragmentary. 
In the following years, short-term coalition governments came to power in Turkey 
for nearly a decade. Frequent cabinet changes, diverse party programs and lack of 
consensus between members of coalition governments prevented development of 
comprehensive counter terrorism strategies. Therefore, Turkey's principal strategy 
had been the use of repression and military force to eliminate terrorism. 
In addition to military measures, restrictions were introduced in the political field to 
tackle the legal aspects of the PKK. Two Kurdish political parties were banned in 
1993 and in 1994 because of alleged links with the PKK. Subsequently, 13 members 
of pro-Kurdish parties in the parliament were detained and suspended from political 
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life. A number of Kurdish newspapers and Kurdish cultural centres were banned for 
providing support for terrorism (Zanon, 2005: 4). 
On the other hand, political repression and human rights violations seen in Turkey 
over the 1990s increased the external pressures from the EU. Especially, the 
European Parliament had frequently drawn attention to human rights violations in 
Southeast Turkey. In a number of resolutions, the European Parliament called for 
modifications to the Turkish Constitution of 1982 and in the Turkish anti-terrorism 
law. It condemned the ban on pro-Kurdish political parties and Turkey's detention of 
Kurdish MP's (Zanon, 2005: 4-5). 
The Customs Union Agreement of 1996 was used as a platform by the EU to put 
forward certain conditions for Turkey. Although the agreement was designed for 
economic purposes and customs alignment between Turkey and the EU, the EU 
asked for revisions in Turkey's counter terrorism strategy against the PKK. During 
the negotiations of the Customs Union Agreement, the European Parliament urged 
the European Council to put forward an extension of human rights as a precondition 
for the ratification of the agreement. The EP called upon the Council to suspend 
Customs Union negotiations unless Turkey carried out an extension of cultural rights 
and changed in the anti-terror law to extend freedom of expression (Celik, 2006: 
213). 
The Customs Union was seen as a chance for Turkey to intensify political and 
economic integration with the EU. Financial promises of EU support for the Customs 
Union Agreement and predicted foreign investment were considered as crucial to the 
recovery of the Turkish economy from an economic crisis in 1995. With the 
agreement, Turkey was promised 2,200 million ECU (Euro) support from the EU 
(Somuncuoglu, 2002: 11). 
To get the benefits of the Customs Union and to deepen relations with the EU, the 
Turkish Government under Prime Minister Tansu Ciller attempted to extend 
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fundamental human rights and to change anti-terrorism legislation. In a reform 
package passed by the Parliament in 1996, terrorist propaganda offences were 
narrowly defined and penalties were reduced in Article 8 of the anti terrorism law 
3713. Furthermore, financial support was promised for those who suffered from 
terrorism and counter terrorism measures in Southeast Turkey. With modification to 
the constitution of 1982, labour organizations and associations were allowed to 
become involved in political life. 
However, modifications in the anti terrorism law and in the Constitution did not 
affect the essence of Turkey's domestic security policy. Turkey maintained a 
coercive approach to eliminate terrorism. The State of Emergency and strict inquiry 
procedures for terror-related crimes remained untouched. Restrictions on freedom of 
expression to prevent terrorist recruitment and on the use of cultural rights were 
maintained. 
In the period before 1999, three factors had limited the adoption of the EU 
requirements on countering terrorism in Turkey. First, the credibility of the EU 
conditions was suffering as Turkey was not classified as a candidate state for EU 
membership. Despite the EU membership application in 1987, Turkey was excluded 
from the EU enlargement until 1999. Consequently, Turkish Governments refused to 
attend joint summits with the EU after 1997, unless it was treated on an equal basis 
with other applicant states (Aybet, 1999: 107). 
The credibility of the EU declined further in Turkey, as the EU financial 
commitments linked with the Customs Union Agreement of 1996 were not delivered. 
Due to the Greek veto, Turkey was able to use only a quarter of the total financial 
assistance that had been allocated for the period between 1996 and 2000 (Kocak, 
2009: 129). 
Second, domestic opposition to the EU requirements had been high during the 1990s. 
Due to intense PKK attacks and the casualties, the EU requirements were perceived 
as an obstacle to the prevention of terrorism. Extension of cultural rights, 
broadcasting and official communication in different languages other than Turkish 
were seen as threats to the integrity of the Turkish Community as well as to the unity 
of the state. 
In the period, the military had received the full support of the political decision-
makers and from the public to tackle terrorism. It was seen as the primary actor to 
implement the state's counter terrorism strategy. In regular meetings, the highest 
decision-making organ, the National Security Council (MGK), had expressed support 
for the Turkish military and advised the extension of the State of Emergency, cross-
border military operations and the deployment of security forces to Eastern Turkey 
and northern Iraq (MGK, 2010). 
Third, the perceptions of the EU and Turkey had been diverse on the definition of the 
problem and the selection of policy instruments throughout the period. In Turkey, the 
source of the PKK terrorism was identified as an "Underdevelopment Problem", 
although it was seen in the EU as an ethnic conflict or a cultural phenomenon (Celik, 
2006: 212). From the EU's viewpoint, the tension in Southeast Turkey was 
determined as an ethnic conflict. The Kurdish population in Turkey was considered 
as an ethnic identity that should enjoy its cultural rights and liberties. It was stressed 
that the PKK terrorism in Turkey could be overcome through the extension of 
cultural rights and liberties and with respect for Kurdish identity (Tocci, 2007: 53). 
Contrary to the EU approach, during the 1990s, decision makers in Turkey did not 
perceive the source of terrorism as a problem involving culture and identity. It was 
believed that low income and lack of investment in Southeast Turkey were likely to 
sustain terrorism. The Kurdish population living in Turkey was seen as a part of the 
Turkish community rather than as a different ethnic population. It was perceived by 
the state that unemployed and less-educated populations were deceived and recruited 
by terror groups who promised them a better future (Atici et aI., 2002: 3). 
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As a result, the EU's approach to solve Turkey's terror problem was not legitimised 
at the domestic level between 1987 and 1999, because of Turkey's and the EU's 
diverse threat perceptions and policy preferences. 
Phase 2: 1999-2005 
In the period between 1999 and 2005, two Turkish governments had been in power. 
The ANASOL-M Government was formed as a coalition government by the 
Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the 
Motherland Party (ANAP) after parliamentary elections in April 1999. After the 
elections of November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a 
majority of the seats in the Turkish Parliament and has been the ruling party since 
then. 
Turkey was admitted as a candidate state for EU membership at the Helsinki Council 
of December 1999. The Council decision declared the start of accession negotiations 
with Turkey when political requirements were fulfilled. Along with other candidate 
states, Turkey was granted the benefit of pre-accession financial assistance and 
membership ofEU programmes and agencies (European Council, 1999a). 
Along with the decision of the Helsinki Council, the credibility of the EU was 
increased in Turkey (Keyman et aI., 2007: 71). The prospect of membership offered 
by the EU increased the optimism of decision makers in Turkey about accession to 
the EU. Surveys conducted in 2002 revealed that 64% of the Turkish public were in 
favour of EU membership (Kubicek, 2004: 49). 
Another event in February 1999 also intervened in the domestic developments on 
countering terrorism in Turkey. The PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in 
Kenya. Subsequently, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire and ended attacks 
against security forces. This lasted from 1999 to 2004. In this period, the PKK only 
performed propaganda activities through its legal elements in Europe and Turkey. 
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The end of the PKK attacks over this period reduced pressures on Turkish 
governments for the adoption of the ED requirements linked with countering 
terrorism in Turkey. Thus, the PKK ceasefrre nourished assumptions among Turkish 
decision makers that separatist terrorism in Turkey had ended (Cornell, 2001; Kirisci, 
2002: 18). Although some high-ranking military commanders criticised the adoption 
of ED political criteria, the military chief, Huseyin Kivrikoglu, and his successor, 
Hilmi Ozkok, gave support to the ED reform process (Hurriyet, 2002). 
On the other hand, during the period, the ED's and Turkey's viewpoints on the 
definition of security problems in Southeast Turkey had remained diverse. At the 
domestic level, insecurity in Southeast Turkey tended to be considered as the result 
of economic and social problems. It was assumed that the social and economic 
disadvantages of the Kurdish population had been exploited by the PKK and its legal 
elements for terrorist recruitment (Atici et aI., 2002: 3). As a policy instrument, 
Turkey opted for law enforcement measures to ensure a secure environment in 
Southeast Turkey for economic and social development. 
In Turkey, the integrity of the state and national homogeneity were still considered as 
core values. Decision makers had been hesitant to increase cultural rights for the 
Kurdish population and extend their liberties. Kurdish cultural rights were still 
considered as separatist propaganda and linked with the PKK. Corresponding with 
domestic threat perceptions, in the first National Programme for Adopting the Acquis 
(NP AA) in 2001, Turkey used tentative language on the ED demands related to 
terrorism. In the NP AA and without giving any concrete commitment, Turkey 
promised to review security measures in Southeast Turkey. Additionally, the 2001 
NP AA did not touch upon the ED demands for the extension of cultural rights. 
Instead, it emphasised national homogeneity, the integrity of the state and the 
equality of the citizens (Council of Ministers, 2001). 
Contrary to Turkey's approach, in AP documents and in progress reports, the EU 
identified the problem in Southeast Turkey as an ethnic conflict or an identity 
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problem. From the EU's perspective, the Kurdish population in Turkey was 
identified as an ethnic minority that should enjoy its own culture, liberties and 
language (European Council, 2001, 2003a). The EU advocated a peaceful settlement 
to end the conflict in Southeast Turkey. In the AP documents and in progress reports, 
the EU requested extension of cultural rights and peaceful solutions to pacify the 
PKK. 
In response to the 9/11 attacks in the US, international cooperation against terrorism 
rapidly increased at the global level. In Europe, the European Council started to 
produce a list of terrorist organizations as of December 2001. However, in the first 
list of 200 I, the PKK was not included. After Turkey's diplomatic efforts, the PKK 
was included in the updated terror list of May 2002 (8ese, 2004: 127). However, in 
practical terms, the activities of the PKK remained untouched in Europe. It was able 
to conduct financing, recruitment and propaganda activities in European countries. 
Related with this issue, an official from the European Council's Counter Terrorism 
Coordination Unit claimed in an interview that, 
"The EU considers the PKK as a local problem which is confined to 
Turkey. It is not considered as a terror threat for the whole of Europe. 
PKK uses European countries just as a support base. Members of the 
PKK are involved in trafficking and intimidation to get finance from 
Kurdish immigrants. They do not commit terror crimes in the EU. 
Violent incidents occurred during some of the demonstrations in the past 
but they were small attacks to diplomatic premises of Turkey" 
(Interview# 11 , 2011). 
In similar vein, an official from the DG Home claimed that, 
"In the EU, counter terrorism policy is determined parallel to the 
activities of terrorist organizations. The PKK is dealing with drugs and 
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human trafficking but they don't perform terrorist attacks in the EU. 
Therefore it is not seen in the interest of the EU counter terrorism policy" 
(Interview#8, 2011). 
In the period between 1999 and 2005, limited progress was observed in Turkey on 
countering terrorism. This situation is explained by two factors. First, the high 
credibility of the EU after Turkey's candidacy boosted the willingness of the 
ANASOL-M Coalition Government to intensify relations with the EU. The EU 
requirements related to countering terrorism in Turkey were seen as a necessary cost 
to get the benefits of the pre-accession process (Bac, 2005: 20). It was thought in 
Turkey that intensifying relations with the EU would advance internal security 
cooperation with the EU against the PKK. 
Second, the PKK's unilateral ceasefire after the detention of its leader, Ocalan, 
diminished the adoption costs at the domestic level. The termination of the PKK 
attacks for five years enabled Turkish decision makers to make revisions in the 
counter terrorism strategy against the PKK. Parallel with the conclusion of the PKK 
attacks, the Turkish military gradually relaxed the security measures in Southeast 
Turkey. 
To meet the political conditions of the EU, the ANASOL-M Government under 
Bulent Ecevit had passed three reform packages before 2002 (Tocci, 2005: 73). 
Amendments in the first two reform packages had limited the powers of law 
enforcement organizations during criminal investigations and shortened pre-
detention periods. Pre-detention periods for organised crime and terror-related crimes 
were reduced by up to four days. Anti-terrorism law no 3713 was also modified and 
narrower definitions and shorter sentences were established for terrorist propaganda 
crimes (ABGS, 2007). 
The death penalty was abolished in 2001 for crimes committed in peacetime (Bar, 
2007: 4). Initially, the death penalty remained applicable for terror and wartime 
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crimes under Article 18 of the Constitution. However, due to EU pressure during the 
trial of Abdullah Ocalan, the ANASOL-M government formulated a middle way and 
decided to suspend the execution of Abdullah Ocalan's sentence until his trial ends in 
the European Court of Human Rights (European Commission, 2001 b). 
On the other hand, due to allegations of torture and ill-treatment by the security 
forces, Turkey was still criticized by the Council of Europe. The EU also called for 
further efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In the 2002 progress report, the 
Commission noted Turkey's progress to improve human rights standards. Yet it 
called for implementation of the adopted revisions to fully meet the EU conditions 
(European Commission, 2002a). Despite the revision of propaganda crimes in anti-
terrorism legislation, in 2001 and 2002 80 books were confiscated because of 
allegations of terrorist propaganda. Due to breaching of anti-terrorist legislation and 
having links with terror organizations, 57 authors were prosecuted in Turkey 
(Hurriyet,2003). 
In the November 2002 general election, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
won a majority of the seats in the Turkish Parliament. In its party programme, the 
new government committed itself to advance relations with the EU and to start the 
accession negotiations. It also got domestic support from civil society for the 
adoption of democratic reforms. 
The AK Party Government passed five reform packages between 2002 and 2004 to 
meet EU political conditions. Concerning counter terrorism policy, the democratic 
reform packages passed in 2003 and 2004 had introduced a narrower approach for 
the definition of terrorism. In Article 1 of the amended anti -terrorism legislation, the 
"use of force" and "criminal actions" were introduced as pre-conditions for terror 
crimes. The offence of terrorist propaganda against the integrity of the state was also 
abandoned in anti-terrorism legislation. Parliament also passed a law for 
compensation of losses resulting from terrorist acts. The law introduced a swift 
process for citizens living in insecurity zones to claim their damages without 
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applying to the courts. The death penalty was abandoned in July 2004 and all 
suspended death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, including Ocalan's 
(Bar, 2007: 3). 
Along with revisions in the Turkish Constitution of 1982, moderately firm conditions 
were set up for the prohibition of political parties. Pro-Kurdish Party members held 
in prison since 1994 were granted the right to a retrial and later freed in 2004. 
However, contrary to the reforms, the pro-Kurdish Peoples Democracy Party 
(HADEP) was banned from politics in 2003 because of its links with the PKK. It was 
addressed by the Constitutional Court for being a source of threats against the 
integrity of the state (Radikal, 2003). 
With the seventh reform package, passed in July 2003, structural changes were made 
to the National Security Council (MGK). Secretariat duty was taken from the 
military and given to a civilian bureaucrat. A mechanism was established to monitor 
its budget and the period between its regular meetings was extended. In consequence, 
military influence in the MGK as well as on Turkey's counter terrorism policy has 
been lessened. However, at the domestic level, the military still tended to be 
considered as the guardian of the state against internal and external security threats. 
Furthermore, some minor changes were made to extend cultural rights in the country. 
Broadcasting and education in the Kurdish language was permitted. Along with this, 
private language courses were opened in some provinces of Turkey. However, in 
practical terms, the use of the Kurdish language in political and daily life was still 
restricted. Some pro-Kurdish party members were sentenced for reading Kurdish 
statements during party meetings in 2003 and 2005. In Southeast Turkey, some 
Kurdish music albums were banned in 2005 by court rulings due to alleged terrorist 
propaganda under the Turkish Penal Code, Article 312 (European Commission, 
2005b). 
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In brief, the ANASOL-M Government and its successor, the AKP, introduced a 
range of refonns to balance security measures and liberties in Turkey between 1999 
and 2004. However, in practical tenns, implementation has been superficial. Due to 
the diverse perceptions of the EU and Turkey over the Kurdish question, the EU 
approach and demands on Turkish counter terrorism policy were not legitimised at 
the domestic level. Although governments had passed eight refonn packages before 
2005, implementation of the refonns on Kurdish cultural rights and countering 
terrorism had remained limited. Despite changes in anti-terrorism law, the Turkish 
Penal Code was used by the courts in practice to preserve the integrity of the state 
(Schimmelfennig et aI., 2006: 104; Tocci, 2007: 62). 
In the Turkish Constitution, Article 14, the tendency to use repression on cultural 
rights was preserved despite being inconsistent with modifications on democratic 
refonns. According to Article 14, it is emphasized that any of the individual rights 
could not be used against the territorial integrity and unity of Turkey and the 
democratic and secular composition of the state (Constitution, 1982). Finally, with 
the resumption of the PKK attacks in 2004, security measures were intensified. 
Phase 3: 2005-2010 
The period starts with the opening of accession negotiations between the EU and 
Turkey. Following a communication from the Commission issued in November 
2004, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey in 
December 2004. In the communication, the Commission found that Turkey's 
progress satisfied the political conditions of the EU. The Council therefore 
recommended opening of negotiations with Turkey. However, in the Commission 
report, tentative language was preferred about the future of relations between Turkey 
and the EU. The Commission report determined Turkey's position as being different 
due to Turkey's size, population, location, military and security potential. It describes 
the negotiation process as "an open-ended process the outcome of which cannot be 
guaranteed beforehand" (European Commission, 2004a). Similarly, in the Council 
statement of October 2005 on the start of negotiations with Turkey, the negotiation 
process IS determined as open-ended. A long period is foreseen for Turkey's 
readiness for EU membership and the EU's absorption capacity is considered as a 
pre-condition for Turkey's accession (European Council, 2005a). 
After the openmg of negotiations, the European Council endorsed an Accession 
Partnership in January 2006 and revised it in February 2008 to represent the 
membership requirements. Concerning the situation in Southeast Turkey, the AP 
document of 2006 asked for the abolition of the village guard system, compensation 
for losses of the victims of terrorism and for the strengthening of cultural, social and 
economic opportunities for the Kurdish population. 
In the period, the Cyprus problem has further increased tensions between the EU and 
Turkey. In 2006, the EU suspended accession negotiations with Turkey on eight 
chapters. This disagreement with the EU on the Cyprus problem and confusion about 
the intention the EU on Turkey's accession resulted in unceliainty in Turkey. It was 
claimed by Turkey that the EU applies different standards for Turkey and changes its 
commitments. In consequence, credibility of the conditionality has started to decline 
since 2005. 
Further to the political problems with the EU, the PKK has ended its five-year 
unilateral ceasefire and started to carry out attacks against security forces in 
Southeast Turkey since the end of 2004. The resumption of the PKK attacks and 
military causalities stimulated nationalism and concerns about the territorial integrity 
of Turkey. Thus, the adoption of a balanced approach between liberties and counter 
terrorism measures in the period has been costly. 
Along with escalation of PKK attacks, the military presence has started to increase 
and tough security measures were again introduced. Implementation of the 
modifications made between 1999 and 2004 for the extension of Kurdish cultural 
rights has been constrained. For instance, broadcasting in Kurdish by private 
organizations was not authorized until February 2010, although legal changes were 
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made to ease restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language (CNNTurk, 2010). 
Although the State of Emergency was completely abandoned in 2002, military forces 
started to establish security zones and frequent checkpoints around some provinces in 
Southeast Turkey (Uslu, 2008). In the Commission progress report of 2005, the 
situation was described as "Turkey continues to adopt a restrictive approach to 
minorities and cultural rights" (European Commission, 2005b). 
In the period, the EU approach and domestic perceptions concerning the tensions in 
Southeast Turkey have remained diverse. In the progress reports of 2006, 2007, 2008 
and 2009, the Commission called on Turkey to find a peaceful solution to its terror 
problem. In AP documents of 2006 and in progress reports, the EU considered the 
Kurdish population as an ethnic minority. To end terrorism, it proposed the extension 
of Kurdish cultural rights and liberties and the protection of human rights. The EU 
also called for socio-economic and cultural development in Southeast Turkey as an 
alternative to the use of law enforcement measures against the PKK. 
On the contrary, the EU's perception and proposals to end violence did not resonate 
with domestic threat perceptions and selected policy instruments. The use of law 
enforcement measures had been a top priority until 2010 to end tensions. On the 
domestic level, it was considered that tension in Southeast Turkey is solely driven by 
the PKK and its international alliance. In nationalist circles, the European states are 
blamed for not taking necessary action against PKK members in Europe. It was 
claimed that EU reforms and requests addressing the extension of ethnic, cultural and 
political rights are actually targeted at weakening Turkey'S national homogeneity and 
the territorial integrity of the state (Polat, 2008: 78; Tocci, 2005: 76). 
Turkey's traditional approach to the Kurdish issue has started to change. For the first 
time, in August 2005, the Justice and Development Party government under PM 
Tayyip Erdogan identified the tensions in Southeast Turkey as the "Kurdish 
Problem" rather than exclusively calling the situation a matter of terrorism. He 
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addressed cultural differences and the multicultural structure of Turkey (Milliyet, 
2005b). 
However, the Kemalist elites and political opposition groups, even some MP's in the 
Justice and Development Party, have voiced reservations on this definition and 
insisted on identifying the tensions in Southeast Turkey as a "PKK problem", a 
"terror problem" or a "security issue" (Milliyet, 2005a). Opponents considered the 
Government's new approach to be a threat to the integrity of Turkey. Later, in a 
MGK meeting declaration of August 2005, the terms "PKK terrorism" and "Kurdish 
problem" were distinguished. In the MGK declaration, the protection of the unity of 
Turkey and the fight against the PKK was declared to be the top priority of the state 
(Milliyet, 2005a). 
With the escalation of terrorist attacks since 2005, security institutions, mainly the 
Turkish military, have started to raise concerns about the legal background of the 
fight against terrorism. The military addressed the adoption requirements of the ED, 
which was made in anti-terrorism law in 2003 and 2004 as drawbacks in the fight 
against the PKK - and called for revisions (Hurriyet, 2006). In consequence, a bill 
was passed by the Parliament in June 2006 to change the anti-terrorism law. The new 
law introduced new restrictions on the media against terrorist propaganda. Besides, 
the anti-terror law broadened the authority of security officials and toughened the 
procedures for the offences committed during their enforcement duties to prevent 
terrorism. The law eased procedures for the prosecution of terrorism offenders and 
limited access to lawyers for the first 24 hours after their capture. In the new law, 
only terrorist attacks against Turkey were considered as terrorism. Acts against third 
countries and international organizations were excluded from the definition of 
terrorism. 
However, the restrictions on media and freedom of expression introduced by the new 
anti-terror law raised criticism in the ED. The European Commission claimed that 
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the definition of propaganda crimes was not in line with the Council of Europe 
Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism (European Commission, 2006b). 
Along with implementation of counter terrorism against the PKK, the Government 
introduced alternative measures to reduce tensions in Southeast Turkey. The state 
television channel (TR T) and two private TV channels started broadcasting in 
Kurdish in 2006. In 2009, the Turkish Higher Education Board permitted the opening 
of a Kurdish education centre in a University in Mardin. 
Additionally, the Government started its "Kurdish Initiative" or "Democratic 
Initiative" in August 2009. In this regard, the PKK was called on to give up the 
armed struggle through terrorist means. Members of the organisation who were not 
involved any terrorist attack were granted parole if they handed their arms to the 
security forces. Subsequently, 34 PKK members returned to Turkey from Northern 
Iraq in October 2009 and were released without facing any prosecution (Sabah, 
2009). 
However, opposition parties, the military and the Kemalist elites have considered this 
process and the release of PKK members as a compromise with the PKK. Later, by 
the end of 2010, the democratic initiative slowed down due to high adaptation costs 
at the domestic level. The Constitutional Court banned the pro-Kurdish Democratic 
Society Party (DTP) in December 2009 on charges of having links with the PKK. 
Also, two DTP MPs and thirty-seven party members were banned from politics 
(Hurriyet, 2009). 
Concerning international cooperation against the financing of terrorism, Turkey has 
been party to all UN and Council of Europe anti-terrorism protocols in the period. In 
January 2005, Turkey ratified the amending protocol of the European Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorism. Turkey then ratified the Council of Europe Convention 
on the Financing of Terrorism in March 2007. Turkey's MASAK started to cooperate 
with international organizations on the prevention of the financing of terrorism. 
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In 2006, a twinning project on money laundering and the fmancing of terrorism was 
begun with fmancial assistance from the EU. As a result, a law on preventing the 
laundering of the proceedings of crime was passed in 2006. With revisions made in 
the Turkish Criminal Code and anti-terror law in 2006, the financial sponsors of 
terrorist groups became punishable as members of terrorist organisations. 
On the other hand, international cooperation with the EU against the PKK has still 
been very limited. Although the PKK was included in the EU list of terror 
organisations in 2002, most of the measures to prevent PKK activities in Europe 
proved ineffective (Renard, 2008). In many European states, the organisation was 
able to engage in fund raising, propaganda, training and recruitment. The PKK-Ied 
TV station 'Roj TV' has started broadcasting from Denmark in 2004 and maintained 
its presence until now. Despite arrest warrants from Interpol, PKK members were 
released after being detained in various European countries. Some prominent PKK 
members such as the leaders of PKK European Branch Zubeyr Aydar, Remzi Kartal, 
Sabri Ok, Nedim Seven, Muzaffer Ayata were allowed to be resident in European 
countries (SABAH, 2011; Uslu, 2007: 167). 
A 2008 report on the Coordination of Terrorism prepared by the US State 
Department noted that the PKK operative, Riza Altun, was detained in Austria in 
2007 but later released despite having fake documents, facing charges in France and 
being subject to an extradition request from Turkey. Similarly, another key PKK 
organizer, Remzi Kartal, travelling to Austria was not detained although he was 
wanted by Interpol. Additionally, the PKK is known to have TV production studios 
in Belgium. South Cyprus is used as a transit route to Europe for PKK members (US, 
2008: 55). 
In brief, despite the negotiation process that started between Turkey and the EU in 
2005, Turkey'S counter terrorism policy has contrasted with the conditions laid down 
by the EU. Three factors have limited compliance with the EU requirements. First, 
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adoption of the EU requirements has been costly for the decision makers of Turkey 
with the resuming of PKK attacks at the end of 2004. Second, the credibility of 
conditionality has declined because of political problems between Turkey and the 
EU. The negotiation process was partially suspended and support for EU 
membership declined at the domestic level. Third, the perception of Turkey in the 
fight against terrorism and the EU approach had still differed. Although the PKK was 
placed on the EU list of terrorist organisations in 2002, PKK members remained 
active in Europe. Moreover in Turkey, the EU conditions on Turkey's counter 
terrorism policy were still considered as threats against unity of the country. 
Consequently, in anti-terrorism law 3713 restrictions were reintroduced to prevent 
the glorification of terrorism. In Southeast Turkey, the military established security 
zones and intensified operations along the Turkish-Iraqi border. In other words, the 
EU approach and policy instruments for a solution to the tensions in Southeast 
Turkey were not legitimised at the domestic level. 
5.7. Conclusion 
Since Turkey's application for EU membership in 1987, Turkey's counter terrorism 
policy differed from the EU's approach until 2010. Over the period, Turkey's 
principal policy instrument has been to use law enforcement measures to end 
tensions in Southeast Turkey. Turkey's strategy throughout the period has also 
included legal restrictions on fundamental liberties and cultural rights, and attempts 
to control the PKK's political activities. Although Turkey has sometimes begun to 
use softer instruments to end terrorism, violence and casualties have raised domestic 
fears about territorial integrity of Turkey and led to the failure of the reform process. 
In the period between 1987 and 1999, PKK terrorism reached high levels in Turkey. 
In 1996 alone, nearly 3,000 people were killed because of terror-related events. In 
response, Turkey implemented extreme measures on countering terrorism. In this 
tumultuous period, terrorist attacks and counter measures against the PKK resulted in 
breaches of human rights, unsolved murders, displacement of civilians and villages 
and the killing of activists and journalists. Further to military measures, restrictions 
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were introduced in the political field to tackle the legal aspects of the PKK. Two 
Kurdish political parties were banned in 1993 and in 1994 because of alleged links 
with the PKK. MPs from pro-Kurdish parties were detained and suspended from 
political life. 
At the same time, Turkey's counter terrorism practices were subject to criticism in 
the ED. Especially, the European Parliament frequently raised concerns on human 
rights violations in Turkey and condemned Turkey's tough counter terrorism strategy 
over the 1990s. However, the pre-1999 ED demands carried little weight in Turkey, 
as structural relations with the ED did not exist. The Customs Union Agreement of 
1996 was the main mechanism through which the EU was able to put forward certain 
requirements related to Turkey's counter terrorism policy. However, due to a 
shortage of incentives and credibility, the EU requirements were ineffective. 
On the other hand, for the Turkish governments, adoption of the EU requirements on 
countering terrorism was costly throughout the 1990s because of the PKK attacks 
and high military casualties. Adoption of the EU requirements for changes in 
Turkey's counter terrorism policy were seen as inappropriate and was contested by 
the military and state elites. Besides, the EU's requirements had not been legitimised 
at the domestic level because of the divergence between Turkish and ED perceptions 
of the problem in Southeast Turkey which Turkey considered to be either an 
underdevelopment problem or a security issue, whereas the EU perceived it as an 
ethnic conflict. 
Although Turkey used tough security measures as the sole instrument to end 
terrorism, the EU asked for a balance between security measures and civil liberties. 
In that sense, the ED has frequently emphasised the need for a political settlement, 
the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights, respect for human rights and socio-
economic development to end terrorism. In consequence, since the necessary 
conditions were lacking, Turkey did not comply with EU requirements between 1987 
and 1999. 
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In the second period, structural relations started between Turkey and the EU. The EU 
confirmed Turkey's candidacy for EU membership in 1999. Conditions for Turkey's 
accession were clarified through accession partnership documents and progress 
reports. At the start of structured relations, delivery of financial assistance and 
institutional links increased the credibility of the EU in Turkey. 
After Turkey was granted candidate status in 1999, domestic support for EU 
membership increased substantially. To start the accession negotiations, adoption of 
the political conditions was seen as a necessary cost to be paid by Turkey. Therefore, 
Turkish governments introduced eight reform packages before 2004 to meet these 
EU political conditions. 
Turkey's domestic adoption costs were further reduced in 1999 when the PKK 
declared a unilateral ceasefire. After the capture of the PKK leader Ocalan, in 1999, 
the PKK gave up the armed struggle until 2004. This ceasefire from 1999 to 2004 
nourished assumptions in Turkey about the conclusion of separatist terrorism. 
However, the EU and Turkey still had diverse perceptions between 1999 and 2005 
concerning the tensions in Southeast Turkey. In Turkey, integrity of the state and 
national homogeneity had been considered as core values to be protected against 
external and internal threats. Therefore, domestic demands for the extension of 
Kurdish cultural rights were considered as separatist propaganda and linked with the 
PKK. On the contrary to Turkey's perception Accession Partnership documents and 
Progress Reports of the EU had identified the tensions in Southeast Turkey as an 
identity problem. Turkey's Kurdish population was classified as an ethnic minority 
that should enjoy its own culture, liberties, and language. 
Consequently, despite high EU credibility and relatively low adoption costs. Turkey 
did not comply with the EU requirements on countering terrorism. Turkish decision 
makers had been wary of the effect on counter terrorism measures of easing 
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restrictions on cultural rights and broadening liberties. The ED proposals to find a 
peaceful solution to PKK activities were rejected by Turkey because of their 
different approaches. Concurrently, transposition of the reform packages in domestic 
politics had remained limited. 
In the third period, between 2005 and 2010, political debate in the EU on Turkey's 
accession increased uncertainty at the domestic level. Furthermore, due to the 
isolation of the North Cypriot Community, Turkey refused to open Turkish harbours 
to Cypriot vessels. Subsequently, in 2006, the ED partially suspended negotiations 
with Turkey leading to a decline in the credibility of the EU conditionality. 
In addition to low credibility, adaptation costs increased because of the resumption of 
the PKK attacks since the end of 2004. The PKK attacks and the rise in military 
casualties increased domestic reactions against the EU requirements. Therefore, the 
use of law enforcement measures remained as the principal instrument for the 
protection of the integrity of Turkey. 
161 
6. The impact of the EU on combating drugs in Turkey 
6.1. Introduction 
Today, consumption of illicit drugs 1 is not only perceived as a problem which affects 
the living conditions of individuals but is also considered as a security threat which 
leads to an increase in criminal activity. Increasing demand for narcotic substances 
triggers both manufacturing and trafficking of drugs. Therefore, contemporary drug 
policies exploit a comprehensive approach, which targets the demand and supply of 
drugs simultaneously. In other words, existing national drug policies cover social and 
criminal aspects of drug abuse to tackle the problem effectively. 
However, the cross-border nature of drug trafficking and widespread consumption of 
drugs entails not only national efforts but also international cooperation. 
Coordination of national efforts appears as a condition for tackling this global 
phenomenon. It is widely accepted that compatible national drug policies of different 
states is likely to increase the efficiency of national measures and international 
cooperation against drugs (European Council, 2008b). 
Meanwhile, the UN performs the leading role in tackling the drug problem 
worldwide. UN Conventions and institutions in the fight against drugs help to 
develop a common approach between the national drug policies of states in different 
regions. UN Conventions on drugs oblige signatory states to develop national 
policies against drugs and lay down a set of instruments to be used for controlling the 
manufacture and trade of licit drugs and the criminalisation of illicit traffic. 
In addition to the UN, the EU performs an important role for the development of 
compatible drug policies in Europe. To reduce drug demand and supply, the EU 
provisions provide a basis for the alignment of national drug policies between 
I In this paper. the term or--drugs" is used for any of the illicit narcotic substances whdher natural or 
synthetic. 
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member states. The ED drug policy also envisages the alignment of criminal law 
against the illicit traffic, manufacturing and trading of drugs, the monitoring of the 
trade in psychotropic substances and the mobilization of law enforcement 
cooperation. Additionally, ED drug strategies and drug action plans aim to 
coordinate activities to increase the effectiveness of national and the ED-level 
policies within Justice and Home Affairs. 
The ED action on drugs not only pursues cooperation between member states but 
also influences third countries. Particularly, in candidate states, alignment with the 
ED drug policy and international cooperation against drugs are counted as one of the 
key priorities in the pre-accession period. Candidate states are required to comply 
with the ED acquis for harmonization of definitions of offences and criminal 
procedures and to tackle the social aspects of the drug problem. Candidate states are 
also required to create certain institutional structures for strengthening international 
cooperation in the fight against drugs. 
Thus, the ED set up conditionality to pursue compliance during the acceSSIOn 
process. Accession partnerships, progress reports and incentives underpin the 
alignment of candidate states. In order to mediate domestic policy transition, the ED 
uses various instruments including financial and technical aid, monitoring 
mechanisms, appointment of liaison officers and twinning programmes. 
Based on the above developments, this chapter analyses the conditions for adoption 
of the ED policy in combating drugs in Turkey. Like the previous two chapters the 
study employs four mediating factors. To give a thorough understanding about the 
conditions for adoption of the ED requirements in combating drugs, domestic 
developments were analysed through control of "determinacy of the EU 
requirements", "credibility of conditionality", "domestic adoption costs" and 
"convergence of threat perceptions". 
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To begin with, the analysis outlines a conceptual framework for the conditions of the 
impact of the ED in combating drugs. It then extracts the dynamics in the EU in the 
fight against drugs and domestic conditions in Turkey. Finally, the study investigates 
the outcome of the EU's requirements with reference to three different periods 
between 1987 and 2010. 
6.2. Conditions shaping the impact of the EU in combating drugs 
in Turkey 
The determinants of the policy transition in Turkey are classified under two 
categories: External (ED-level) factors and domestic conditions. In this regard, 
"Determinacy of the EU requirements" and "Credibility of conditionality" are 
categorized as EU-level factors. On the other hand, domestic factors that have an 
impact on policy transition are counted as "adoption costs" and "the convergence of 
threat perceptions between Turkey and the EU". 
Determinacy of the EU requirements 
The EU started to determine accession conditionality for Turkey in combating drugs 
after it became recognized as a candidate state in 1999. Relations before 1999 had 
aimed to develop a liberal market economy in Turkey and to facilitate mutual trade 
between the EU and Turkey. 
The external features of JHA and internal security cooperation with non-member 
states were not considered as objectives under JHA. In 1998, alignment of candidate 
states under JHA was included in accession conditionality of CEECs for the first 
time (Mitsilegas et at., 2003: 130). Later, in the Tampere meeting conclusions of 
October 1999, the Council addressed the necessity of internal security cooperation 
with third states under JHA. It emphasized the harmonization of internal and external 
security policies and stronger external action to tackle internal security threats. 
After Turkey was granted ED candidacy in 1999, the European Council endorsed the 
first Accession Partnership (AP) in 2001 and determined a framework to be adopted 
by Turkey for its alignment with EU drug policy. Later, in 2003, 2006 and in 2008 
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the European Council endorsed additional APs for Turkey and detennined short- and 
medium-tenn membership conditions. In the AP documents, the EU required the 
reinforcement of administrative capacity to adopt, implement and manage the EU 
acquis on drug trafficking as part of the fight against drugs (European Council, 2001, 
2003a; European Council, 2006; European Council, 2008a). After 1999, the 
European Commission started to issue Progress Reports. In these annual reports, the 
Commission further clarified EU conditionality on drugs and addressed requirements 
for compliance with the EU drug policy in Turkey. 
Under JHA, acceSSlOn conditionality in combating drugs establishes a threefold 
agenda for applicant states. First, the EU requires adoption of the EU acqllis in the 
fight against drugs. The EU acquis on drugs comprehends both drug supply and 
demand-reduction measures including framework decisions, joint actions, counter 
drug strategies, programmes and drug action plans. In addition to the legal provisions 
of the EU, international drug conventions ratified by the EU are considered to be part 
of the EU acquis. Thus, the EU particularly asks for ratification of the 1961, 1971 
and 1988 UN Drug Conventions and other relevant international conventions as a 
condition of compliance with the EU anti-drug policy. 
Second, the EU demands the establishment of adequate administrative 
infrastructures, which are capable of implementing the EU acquis in the fight against 
drugs. Conditionality on the development of administrative structures underlines the 
establishment of new institutions, management systems and coordination 
mechanisms to maintain cooperation against drugs trafficking in Europe. In this 
. regard, administrative structures are required to be capable of implementing the EU 
acquis and undertaking operational cooperation with EU agencies and member state 
institutions (European Commission, 2005b). 
Third, the EU asks for the development of international cooperation between EU 
institutions and national agencies in the fight against drugs. Conditionality obliges 
states to establish institutional links between domestic institutions and EU agencies 
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for involvement in ED activities on demand and supply reduction. Therefore, the ED 
asks for participation in the activities of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and establishment of a national focal point on 
drugs. At the domestic level, accession states are required to coordinate national 
efforts on demand-reduction, supply-reduction and rehabilitation through appropriate 
national coordinating institutions. National law enforcement agencies are required to 
cooperate with ED member state institutions against cross-border drug trafficking 
through strategic or operational agreement with Europol and member state 
institutions. 
Credibility of conditionality 
In Turkey, candidacy for ED membership had been an important factor in increasing 
the credibility of ED conditionality since 1999 (Schimmelfennig et aI., 2005; 42; 
Keyman et aI., 2007: 71). In the Helsinki Council of 1999, the ED formally declared 
Turkey as a candidate state for ED accession and allowed it to benefit from pre-
accession financial assistance and to join ED programmes and agencies (European 
Council, 1999a). 
This decision received positive responses as it strengthened ED membership 
expectancy in Turkey and acted as an incentive for Turkey to adopt ED drug policy 
after 1999. Intensifying interactions between Turkey and the ED and the delivery of 
financial assistance gave credibility to membership conditionality between 1999 and 
2005. 
Delivery of financial assistance and institutional links with the ED agencies against 
drugs also increased the ED's credibility. At the start of structured relations, the ED 
allocated pre-accession fmancial assistance to Turkey to support the foundation of 
the Turkish National Focal Point to the EMCDDA and to adopt a national strategy in 
the fight against drugs (CFCD, 2002). These membership links between EMCDDA 
and Turkey's National Focal Point allowed Turkey to join community programmes in 
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combating drugs. Europol also concluded a strategic cooperation agreement with 
Turkey in 2004. 
However, the credibility of the ED conditionality started to decline in Turkey after 
2005. The opening of negotiations in 2005 initiated a debate in the ED over the side 
effects of Turkey accession. Opponents of Turkey's membership put forward the 
absorption capacity of the ED as an obstacle to Turkey becoming a new member 
state, although this had not been raised as a problem before the commencement of 
negotiations with Turkey. It was argued that Turkey's extensive borders. population 
and cultural differences would be injurious to the EU's economy and security 
(Kirisci, 2007: 8). This was compounded by Cyprus' ED membership and the 
isolation of the Turkish-Cypriots raised questions about the EU's fairness to Turkey. 
Turkish decision-makers and the country's elites began to criticize the EU for its 
unequal treatment of Turkey. 
Domestic adaptation costs 
Compliance with ED drugs policy does not imply high adaptation costs for Turkey. 
The absence of adoption costs and domestic resistance to combating drugs are 
attributed to two main factors. First, Turkey's membership of EMCDDA has been an 
opportunity for Turkey to intensify its institutional relationship with the EU. 
Institutional links created new opportunity structures for Turkish administrative 
bodies to take a part in international initiatives on drugs. A senior official in the 
Ministry of the Interior claimed that, 
"Institutional links with the ED agenCIes IS valuable to advance 
enforcement against illicit trafficking and manufacturing in Turkey. The 
ED assistance, strategic and operational cooperation agreements with EU 
agencies helps administrative capacity development and improves the 
effectiveness of Turkish institutions in the fight against drugs. All in all, 
the relations with the EU contribute to the internal security of Turkey" 
(lnterview#l, 2009). 
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Second, the interactions with the EU and adoption of the EU requirements were seen 
as an opportunity to strengthen the internal security of Turkey. In that sense, the EU 
financial assistance, twinning projects and training seminars held between EU 
member state agencies and Turkish authorities minimize the number of opponents in 
Turkey to veto its new drug policy. Particularly, after adoption of the EU 2000-2004 
action plan on drugs and the 2003 action plan for collaboration between the EU and 
the Western Balkan and candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), 
various seminars, workshops and study visits on demand and supply reduction took 
place with participation of officials in Turkey and in EU member states. 
An official in the Turkish Ministry of the Interior claimed that, 
"relations with the EU are constructive as they strengthen the internal 
security of Turkey. Study visits, training seminars and other interactions 
with the EU member state agencies are helpful for exchange of best 
practices. Officials in Turkish institutions are benefiting from these 
programmes to advance technical and practical capabilities in the fight 
against drugs. Furthermore, information exchange, sharing best practices 
between national agencies and member state institutions facilitates 
international cooperation and the number of controlled delivery 
operations for drug seizures" (Interview#6, 2010). 
Convergence of threat perceptions: Domestic resonance and 
legitimacy of EU approach 
The convergence of Turkish and EU perceptions in combating drugs increases the 
likelihood of the adoption of the EU requirements in Turkey. Although Turkey uses 
slightly different problem-solving approaches, both Turkey and the EU perceive 
drugs as a particular problem for both public health and security. Shared internal 
security objectives and common threat perceptions legitimized the EU policy and 
requirements among Turkish decision-makers and officials in public institutions. 
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Common threat perception with the EU and the legitimacy of EU drug policy in 
Turkey rests upon three reasons. First, it is perceived in Turkey that drug abuse and 
addiction are potential threats to the community. According to Turkish public 
opinion, drug addiction is a serious health problem and source of social disorder 
(TUBIM, 2007b). Therefore, it is considered an important duty of the state and non-
governmental organisations to tackle addiction and the underlying reasons for drug 
abuse. 
The Turkish constitution of 1982 obliges governments to determine policies for 
maintaining social order and to protect the community from bad tendencies, 
including drugs. Article 58 of the constitution regards drug addiction as damaging to 
the community. The constitution specifically emphasizes youth as a target group for 
drug addiction and obliges governments to take all necessary actions against drugs. 
In Article 58 of the constitution, it is stated that ..... The State shall take relevant 
measures to protect young people from alcohol and drug addiction, from criminal 
activities, gambling and similar vicious practices and habits as well as illiteracy" 
(Constitution, 1982). The Constitution goes on to oblige governments to enhance the 
state's problem-solving capacities against drug demand. In this regard, the EU's 
problem-solving approach to the drug problem is seen to be appropriate for meeting 
Turkey'S domestic needs and policy challenges. Domestic policy objectives on drugs 
legitimize the adoption of EU drug policy and alignment with EU administrative 
structures. 
Second, due to its geographical proximity to Europe and Asia, Turkey has been a 
transit country for illicit drug trafficking activities. Turkey straddles the so-called 
"Balkan Route" which is llsed for transferring drugs produced in Afghanistan to 
Western Europe (Europol, 2008: 39). The particularly mountainous terrain on the 
borders of Southeast Turkey facilitates smuggling of narcotic substances through the 
Iranian and Iraqi borders. International and Turkish-based organised crime groups 
take a big share in trafficking heroin to Europe (Paoli et aI., 2008: 26). In 2007, over 
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two tons of heroin, nearly six million synthetic drug tablets and thirteen thousand 
litres of psychotropic substances were seized on Turkish territory (KOM, 2007). 
Terrorist organizations in Turkey, such as the PKK also use drug trafficking to get 
financial support for their activities. Primarily, the PKK uses the "Balkan Route" as a 
transit destination for trafficking heroin to Europe. Turkish migrants and Kurdish 
,refugees in European countries are used as bases for trafficking narcotic substances 
(Pek et al., 2007: 146-148; Robins, 2005). In Europe, low socio-economic status and 
cultural marginalization motivate immigrants to become involved in drug trafficking. 
Kin-based relationships between members of organised crime groups and the 
difficulty of translation from the Turkish and Kurdish languages make enforcement 
problematic for European security agencies (Paoli et al., 2008: 24) 
Third, for over a decade, Turkey was involved in international initiatives for the fight 
against drugs in its region. Relations with the UN and neighbouring countries in 
combating drugs developed recognition about drug-related crimes and international 
security cooperation among Turkish officials (Interview#3, 2009). Primarily, Turkey 
intensified interactions with the EU after 2001 and set up institutional links on the 
fight against cross-border trafficking and drug abuse. With the allocation of pre-
accession financial assistance for institution-building and capacity-development, 
Turkish officials became involved in training seminars, workshops and mutual visits 
with their counterparts in the EU member states. These activities have led to a 
learning process among Turkish officials and legitimized the EU drug policy in 
Turkey. 
It is claimed by an official at European Commission that, 
"Twinning projects have been the most useful instrument to line up 
domestic policies of applicant states in combating drugs. The official 
from beneficiary countries is able to become aware of the EU policies 
through direct interactions with the contractor member state officials. 
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Through mISSIOn reports of the officials, the EU is able to monitor 
domestic developments very closely. In that sense results of the twinning 
projects are excellent" (Interview#10, 2011). 
In addition to interactions with the EU, Turkey's long-standing cooperation with the 
UN in the fight against drugs increases the likelihood of international cooperation in 
Turkey. In 2000, Turkey set up the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and 
Organised Crime (T ADOC) with UN financial assistance. Meanwhile, in cooperation 
with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Turkish police 
provide training seminars to domestic institutions and neighbouring countries to 
tackle drug trafficking and organised crime. Lengthy cooperation with the UN 
ensures Turkish officials' readiness for international security cooperation against 
drugs (Interview#1, 2009). 
On the other hand, from the EU's point of view, cooperation with Turkey and other 
applicant countries is perceived as important for the fight against the illegal supply of 
drugs in Europe. Particularly, due to its geographical position on the "Balkan Route", 
internal security cooperation with Turkey against drug trafficking is considered as 
crucial to prevent drug supply in to Europe. A communication on the Commission's 
relations with Turkey on drugs asserted that, 
"the Commission is concentrating its efforts on producing and transit countries 
and regions [sic] and in particular on the two main trafficking routes to the EU: 
the heroin route from Afghanistan to the EU via Central Asia, Iran, the 
Caucasus, Turkey, Eastern Europe and the Balkans; .... the Commission 
should seek out, within existing ceilings, new sources of funding for co-
operation with Turkey and include co-operation on drugs issues in the 
forthcoming drafting of the Accession Pat1nership" (European Commission, 
2004c). 
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6.3. The EU approach in combating drugs 
Development of a legal basis of the EU drug policy dates back to a Council decision 
in 1990 on the ratification of the 1988 'United Nations Convention against illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances'. With ratification of the 
convention, the EU committed to take the necessary legislative and administrative 
measures against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in the 
EU. 
Subsequently, to stimulate compliance with the UN convention, the European 
Council adopted a regulation in December 1990 and called on member states to take 
the necessary monitoring measures including documenting, recording, pre-export 
notification and labelling against the illicit trade of psychotropic substances. Member 
states were also called on to maintain a coordination system and to deliver sanctions 
against illicit trade (European Council, 1990). 
As in the early 1990s, the EU has served as a catalyst for the implementation of the 
provisions of UN conventions in Europe. So far, UN conventions and activities have 
inspired the EU drug strategies and development of the EU -level measures in 
combating drugs. The UN policies are emulated and international conventions on 
drugs are considered as the part of acquis linked with the EU drug policy (Lavenex et 
aI., 2009; 94). Corresponding with the UN and Council of Europe conventions, the 
EU provisions endorsed by the European Council, place duties on states for 
controlling and criminalizing the manufacture, trade and traffic in illicit drugs in the 
EU. 
Combating illicit drugs has been a specific policy domain with entry into force of the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. In the Treaty, the drug issue was linked with public 
health and the Third Pillar. Treaty Article 129, under Public Health, called on 
member states to take common action against drug addiction. Additionally, Article 
K.l under JHA counted combating drug addiction as one of the security objectives of 
the European Community. Article K.l also underlined the need for police 
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cooperation and information-exchange between member states against trafficking 
drugs (Treaty of Maastricht, 1993). 
To tackle drug trafficking in Europe, an agreement signed between EU member 
states established the Europol Drugs Unit in 1993, which was the initial model of 
Europol. Soon after, each member state was asked to send liaison officers to the 
headquarters of the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) and establish a contact office in The 
Hague. Liaison officials were authorized to exchange information between each 
other when necessary. After the formation of Europol Drugs Unit and the liaison 
offices in The Hague, internal security collaboration between national law 
enforcement agencies of the EU member states were increased. EDU and liaison 
officers began to practise information exchange, not only on drug trafficking but also 
on various other types of cross-border crime such as, terrorism, organised crime, 
human trafficking and fraud. 
In the period until 1999, drug demand and drug supply were considered as separate 
policy areas under JHA and the public health policy. Corresponding with the Public 
health provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Commission prepared a drug 
strategy in 1994, which determined EU-Ievel objectives and priorities for preventing 
drug dependence for the period 1995-1999. This strategy exclusively focused on 
demand reduction and did not touch upon the illicit manufacturing, trade or traffic of 
drugs. Concerning demand-reduction, the 1995-1999 EU Drug Strategy aimed to 
raise awareness in member states of the use of synthetic and natural drugs. To 
prevent drug addiction, drug-related mortality and diseases, the strategy proposed the 
use of counselling and social support services. For achieving its objectives, it called 
for the use of community programmes, policies and instruments for improving public 
awareness in the member states. At the international level, the strategy also required 
cooperation with the Council of Europe, the United Nations and non-member 
countries, including European Free Trade Association (EFT A) and Central Eastern 
European countries (European Commission, 1994). 
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On the other hand, in the fight against drug supply, until 1999, the European Council 
endorsed individual provisions rather than preparing an overall strategy. For 
increasing the effectiveness of the enforcement of the law against drugs, the Council 
adopted a joint action in November 1996, which delivered an information exchange 
mechanism between member states on new types of illicit drugs. In this joint action, 
member states were called on to exchange technical information on seizures of drugs 
including chemical specifications, physical dimensions, and type and quantity with 
the Europol Drug Unit designated as the transmitting channel for information 
(European Council, 1996a). 
Furthermore, in a joint action of 1996, the European Council underlined the 
implementation of the provisions of the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 
1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, as the basis for member states' national legislation against 
drugs. In the joint action, member states were called on to impose serious sentences 
for illicit drug trafficking and illicit cultivation of narcotic plants (European Council, 
1996b). 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the JHA policy, has 
entered a new phase. The Treaty emphasized an enhanced internal security regime to 
generate a free and safe EU zone and initiated an . Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice'. In this context, law enforcement cooperation between member states was 
intensified to "provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, 
security and justice". In the treaty, the fight against illicit drug traffic was counted 
one of the objectives to maintain internal security within the EU. Unlike the Treaty 
of Maastricht, the Amsterdam Treaty emphasized the implementation of minimum 
rules and sentences in the national criminal law of member states. Article K.3 of the 
treaty described this issue as "adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating 
to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of organised 
crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking" (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). 
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In December 1999, a new drug strategy was prepared by the Commission for the 
period of 2000-2004 and endorsed by the JHA Council. Unlike previous drug 
strategies, the 2000-2004 drug strategy considered demand- and supply-reduction 
simultaneously. The Council also underlined the use of EMCDDA and Europol to 
achieve these objectives. 
The EU's 2000-2004 drug strategy was based on the principles of both the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and the political declaration of the United Nations General Assembly 
Twentieth Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) held in June 1998. Corresponding 
with this declaration, drug strategy espoused a "global, multidisciplinary, integrated 
and balanced" approach for delivering proposed objectives against drugs. In this 
regard, demand and supply reduction were seen as mutually reinforcing elements. 
Along with the UNGASS declaration, the strategy underlined the promotion of 
international cooperation and support for the UN and UNDCP efforts against illicit 
drugs. Under the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU drug strategy 2000-
2004 highlighted cooperation between member states and the use of law enforcement 
measures. It also called for common action on judicial cooperation and the adoption 
of minimum measures in national criminal legislation and cooperation between 
national customs and law enforcement authorities against illicit drug trafficking. For 
demand reduction, it addressed the use of social initiatives. Moreover, the, strategy 
pointed to the drug problem as a major priority for the EU's external action to 
support its Justice and Home Affairs policy (European Council, 1999b). 
With the adoption of the '"EU Action Plan on Drugs" by the Feira Council of June 
2000, relations with candidate countries in combating drugs came to the agenda of 
the EU. In the Council declaration, the EU became dedicated to intensifying 
cooperation with candidate states against cross-border security problems. It was 
acknowledged in the declaration that the EU should achieve and support cooperation 
with candidate countries in various policy fields, including the fight against drugs. 
Concurrently, the drug action plan underlined the alignment of candidate states with 
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the ED drug policy. It called on the Commission to assist candidate countries' 
development of national drug policies. The Commission was called on to negotiate 
with candidate states to allow them to participate in the work of EMCDDA 
(European Council, 2000b). 
Afterwards, the "Action plan on collaboration against drugs between the EU and 
countries of the Western Balkans and Candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey)" was endorsed by the JHA Council of June 2003. The ED action plan 
proposed the adoption of ED practices and the development of national drug 
strategies in applicant countries. Candidate states were also invited to participate in 
the work of EMCDDA. 
Under the action plan, the development of strategic plans and national institutions 
against drugs were given as central objectives. The use of financial assistance 
programmes was recommended for capacity-development and institution-building. 
Member states and the Commission also called for the drawing up of cooperation 
agreements with applicant states. The action plan highlighted the establishment of 
national focal points in candidate states for cooperation with EMCDDA. It also 
addressed operational and strategic information exchange for law enforcement 
cooperation, the improvement of cross-border security measures and the use of 
controlled delivery operations against cross-border drug trafficking (European 
Council, 2003b). 
As a part of the continuing progress m internal security co-operation between 
member states, in November 2004, the European Council endorsed The Hague 
Programme for strengthening the internal security of the EU. In this programme, 
illicit drugs were labelled as a primary security threat along with terrorism, 
immigration and organised crime. The measures adopted within the Hague 
Programme included a list of actions for the development of coordination 
mechanisms between member states for achieving internal security objectives for the 
period between 2005 and 2009 (European Council, 2004b). 
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In the Hague programme, the ED's current drug strategy "The European Strategy on 
Drugs" of December 2004 was endorsed for the period between 2005 and 2012. The 
strategy considers illicit drugs as a problem to be addressed at the international-level. 
Therefore, the strategy points to the coordination of national initiatives against drugs 
in the ED. It calls on member states to coordinate their efforts around the same 
objectives. The European Strategy on Drugs sets out its purposes around two 
policies: "demand reduction" and "supply reduction". Also related with these two 
policies, it emphasizes two crosscutting themes: "international cooperation" and 
"information, research and evaluation" (European Council, 2004a). 
Corresponding with the 2005-2012 Drug Strategy, the European Council adopted 
two Drug Action Plans for the periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. In these, the 
implementation deadlines were listed to achieve concrete results against drugs. 
Member states were called on to adopt national strategies and action plans in line 
with EU drug strategy. In order to prevent drug addiction, comprehensive and 
effective prevention programmes were recommended to be conducted for target 
groups in schools, communities and NGOs. For supply reduction, criminal and 
judicial cooperation between member states through Europol, Eurojust and external 
relations with third countries were emphasized. For joint operations and information 
exchange, member states and Europol were invited to develop joint investigation 
teams against drug trafficking groups. For international cooperation, member states 
and the Commission were called on to promote the EU's approach against drugs and 
to support third-countries in their efforts against drugs. Therefore, Commission was 
called on to develop mutual relations and agreements with third countries on drugs 
(European Council, 2005b). 
6.4. Domestic dynamics of Turkey in the fight against drugs 
So far, Turkey has ratified most of the key international drug conventions aiming to 
control production, diversion and illicit trafficking of drugs worldwide. 
Corresponding with the national dynamics of Turkey, a range of policy instruments 
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were adopted in Turkey to regulate licit poppy manufacturing, to prohibit drug 
trafficking and to control the abuse of narcotic drugs. To that end, Turkish drug 
policy gives preference to both national objectives deriving from domestic dynamics 
and to its international commitments linked with the conventions. With respect to its 
international commitments and domestic priorities, Turkey's drug policy can be 
categorized under three main issue areas: Legal manufacturing of drugs, counter 
efforts against illicit manufacturing and trafficking and the fight against drug 
addiction. 
Turkey has been a poppy producing country for many decades; indeed it is one of the 
largest licensed poppy producer countries in the world (Mansfield, 2001: 6). 
Annually, Turkish farmers cultivate nearly 60 tons of opium under supervision of the 
state. Farmers are certified for licit poppy production and monitored through strict 
formal mechanisms. With respect to international requirements, each year TMO 
licenses nearly 100,000 farmers in 13 provinces of Turkey for poppy cultivation. 
Raw plants are then processed by the state for medical purposes or exported to the 
US, Japan and Western European countries (TMO, 2009). 
A formal agency, the so-called Turkish Grain Marketing Board (TMO) under the 
Ministry of Agriculture carries out the licensing procedures for cultivation. Raw 
products are bought by TMO and processed or exported under the control of the 
Ministry of Health (Council of Ministers, 1987, 1988). 
On the other hand, due to its geographical location between the East and the West, 
Turkey has been used as an active destination for the trafficking of illicit drugs. 
International and Turkish organised crime groups smuggle Afghan opium across the 
Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi borders to Turkey where it is processed into heroin m 
clandestine laboratories in Southeast Turkey (Europol, 2008: 21). 
In addition to organised crime groups, the PKK deals with drugs trafficking in 
European countries and in Turkey for financing its activities (Pek et aI., 2007: 146). 
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According to official seizure reports of 2008, 353 narco-terrorism operations were 
conducted linked with members of the PKK and 794 individuals were detected with 
50kg of heroin being seized (KOM, 2008). 
Turkey's current administrative structure for anti-drugs-trafficking enforcement 
comprises three different law enforcement institutions under the Ministry of the 
Interior. The Turkish Police Organization or so called Directorate General of 
Security (EGM) is the main agency responsible for the fight against trafficking of 
drugs in Turkey. In rural areas and around the coast, the Gendarmerie and the 
Coast guard Command, perform their respective enforcement duties in coordination 
with the EGM. 
The EGM, under the Ministry of the Interior, is the central institution for the 
implementation of national policies. Under the EGM, the Anti-Smuggling and 
Organised Crime Division (KOM), founded in Ankara in 1980, specialises in 
fighting organised crime and drug trafficking. Under the KOM, the Narcotic Crimes 
Department performs enforcement duty against illicit manufacturing and trafficking 
of drugs. This department has branches in 81 provinces of Turkey with 
approximately 1,100 officers (KOM, 2006). 
At the intemationallevel, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
is an important partner for Turkey in tackling drug trafficking in its neighbourhood. 
A joint initiative by UNODC and the Turkish Government provided a cooperation 
programme through which the United Nations supported T ADOC. This five-year 
joint project aimed to enhance regional cooperation with Turkey's neighbours 
through law enforcement training. The project was completed in three stages 
between 2000 and 2003. In the first phase, T ADOC was founded as a training 
institution with technical and administrative capacity. In the academy, four research 
centres were established to analyse new enforcement techniques for specific crime 
types. In the second and third phases of the programme, various training programmes 
were executed through research centres (UNODC, 2000). 
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Meanwhile, T ADOC sustains training programmes with Turkey's neighbouring 
countries for the suppression of illicit production, abuse and smuggling of drugs and 
narcotic substances. T ADOC's activities aim to provide training to the beneficiary 
countries and to share best practices in the field of combating drugs and organised 
crime. In this regard, research centres of the academy analyse theoretical and 
practical information to develop new strategies for law enforcement. Training 
programmes also aim to intensify cross-border dialogue between officers of Turkey 
and the countries of the region against cross-border crime. Programmes are prepared 
for the law enforcement officers of neighbouring countries on a regional basis. They 
are offered to Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) states, members of the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) group, OSCE, the Balkan States and to 
other countries that have mutual agreements with Turkey on the prevention of drugs 
and organised crime. Since 2000, T ADOC has organised nearly 30 training seminars 
for enforcement officers from different countries. Between 2000 and 2008, 179 
training seminars were organised for 2,382 participants from 58 countries (KOM, 
2008). 
In terms of international law enforcement cooperation, the KOM under the EGM 
conducts cross-border law enforcement cooperation with neighbouring countries 
against international drug trafficking. Through bilateral agreements, Turkey conducts 
joint operations and controlled-delivery operations at an international-level. In 
addition, through liaison officers, information exchange and joint operations are also 
performed with states in Europe and Central Asia. In this regard, in 1999 Turkey 
signed a cooperation agreement with countries from South-eastern Europe which 
established the South-eastern Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) against 
transnational crime in the region. In order to tackle illicit drug trafficking, SECr 
members established a task force. Thus, the drug trafficking task force delivers law 
enforcement cooperation through liaison officers of member states. Meanwhile, 
Turkey has two liaison officers appointed from national police and customs 
authorities to serve at SECI headquarters in Romania. 
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By 2008, 59 foreign liaison officers from 25 countries were serving in Turkey for 
cross-border cooperation. Turkey has a total of five liaison officers in other countries 
including Germany, Holland, Denmark, the UK and Uzbekistan (KOM, 2008; 
TUBIM, 2007b). In Turkey, as a result of information exchange with other countries, 
116 joint operations were executed against drug trafficking groups between 2003 and 
2007. In 2007 alone, 47 joint operations were performed with the US, Germany, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Holland, the UK, Spain, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Hungary, Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine 
through information exchange. Additionally, since the adoption of controlled-
delivery regulation in Turkey, Turkish law enforcement authorities conducted 77 
controlled-delivery operations between 1997 and 2007 in cooperation with different 
countries (KOM, 2007). 
Another aspect of the drug policy in Turkey focuses on demand reduction. In Turkey, 
illicit drug consumption and addiction are widely perceived as a serious habit and a 
threat against society, although there is no widespread use of illicit drugs (Robins, 
2008: 633). According to Turkish public opinion, it is believed that drug abuse may 
cause social disorders and serious health problems. Therefore, it is considered an 
important duty of the state and NGOs to tackle addiction and the underlying reasons 
for drug abuse. Attributed to the perception, the Turkish Constitution of 1982 obliges 
governments to enhance the problem-solving capacities of the state to combat drug 
demand (Constitution 1982). 
In Turkey, state and voluntary organizations emphasize the harmful effects of 
addictive substances through various awareness activities to protect at-risk groups 
including youths, students and less-educated populations. A range of public 
institutions in Turkey are involved in the fight against drug addiction. To increase 
awareness in Turkey of drug addiction, the Ministry of Education, Turkish Radio and 
Television (TRT), the Ministry of Health and the Directorate General for Security 
conduct projects. 
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The Turkish National Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBIM) 
works under the EGM as a coordinating institution. TUBIM's duties can be 
categorized into two groups. First, at national-level, it is the institution coordinating 
national demand-reduction activities against drugs. It has focal points in 25 public 
institutions in Turkey including the Family Research Agency (AAK), the Ministry of 
Health, the Under-secretary of Customs, the Turkish Radio Television Agency 
(TRT) , the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Gendarmerie, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara University, the Turkey Statistics Agency, the 
State Planning Agency, the Secretariat General for EU Affairs (ABGS) and the 
Directorate General for Security (EGM). The institutional focal points of TUBIM for 
the coordination and exchange of information on drug-related issues are appointed by 
each institution from among their own staff. There are also focal points of TUBIM in 
81 provinces of Turkey. Officers of TUBIM participate in local awareness activities 
for demand reduction, such as conferences, panels and seminars in coordination with 
the Ministry of Education (TUBIM, 2007c). 
The second duty of TUBIM has an international aspect. It functions as Turkey'S 
national focal point of the EMCDDA. Through a data-transfer system, it supplies 
information to the EMCDDA about Turkey'S 'risk and struggle' profile on drugs 
(TUBIM, 2007c). In order to transmit data to EMCDDA, a computer system, the so-
called REITOX network, was established in the institution with EU assistance. 
TUBIM obtains data from national institutions through institutional focal points and 
then transfers it to EMCDDA on a regular basis. Data provided includes risk groups, 
drug-related deaths, rehabilitation results, ratio of drug addiction to the general 
population, etc. (TBMM, 2008). 
TUBIM also engages in EU initiatives on behalf of Turkey. Annually, it issues a 
national situation report in combating drugs in Turkey. The report outlines Turkey's 
'risk and struggle' profile against drugs based on data received from domestic 
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institutions such as the Ministry of Health, the Under-secretariat for Customs and the 
Directorate General for Security (TUBIM, 2006b). 
6.5. Accession conditionality concerning the fight against drugs 
in Turkey 
Requirements of the EU within the context of drugs policy include implementation 
of the acquis and coordination with the EU institutions simultaneously. The EU 
acquis in this field does not identify any administrative structure for national focal 
points. However, to be able to conduct information exchange on drugs through 
EMCDDA and Europol, national focal points and enforcement agencies are required 
to have adequate administrative and technical capacity. Candidate countries are 
required to set up adequate administrative capacity for fight against drug-related 
crimes and for co-operation with member states (European Commission, 2005a). 
The EU began to determine accession conditionality for Turkey in combating drugs 
after it became a candidate state in 1999. A JHA expert mission to Turkey in 
September 2000 was the EU's first concrete step to identify conditionality on drugs. 
The assessment report of the mission pointed to institutional deficits in Turkey and 
addressed the reorganization and modernization of administrative structures to 
strengthen the fight against drug trafficking. The report underlined the need for 
coordination between domestic agencies at national-level. It suggested establishing a 
specific administrative structure to coordinate domestic policies on demand and 
supply reduction. The mission report also recommended cooperation with the EU 
agencies and the establishment of a mini-Dublin group for coordination of 
international efforts at the global level (Maffre, 2001: 45). 
Accompanying Turkey'S candidacy, the Council endorsed the first Accession 
Partnership in March 2001. In the Accession Partnership document, the EU counted 
effective enforcement against drug trafficking as a condition to be implemented by 
Turkey. It called upon Turkey to improve the capacity of administrative structures to 
implement and manage the EU acquis in this field. Therefore, it particularly 
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emphasized training and appropriate coordination between national ministries and 
the development of effective border control to prevent trafficking in drugs. In the 
medium term, the Accession Partnership of 2001 underlined implementation of the 
EU acquis and intensifying international cooperation in the fight against drugs 
(European Council, 2001). 
The European Council endorsed a revised AP for Turkey in May 2003. Concerning 
drugs, the revised AP invited Turkey to strengthen efforts against drugs and demand 
legal alignment, administrative capacity development and the strengthening of 
national and international cooperation. The AP document underlined the adoption 
and implementation of EU criminal law in the field of drugs. It also required Turkey 
to adopt a National Drug Strategy in line with the 2000-2004 EU Drug Strategy and 
Action Plan (European Council, 2003a). 
Following the openmg of accession negotiations m 2005, the European Council 
endorsed two further AP documents for Turkey in 2006 and 2008. According to the 
AP document of 2006, in the short term, Turkey was called on to strengthen its fight 
against drugs and to develop, and implement a national drugs strategy in line with the 
EU Drugs Strategy and Action Plan. In the medium term, the AP sought to enhance 
the capabilities of the national focal point to EMCDDA and the adoption of the EU 
acquis in the fight against drugs (European Council, 2006). In the AP document of 
2008, Turkey was also called to strengthen its fight against drugs under JHA 
(European Council, 2006; European Council, 2008a). 
Further to AP documents, in the annual progress reports of the European 
Commission, the EU outlined accession conditions for Turkey'S drugs policy. Strong 
emphasis was also placed on ratification of the international drug conventions, 
adoption of the acquis and capacity development for action against illicit drug 
trafficking on the Balkan trafficking route. 
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In the progress reports, Turkey was identified as a major drug trafficking centre, 
particularly for drugs coming from Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia, and as a 
centre for refining opium. Therefore, the Commission called on the Turkish 
authorities to devote attention to dismantling hidden laboratories and combating the 
chain of trafficking more effectively. Reports invited information exchange between 
ED member states and Turkey. They required greater efficiency and the 
reinforcement of police cooperation. Commission reports also called on the Turkish 
authorities to establish legal instruments to facilitate international police cooperation. 
Concerning demand reduction, Commission Reports called on Turkey to appoint a 
National Drug Coordinator, to improve co-ordination and co-operation among 
relevant national institutions. They also asked for the development of a national drug 
strategy in line with the ED Drug Strategy and for the capacity of the Turkish 
National Focal Point to be brought into line with EMCDDA standards. 
Table: EU requirements in AP documents linked with Turkish drug policy 
Task to be undertaken Document Date and Timescale 
Enhance the fight against drugs trafficking. Improve the 2001 Accession 
capacity of public administration to adopt, to implement, and Partnership - Short Term 
to manage the acquis in particular through training and 
appropriate coordination between ministries, to prevent illegal 
trafficking in drugs. 
Adopt and implement the EU acquis in the field of fight 2001 Accession 
against drugs further intensify international cooperation in Partnership - Medium Term 
those fields. 
Continue to strengthen the fight against drugs, particularly 2003 Accession 
through legislative alignment, improved administrative Partnership - Short Term 
capacity, and enhanced cooperation between different law-
enforcement bodies, in line with EU standards. 
185 
Adopt and implement the acquis in the fields of the criminal 2003 Accession 
law fight against drugs; further increase administrative Partnership -Medium Term 
capacity, cooperation between the different law enforcement 
bodies and intensify international cooperation in these fields. 
Develop and start to implement a national drug strategy in line 
with the EU drugs strategy and action plan. 
Strengthen the fight against drugs. Develop and start 2006 Accession 
implementing a national drugs strategy in line with the EU Partnership -Short Term 
Drugs Strategy and Action Plan. 
In the field of drugs, continue to strengthen the national focal 2006 Accession 
point. Adopt and implement the acquis in the fields of fight Partnership -Medium Term 
against drugs. 
Strengthen the fight against drugs. 2008 Accession 
Partnership -Short Term 
6.6. Outcome: Assessment of the EU's involvement 
The impact of the EU in combating drugs in Turkey is scrutinized with reference to 
three periods in the following sections. The first phase covers 1987, when Turkey 
made an official membership application to the EU, to 1999, when the Helsinki 
Council admitted Turkey as a candidate state. The second phase covers from 1999, 
when the EU began structured relations with Turkey through the construction of 
conditionality, to the start of accession negotiations in 2005. The last phase covers 
2005-2010 in which accession negotiations had been started. In these three periods, 
the study considers four selected variables: "Detelminacy of the EU requirements", 
"credibility of conditionality", "domestic adaptation costs" and "convergence of 
threat perceptions" between Turkey and the EU. 
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Table: Mediating factors for transition of drug policy 
Period 1987-1999 1999-2005 2005-2009 
tHigh (High High (High 
Determinacy of the Low (Lack of (Accession partnership (Accession partnership 
EU requirements conditionality, idocuments, progress documents, progress 
limited progress in !reports, assessment !reports, screening) 
~ h e e EU drug policy) !visits) 
Low (Uncertainty on 
Credibility of Low (No lHigh (Candidacy, delivery of the EU 
conditionality ~ e m b e r s h i p p ~ e l i v e r y y of assistance, !promises, Cyprus 
perspective and other institutional links ) issue) 
incentives) 
Low (due to benefits 1L0w (due to benefits Low (due to benefits 
Domestic of internal security of internal security of internal security 
adaptation costs cooperation and cooperation and cooperation and 
financial assistance) financial assistance) financial assistance) 
tHigh (relations with lHigh (relations with 
Convergence of Low (No concrete ~ , , Institutional links, ~ , , Institutional links, 
threat perceptions relationship in .. .. ralllmg programs, rallllllg programs, 
between Turkey combating drugs) cooperation cooperation 
and the EU agreements against agreements against 
drugs) drugs) 
Outcome ~ o o policy outcome Compliance Compliance 
Phase 1: 1987-1999 
Unlike the Central Eastern European countries (CEECs), Turkey did not get 
candidate status, although it made a membership bid in 1987. Due to not being 
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considered as a candidate for membership, the EU did not set up membership 
conditionality for Turkey until 1999. Consequent to the absence of structured 
relations and membership conditionality, the EU was not able to put adaptation 
pressures on Turkey to pursue domestic alignment with the EU drug policy. Only in 
a Council between Turkey and the EU in March 1995, was it declared that Turkey 
and the EU should extend cooperation to different policy areas, including JHA. The 
Association Council declaration also underlined an intention of strategic cooperation 
to be based on information exchange on internal security issues (Association 
Council, 1995). However, no precise steps were taken afterwards. 
As an alternative to the influence of the EU, Turkish drug policy before 1999 was 
mainly driven by domestic factors and other international dynamics. In that sense, 
legal poppy production and trade became an important factor for the progress in 
Turkish drug policy (Ergul, 2002; Robins, 2008: 632). In order to regulate poppy 
production and legitimize it at the international level, Turkey developed a close 
relationship with the UN International Narcotic Control Board (INCB) and ratified 
the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in May 1967. 
However, Turkey did not establish a licensing and monitoring system, as mentioned 
in the UN Single Convention, until the mid-1980s. For the first time in 1986, 
Parliament (TBMM) adopted a law to control poppy production in Turkey complying 
with the 1961 UN Convention (TBMM, 1987). According to the legislation, non-
licensed cultivation was prohibited and the Government was authorized to set up 
conditions for monitoring cultivation, processing and export of poppy products. To 
comply with the UN convention, the ANAP Government issued two directives to 
regulate the licensing, processing and trade conditions of poppy production. 
Meanwhile, according to the directives of 1987 and 1988, the government would 
determine each year the size and geographical location of the areas used for poppy 
production after consulting with the United Nations International Narcotic Control 
Board (INCB). 
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In addition to legal poppy production, another domestic dynamic that has impacted 
on the development of Turkish drug policy has been domestic values among the 
Turkish public on drug abuse. According to public opinion in Turkey, drug addiction 
has been perceived as a serious health problem and as a source of social disorder for 
many decades. Attributed to social norms, the Turkish Constitution of 1982 obliged 
decision-makers to take necessary measures to prevent youth falling victim to bad 
tendencies, including drugs. In article 58 of the constitution, drug addiction is 
identified as a security threat to be tackled and a harmful habit that damages the 
community. The Constitution identified youth as a target group for drug addiction 
and called for the setting up of social initiatives against drug addiction (Constitution, 
1982). 
Turkey's geographical location on the "Balkan Route" also persuaded Turkey to 
develop international cooperation against drug trafficking. In the period, Turkey's 
participation in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and relations with 
the UN in the fight against the illicit traffic of drugs have influenced Turkish drug 
policy. Turkey has been a member of the ECO since its establishment in 1985. 
Meanwhile, ECO pursues social and economic development between Turkey, 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Regarding social developments, ECO aims to control 
drug abuse and support ecological protection and intercultural dialogue in its region, 
in cooperation with UN. Concerning drugs, ECO member states, including Turkey, 
set up a Drug Control Committee in 1992 to intensify international cooperation. In 
March 1995, the UN started participating in the activities of the Drug Control 
Committee. Later, ECO signed an agreement with the UN under the United Nations 
Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) to support the fight against drugs in the region. 
In December 1995, in consultation with UNODC, the ECO Drug Control Committee 
issued an action plan that underlines measures to be taken at national and 
international levels to ensure reductions in both supply and demand. On supply 
reduction, the action plan called on ECO states to establish a communication 
network, adopt controlled-delivery legislation, appoint drug liaison officers between 
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member states and establish a regional training centre to support regional 
cooperation. For demand-reduction, the ECO action plan emphasized the 
identification of priority and high -risk groups at the national level and recommended 
the preparation of national public awareness projects, particularly through the mass 
media, and educational programmes to raise awareness of the dangers of drugs. The 
action plan also called on ECO states to ratify UN Drug Conventions, to prepare 
national drug strategies and to start pilot projects for demand reduction. For the 
coordination of national policies, the action plan underlined the establishment of a 
national committee to coordinate the activities of national institutions on demand 
reduction (ECO/DCCU, 1996). 
Complying with the ECO drug action plan, in February 1996, Turkey ratified the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (UN, 1988). Corresponding with the UN 
Convention, the Turkish government passed legislation in December 1996 against 
the manufacturing, import, export and use of psychotropic substances. The rule 
adopted by the parliament, authorized the Ministry of Health to establish the 
licensing mechanism in accordance with the annex of the 1988 UN convention to 
identify types of psychotropic materials. The law also delivered a sentence of two to 
four years imprisonment as the penalty for illicit production, trade and use of 
psychotropic substances listed in the annex of the UN Convention (TBMM, 1996). 
Additionally, the Turkish Government adopted a regulation in December 1997 to 
allow "Controlled Delivery" operations against trafficking in drugs. According to the 
Government regulation, in order to discover the perpetrators or evidence of criminal 
activity, Turkish law enforcement agencies are authorized to allow trafficking of 
illicit goods and their assets until they reach their target. Controlled delivery 
regulations authorize the Directorate of Security (Turkish national Police), 
Gendarmerie, Coast Guard and Customs Enforcement agencies to perform operations 
at the national and international levels. Concerning national and international 
collaboration, the regulation developed a mechanism for communication and mutual 
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understanding between domestic agencies and coordination with international bodies 
(Council of Ministers, 1997). 
In this period, Turkey's participation in international initiatives against drugs and the 
ratification of the 1988 UN drug convention had further increased the awareness of 
drug abuse on the domestic level. After the mid 1990s, public institutions such as the 
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and NGOs conducted individual 
awareness programmes and campaigns to protect youth from drugs and other 
addictive substances. As a response to domestic concerns about drug abuse, in a 
meeting in April 1996, one of the executive organs, the National Security Council 
(MGK), addressed the necessity of a national drug policy for coordinating national 
activities against drug addiction in Turkey. The MGK invited the government to 
determine a national policy to protect the community from drug addiction and 
strengthen the fight against trafficking drugs (MGK, 1996). 
Soon after, the Turkish Government endorsed Turkey's first national plan "The 
Strategy on Preventing, Monitoring and Management of Drug Addiction" against 
drugs in 1997 for the period 1997-2002. The strategy targeted the protection of youth 
against drugs through demand reduction. In order to achieve this objective, the 
strategy proposed implementation of awareness activities nationwide. In the strategy, 
15-24 year olds were addressed as the target group of awareness activities. 
Therefore, the strategy invited the Ministry of Education to launch awareness 
projects in schools. It also recommended the use of media campaigns and training 
programmes for families to reduce the demand for drugs and protect youth from drug 
addiction (TUBIM, 2006b). 
With reference to the strategy, to coordinate the national efforts to increase the 
effectiveness of the activities against drugs, the Government had set up two 
committees. Committees were designed to coordinate the activities of national 
institutions in the fight against drugs. These committees served until 2002, as the 
groups responsible for advancing national policies against drug demand. However, 
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they could not achieve the proposed coordination, because of administrative deficits 
and the absence of legal powers (AAK, 2000). 
At the international level, Turkey has also participated in the activities of the Council 
of Europe Co-operation Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in 
Drugs (Pompidou Group) since 1980. Turkey created a permanent post in the 
Pompidou Group appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Basically, the 
Pompidou Group was established as a forum where policy makers and researchers 
could discuss development of policies in the field of drugs in Europe and in other 
regions of the world. In this regard, it encourages collaboration between ED and non-
EU countries and other international organisations, through conferences, seminars 
and other research activities. Thus, it promotes scientific research and analysis so 
that anti-drug policy-makers remain well-informed. Turkey has made a full 
contribution to these activities (Council of Europe, 20 11 b). 
In brief, since Turkey was not an ED member and no conditionality had been stated, 
the ED was not able to become involved in developments in Turkish drug policy in 
the period between 1987 and 1999. On the other hand, national factors and relations 
with international organizations (primarily the UN and ECO) dominated 
developments on drug policy in Turkey. 
Phase 2: 1999-2005 
After admitting Turkey as a candidate state in 1999, the ED identified deficiencies in 
Turkish drug policy and clarified accession requirements in formal documents and in 
mutual visits. Turkey adopted its first National Plan for Adopting the ACqllis (NP AA) 
in March 2001. In the NP AA of 2001, Turkey committed to adopting the ED acqllis 
on the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of drugs and underlined its intention to 
implement the ED drug policy and intensify institutional cooperation with ED 
member states and institutions (Council of Ministers, 2001). 
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Along with the beginning of fonnal relations as a candidate state, the credibility of 
EU policies in Turkey was increased. The coalition government, fonned by the 
Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP) between 1999 and 2002 compromised on the idea of EU 
membership despite having divergent political ideologies. In the period, Turkey's 
candidacy allowed Turkish governments to adopt EU rules in various policy areas, 
including drugs policy. EU incentives, such as the delivery of financial assistance for 
capacity development, institutional links with EMCDDA and internal security 
cooperation with member states had strengthened the credibility of EU demands on 
drugs. 
Just after the Helsinki Council decision, Turkey put a strategy into practice in 2000 
to strengthen institutional ties with EU agencies. Through this strategy, Turkey 
aimed to benefit from institutional cooperation and EU financial assistance for 
administrative capacity development (Interview#1, 2009). Turkey outlined its 
willingness to participate in the activities of EMCDDA and submitted an official 
membership application in 2001 (European Commission, 2001 b; KOM, 2006). 
Due to Turkey's strategic location on the transit smuggling route between the 
producer and European countries, internal security cooperation with Turkey against 
drugs was perceived to be crucial by the EU. In an European Commission 
communication of 200 1, this issue was claimed that, 
''The two mam alms of the EU are to enable applicant countries to 
implement the drugs acquis, and to bring the EU and applicant countries 
into closer drugs cooperation ..... special attention will be given to co-
operation with Turkey. The Commission intends in particular to 
strengthen its cooperation with Turkey and intends to begin soon 
negotiations on an agreement to help prevent the diversion of chemical 
precursors" (European Commission, 2001 a). 
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Due to the importance given to Turkey combating drugs, Turkey's application for 
EMCDDA membership was accepted as a positive sign by the EU. Subsequently, 
Turkey appointed the Family Research Agency as its first National Focal Point in 
June 2001 to carry out membership negotiations with EMCDDA. As a first step to 
meeting the EU requirements, in April 2001, Turkey ratified the 1972 Protocol 
Amending the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. 
In the period, adoption of the EU requirements was not seen as costly by decision 
makers in Turkey. The benefits of cross-border security cooperation with the EU 
member states and allocation of financial assistance for capacity development 
minimized domestic opposition to the EU conditionality. Turkey's fOlmal application 
for EMCDDA membership and positive responses received from the EU also 
minimized domestic opposition. Governments and senior officials in the Ministry of 
the Interior considered that institutional links to be established with EU agencies and 
member states would advance the effectiveness of national drug policy and 
enforcement against drug-related crimes in Turkey. It was also believed that EU 
assistance and strategic and operational cooperation agreements with the EU 
agencies would help administrative capacity development (Interview#l, 2009; 
Interview#6, 2010). 
Additionally, it is claimed by an interviewee from an independent research 
organization in Turkey that, 
"After the Justice and Development Party came to power In 2002, 
cooperation with the EU against drugs was continued since the 
prevention of social erosion caused by drugs corresponds with the 
conservative principles of the ruling Justice and Development Party 
(Interview#3). 
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Following the application of Turkey for EMCDDA membership, a group of experts 
from EMCDDA made an assessment visit to Turkey in October 2001 to detennine 
conditions for Turkey's participation in EMCDDA activities. During the visit, the 
experts met with the relevant domestic institutions. Finally, an assessment report was 
prepared about conditions in Turkey to tackle drugs and the necessary steps that 
Turkey should take (TADOC, 2002). Concerning administrative structure, the report 
underlined the importance of a mechanism, which could coordinate the activities of 
the state and collaborate with the EMCDDA. It also emphasized the significance of a 
well-equipped institution to serve as a National Focal Point and to carry out 
negotiations with the EMCDDA on the participation process. The assessment visit 
pointed to the Family Research Agency's lack of legal background and recommended 
that another institution should be appointed as the national focal point. 
In order to enhance cooperation with candidate states in combating drugs, the JHA 
ministers of member states and candidate states, including Bulgaria, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania and Turkey met in Brussels in February 2002. In the final 
declaration of the meeting, candidate states were invited to integrate national drug 
policies and institutions with the EU. In this context, the parties agreed to launch an 
initiative to establish National Focal Points in candidate states by March 2002. For 
this purpose, the EU committed to assist candidate states through the PHARE 
Programme and Pre-accession Financial Assistance. In response, candidate states 
were committed to carry out the necessary actions listed in the EU drug strategy and 
action plan. Additionally, the EU and candidate states agreed on reinforcing regional 
cooperation against synthetic drugs and the diversion of chemical precursors 
(European Council, 2002a). 
Corresponding with the suggestions given in the EMCDDA assessment visit and 
JHA ministers meeting of February 2002 in combating drugs, the Turkish 
government appointed the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and 
Organised Crime (T ADOC) as Turkey'S National Focal Point for EMCDDA in May 
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2002. In addition, the functions of the committees which were established in 1996 for 
monitoring and steering the fight against the use of narcotic drugs were terminated 
with their duties being taken over by TADOC, a training department in the Anti-
Smuggling and Organised Crime Division of the Turkish National Police. 
After being appointed as the National Focal Point to EMCDDA, TADOC prepared a 
twinning project to enhance institutional capacity and address Turkey's legal deficits 
in the fight against drugs. The twinning project, the so-called "Establishment of a 
National Drugs Monitoring Centre (Reitox Focal Point) and development and 
implementation of a National Drugs Strategy", was approved to begin in 2004 using 
the 2002 EU pre-accession financial assistance. The project aimed to create a 
national drug policy and a parallel institutional structure in Turkey to meet EU 
standards. It proposed to establish an information network in Turkey to function as 
the National Focal Point for the EMCDDA (T ADOC, 2002). 
As a matter of mutual interest in the fight against drugs, Turkey and the EU signed 
an agreement in December 2002 to control the export, import and transit of 
psychotropic substances which could be used in the illicit manufacturing of drugs. 
Complying with the provisions of the 1988 UN Convention on Illicit Trafficking of 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the agreement between the EU and 
Turkey established administrative requirements such as trade monitoring, suspension 
of shipment and information exchange between EU member states and Turkey. To 
prevent the transfer of psychotropic substances for illicit purposes, parties committed 
to provide necessary information to each other. It was also concluded in the 
agreement that shipment can be suspended if there are reasonable grounds to believe 
controlled substances will be used for the illicit manufacture of drugs (Agreement, 
2003). 
In May 2003, the European Council endorsed a revised AP for the period 2003-2004. 
Concerning drugs, this revised AP again invited Turkey to strengthen its efforts 
against drugs through legislative alignment, to improve administrative capacity, to 
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enhance cooperation between different law -enforcement bodies and to 
international conventions in the field of drugs (European Council, 2003a). 
SIgn 
Furthennore, the JHA Council of June 2003 outlined an action plan to intensify 
collaboration between the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans and 
Candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) against drugs. The action plan 
called on the Commission and member states to conduct bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives with non-member states and to assist national activities, including the 
exchange of infonnation and experiences. For demand reduction, the action plan 
highlighted the use of national focal points in coordination with EMCDDA and the 
implementation of relevant EU acquis and UN Conventions. For law enforcement 
cooperation, it addressed operational and strategic infonnation exchange, the 
improvement of cross-border security measures, the use of controlled delivery and 
the development of an infonnation exchange system on new synthetic drugs 
(European Council, 2003b). 
Subsequently, in October 2004, Turkey signed the Council of Europe Agreement on 
"Illicit Traffic by Sea, implementing article 17 of the United Nations Convention 
against lllicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances" which sets up 
administrative rules for measures on monitoring, jurisdiction and enforcement of 
illicit traffic by sea (Council of Europe, 2000). Furthennore, Turkey and Europol 
signed a strategic cooperation agreement in 2004 whereupon Europol started to 
provide strategic and technical assistance in the fight against transnational crime. As 
a matter of common objectives with the fight against drugs, Turkey and the EU 
signed the agreement for Turkey's membership of the EMCDDA in 2004. 
To enhance the administrative structure of Turkey against drugs and to develop a 
national drug policy, a twinning project was undertaken between 2004 and 2006 in 
cooperation with Spain and Greece (ABGS, 2008). With the beginning of the project 
in 2004, the Turkish National Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(TUBIM) was founded to function as the National Focal Point of Turkey for the 
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coordination of domestic policies and relations with the EU in the fight against drugs 
(T ADOC 2002). 
Institutional interactions between Turkish officials and their EU counterparts were an 
important element for the recognition of EU policies in Turkey until 2005. Twinning 
projects, training programmes and relations with the UN have initiated a learning 
process among Turkish officials (Interview#3, 2009; Kirisci, 2007: 19). Interactions 
developed an understanding on the importance of cross-border cooperation and the 
necessity of compatible drug policies to control drug demand and supply at the 
global level. Particularly, "the EU 2000-2004 action plan on drugs" and "2003 action 
plan for collaboration between the EU and Candidate countries" gave added impetus 
to the institutional interactions between member state agencies and Turkish officials. 
Various seminars, workshops and study visits were made with the participation of 
Turkish and EU member state officials. In that sense, the twinning project started in 
2004 and training seminars had served as a transmitting channel to increase Turkish 
awareness of EU drug policies. Training seminars and exchange of best practices 
between EU agencies and officials from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of 
Health and the Customs Authorities in the fight against drugs helped develop a 
common understanding for the development of internal security cooperation against 
drugs. 
In the period, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) had also 
been a partner for Turkey to tackle illegal drugs. As a mutual initiative between 
UNODC and Turkish Government, a joint project to enhance regional cooperation 
between countries neighbouring Turkey was started. The project was completed in 
three stages between 2000 and 2003. In the first phase, the Turkish International 
Academy against Drugs and Organised Crime (TADOC) was founded as a training 
institution. In the academy, four research centres were established to analyze new 
enforcement techniques for specific crime types. In the second and third phases of 
the programme, various training programmes took place in the research centres 
(UNODC, 2000). 
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Phase 3: 2005-2009 
In this phase, Turkey-EU relations shifted to another stage with the opening of 
accession negotiations in 2005. Following a communication of the Commission on 
Turkey's satisfying progress to meet political conditions (Copenhagen Criteria), the 
European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey in December 
2004. The European Council called on Turkey to adopt the entire acquis within the 
framework of JHA. Additionally, Turkey was invited to ratify international 
agreements concluded by the EU (European Council, 2005a). 
However, the start of the negations initiated a debate in the EU on Turkey'S 
membership. The absorption capacity of the EU and the cultural difference with 
Turkey were suggested as obstacles for Turkey's accession. Parallel to the debate on 
Turkey's accession, Germany, Austria and France suggested "privileged partnership" 
for Turkey as an alternative to full membership. According to the proposal, the EU 
would intensify relations with Turkey despite differences, but Turkey should be a 
privileged partner rather than being an EU member having equal rights with other 
member states. The Cyprus issue was a further setback to Turkey (see. The previous 
discussions in the Chapter 4). 
At the domestic level, political debate in the EU on Turkey'S membership and the 
suspension of negotiations resulted in uncertainty about the possibility of EU 
accession in the future. The AK Party Government and the political elites started to 
criticise the EU because of the alteration in its commitments. Accordingly, credibility 
of EU conditionality declined in Turkey. Subsequently, the transition process has 
slowed down in Turkey in various policy domains since 2005. 
However, for Turkish Drug Policy this was not the case. Although credibility of the 
EU declined in Turkey after 2005, transposition of the EU policy in combating drugs 
made constant progress in this third period. As an alternative to the credibility of the 
EU incentives, Turkey and the EU perceived drug supply and consumption as a 
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serious problem for public health and security, which increased the likelihood of the 
EU requirements being adopted. In addition, contacts between Turkish and EU 
officials provided legitimacy for such an adoption. Turkish public policy makers and 
administrative elites considered the EU drug policy as appropriate to increase the 
effectiveness of fight against drug demand and supply in Turkey. 
In this period, EU financial assistance for administrative capacity development, 
institutional links with EMCDDA and internal security cooperation with EU member 
states against drug trafficking have also eliminated domestic adoption costs. This 
issue was reflected by an official from Turkey that, 
"Institutional interactions with the EU agencies and assistance of the EU 
for institutional capacity development were considered as valuable to 
advance technical and operational capabilities of Turkish institutions in 
the fight against drugs" (Interview# 1 2010). 
Soon after the start of accession negations with the EU, in June 2005, a new Turkish 
Penal Code came into force. The new code abandoned the previous 1926 penal code 
including sentences for drug-related crimes. Corresponding with the EU acquis on 
drugs, the new penal code introduced different sentences for those who commit drug-
related crimes. Drug offenders were categorized as drug consumers, suppliers and 
traders. Under article 191 of the penal code, those who grow, buy or posses drugs for 
personal consumption became liable to one to two years in prison (TBMM, 2004). 
Unlike the previous code, the new legislation delivered a similar approach to EU 
practices and encouraged treatment and rehabilitation for addicted users. Judicial 
supervision for drug addicted offenders as an alternative to imprisonment was 
introduced. However, in the 1926 code, treatment and rehabilitation could be applied 
in addition to a sentence if drug addiction was serious and posed a threat to the 
community (TBMM 2004). 
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In the penal code of 2005, severe sentences were delivered for illicit manufacturers , 
importers and exporters of drugs. Under Article 188, suppliers became liable to a 
minimum 10 years imprisonment. Moreover, those who sell, stock and distribute 
drugs became liable to 5 to 15 years in prison. For hard drugs, such as heroin, 
cocaine and morphine, the sentences were increased by fifty percent. In addition, 
sentences for organised crime groups or individuals that abuse their public duties, 
such as doctors and pharmacists, have also been subject to increase by one-half. 
Furthermore, under article 189, members of the legal profession became liable if they 
benefited from the trade or manufacturing of drugs (TBMM 2004). 
Along with the start of accession negotiations with Turkey, the European Council 
endorsed a new AP in January 2006 to address short and medium-term EU priorities 
during the negotiations. According to the AP document, in the short term, the EU 
requested the development and implementation of a national drugs strategy in line 
with the EU Drugs Strategy and Action Plan (European Council, 2006). Later, in the 
2006 Progress Report, the Commission again invited Turkey to prepare a national 
drug strategy in line with the EU Drug Strategy of 2005-2012 (European 
Commission, 2006b). 
In the period, the twinning project, which was started in 2004 and concluded in 2006, 
had the impetus to meet the EU requirements. Following the conclusion of the 
project, Turkey prepared a National Drug Strategy in 2006, which is compatible with 
the EU drug strategy. Meanwhile, this strategy, the so-called "National Policy and 
Strategy Document for Addictive Drugs and Fighting against Drugs", identifies 
Turkey's policies and objectives against drugs for the period 2006-2012. 
In the national drug strategy of 2006-2012, Turkey preferred a similar approach to 
that of the EU's existing drug policy, It was mentioned in the strategy that the EU 
drug strategy was taken as the basis for the establishment of Turkish policy against 
drugs. Both strategies claim a "Balanced Approach" to the drug problem, which 
starts by using the interconnection between demand and supply to develop anti-drug 
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measures (TUBIM, 2006a). It was assumed that increasing demand for addictive 
substances increases supply and trafficking, therefore, a comprehensive anti-drug 
policy should cover the social and criminal aspects of drug abuse. 
In the strategy, the main objectives of Turkish national drug policy were set out as; 
prevention of drug trafficking; protection and rehabilitation of the population and 
addictive users; improving institutional standards and coordination with international 
organisations. Corresponding with the EU drug policy, Turkey's strategy has set up 
five main issue areas: coordination; demand reduction; supply reduction; 
international cooperation and research/information! evaluation. A national-level 
strategy proposed raising awareness, strengthening organizational structures, and 
research for reducing demand. F or suppressing drug trafficking, the strategy 
addressed the significance of controlled delivery operations. Controlled delivery 
operations held between Turkey and the EU member states counted as an effective 
instrument for dismantling the drug trafficking organisations. At the international-
level, cooperation with EMCCDA, Europol and with other international 
organisations was among the measures to be taken by Turkey against drugs (TUBIM, 
2006a). 
Later, Turkish drug policy was underpinned by an action plan in 2007. The Ministry 
of the Interior prepared and endorsed the "Action Plan for Implementation of the 
National Policy and Strategy Document on the Fight against Addictive Substances 
and Addiction". The action plan has set up a list of instruments to be used to achieve 
proposed objectives of the National Drug Strategy. In terms of supply reduction, the 
action plan underlined the strengthening of institutional capacity and national and 
international cooperation. It called for stronger control measures along borders and at 
border access points and for increasing the number of officers for law enforcement 
and monitoring the illicit cultivation of narcotic plants in the provinces. 
In order to coordinate national activities, the action plan proposed the establishment 
of a mechanism for coordination between national organizations. Subsequently, in 
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2007, a Coordination Board was set up to coordinate activities of civil agencies and 
non-governmental organisations. The coordination board included representatives of 
civil and non-governmental agencies to make assessments about demand reduction 
activities. Furthermore, for scientific assessment, a scientific board, on which 
academics from different universities are appointed to evaluate the latest situation 
about drug use, has been established (TUBIM, 2007a). 
In order to enhance international cooperation the action plan called for national 
institutions to develop contacts with neighbouring and transit countries on the Balkan 
drug trafficking route. The EGM is called on to increase liaison officers in transit and 
in neighbouring countries. The action plan also called for relevant institutions to 
participate in the EMCDDA meetings for information exchange. Additionally, 
mutual visits were recommended to share the good practices of EU member states 
about legal adjustments and activities for harmonization of the EU acqllis (TUBIM, 
2007a). 
In October 2007, as part of increasing relations with the EU on drugs, a membership 
agreement was signed for Turkey's participation in the EMCDDA. It was underlined 
in the agreement that this participation would help Turkish adoption and 
implementation of the acquis concerning drugs (European Commission, 2006a). In 
the agreement, Turkey committed to engage in the work of EMCDDA and accepted 
the legal status ofEMCDDA under Turkish law. Additionally Turkey was allowed to 
be represented in meetings and on the Management Board of the Centre but without 
the right to vote. Later, in April 2008, the European Council approved the agreement. 
6.7. Conclusion 
Since Turkey was not granted candidacy for the EU membership, there was no 
structured relationship between Turkey and the EU before 1999. Therefore, the EU 
was not able to put forward accession requirements on drugs. Due to the lack of a 
membership perspective and other incentives, such as institutional links and financial 
assistance, the credibility of the EU policies carried little weight in Turkey before 
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1999. Subsequent to the absence of membership relations and lack of conditionality, 
the EU was not able to become involved in developments in Turkish drug policy 
between 1987 and 1999. 
As an alternative to the EU, Turkish drug policy before 1999 was mainly based on 
domestic factors and other international dynamics. In that sense, licit poppy 
production took place as an important feature of Turkish drug policy. On the other 
hand, due to its situation on the Balkan drug trafficking route, Turkey had developed 
close ties with the UN. In this period, poppy cultivation and economic concerns 
convinced governments to regulate legal poppy production in Turkey. To be able to 
legalize and export poppy products to other countries, Turkey maintained 
cooperation with the UN International Narcotic Control Board. Additionally, to 
control drug trafficking through the Balkan route, Turkey signed major UN Drug 
Conventions before 1999. 
Domestic public concerns on drug addiction and drug-related cnmes initiated 
demand-reduction campaigns in Turkey. In that sense, domestic norms and values 
persuaded governments to take measures for demand-reduction. Public institutions 
and NGOs organised awareness projects to protect citizens against harm from the use 
of illicit drugs. Yet, legal and administrative deficiencies in Turkey limited the 
implementation of a comprehensive drug policy before 1999. 
Developments in Turkish Drug Policy made constant progress after 1999. Turkey's 
candidate status increased the credibility of the EU in Turkey. In AP documents, in 
progress reports and through assessment visits, the EU put forward an agenda for 
Turkey to align with the EU acquis and administrative structures in the fight against 
drugs. Additionally, the EU established institutional links and allocated financial and 
technical assistance to Turkey for administrative capacity development. 
In the second phase, convergence of threat perceptions between the EU and Turkey 
and the legitimacy of the EU drug policy became important factors supporting 
204 
change in Turkish domestic drug policy. Despite having somewhat different 
problem-solving approaches, both Turkey and the EU perceived drug abuse and 
drug-related crimes as important internal security threats over the period. Especially, 
the emulation of UN policies and implementation of the provisions of UN drug 
conventions by Turkey and the EU member states provided convergence of 
perceptions between the EU and Turkey. Consensus between the EU approach and 
domestic security objectives of Turkey had legitimized adoption of the EU approach 
and instruments against drugs. In this period, clarity of accession conditionality, the 
EU incentives, the positive responses of domestic actors and a constellation of 
interests against drugs triggered domestic transition in Turkey to comply with the EU 
Drug Policy. 
In addition, the benefits of internal security cooperation with the EU and allocation 
of pre-accession financial assistance significantly reduced domestic objections to the 
adoption of the EU requirements. In the period, domestic actors assumed that 
institutional links would be established with EU agencies and member states which 
would improve the effectiveness of national drug policy and enforcement against 
drug-related crimes in Turkey. 
After 2005, the credibility of the EU started to decline in Turkey. Domestic debate in 
the EU about Turkey's accession and increasing domestic unce11ainty whether 
Turkey would be able to gain EU membership hampered domestic alignment. 
Compliance with the EU requirements has slowed down in various policy domains. 
However, this was not the case for combating drugs. 
Even with the decline in EU credibility, transition of Turkish drug policy made 
constant progress after 2005, in the period, common threat perception with the EU in 
the fight against drugs and institutional interactions legitimized the adoption of the 
EU conditionality on drugs. At the domestic-level, Turkish public policy makers and 
the administrative elites considered the EU drug policy as an appropriate way of 
dealing with domestic deficiencies in the fight against drugs in Turkey 
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7. Conclusion 
In the previous chapters, the conditions for the impact of the ED on the internal 
security of Turkey have been scrutinized through analysis of the three sub-policy 
domains of JHA. Considering the theories of rationalist and constructivist 
institutionalism, the study investigated the effectiveness of the EU's influence 
mechanisms, domestic responses and outcomes of the EU conditionality for the 
internal security of Turkey linked with the external dimension of the JHA. 
By limiting the field of JHA, the study concentrated on the fight against organised 
crime, terrorism and drugs as the case studies of the research. In the analysis, legal 
and institutional changes as well as the extent of internal security cooperation with 
the EU were tracked with reference to three different periods of time, from 1987 to 
2010. The research aimed to provide insight into the conditions of the influence of 
the ED on applicant countries under JHA, the way the ED operates the external 
dimension of JHA in applicant states and the extent to which the ED engaged with 
the internal security of Turkey during the enlargement process. 
The findings of the research were contrasted with the findings of recent studies 
analysing the impact of the ED on applicant states. Although prevailing studies 
address "credibility of conditionality" and "adoption cost" as the most intluential 
factors for adoption of the ED rules in applicant states, the findings of this research 
reflect that the convergence of threat perceptions between the EU and applicant 
states is the key mediating factor to facilitate domestic alignment in the JHA domain. 
The study reveals that the ED incentives and sanctions can be ineffective in ensuring 
compliance in the field of JHA if the EU requirements do not correspond with 
domestic threat perceptions. 
Comparison of the three case studies shows that domestic alignment in Turkey in the 
fight against transnational crime is likely in cases where the ED and Turkey have 
compatible threat perceptions. It is drawn from the analysis that the EU impact and 
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international security cooperation on drugs and organised crime shows progress even 
in the face of a decline in the credibility of the EU conditionality. Due to the 
convergence between threat perceptions of Turkey and the EU in combating drugs 
and organised crime, adoption of the EU requirements has been legitimized in 
Turkey for these two policy domains. In contrast, the impact of the EU has been 
limited in the case of terrorism as the threat perceptions of Turkey and the EU are 
diverse. 
In the following sections, the findings of the thesis are outlined in detail. The 
conclusion is presented in three parts: First, the way in which the EU operates the 
external dimension of JRA in applicant countries is outlined by looking at the 
policies of the EU towards Turkey. Second, conditions for compliance with the EU 
requirements on JRA are presented. Finally, the extent to which the influence of the 
EUs the combating of drugs, terrorism and organised crime in Turkey is analysed. 
7.1. The way the EU extends JHA towards applicant countries 
In comparison to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Partnership 
Agreements of the EU with third countries, enlargement is an influential instrument 
for the exercise of the external dimension of JRA. Since enlargement policies 
prepare applicant countries for EU accession, the EU puts forward a range of 
requirements for the adjustment of the internal security of these states to meet EU 
standards. The enlargement process enables the EU to engage with the domestic 
policymaking process of applicant countries to conduct internal security cooperation 
for tackling transnational crime. In other words, instruments of enlargement and a 
structured relationship entitle the EU to exert its influence on non-member states in 
the context of the external dimension of JHA. Thus, the EU enhances internal 
security in its neighbourhood without having to await the conclusions of a lengthy 
enlargement process. 
The EU operates a range of instruments in the enlargement process to bring the 
internal security of applicant states into alignment with the EU templates. To 
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facilitate compliance with accession conditionality, the EU uses incentives and 
monitoring mechanisms. The EU also employs deterrents and benchmarking to 
trigger transposition of JHA standards at the domestic level. Through Accession 
Partnership documents and Annual Progress Reports, the EU determines accession 
requirements, their sequence and a deadline for compliance. 
It was observed from the cases of the research that conditionality on JHA includes a 
wide range of issues that reflect the ED's security objectives. In this sense, the 
conditionality on JHA comprises a threefold agenda. First, the EU asks for adoption 
of the EU acquis and ratification of relevant international conventions. The ED 
requirements on adoption of the EU acquis aim for alignment with the legal basis of 
JHA to secure the harmonization of definitions of offences and criminal procedures 
in applicant countries. Accession conditions on JHA do not foresee a single criminal 
system; instead the acquis determines minimum standards and leaves room for 
applicant states to insert domestic preferences in their criminal legislation. 
In the legal context, the conventions of the UN and the Council of Europe are 
considered as an essential component of the ED acquis in the fight against drugs, 
terrorism and organised crime. Especially since the UN conventions inspire the EU 
policies in the fight against drugs and organised crime, conditionality includes as an 
indispensable requirement the ratification of the 1961, 1971 and 1988 UN Drug 
Conventions and the Palermo Convention of 2000 and its additional protocols on 
Organised Crime. To ensure implementation of the provisions of international 
conventions, the ED undertakes common projects with the UN and CoE in applicant 
countries. To that end, the EU works as a transmitting channel to spread the 
principles of the UN and CoE in its neighbourhood. 
Additionally, acceSSlOn states are asked to establish necessary administrative 
infrastructures to strengthen institutional capacity in the JHA domain. The EU 
requires development of administrative capacity, management systems and 
coordination mechanisms that can be capable of implementing the EU acquis and 
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achieving operational cooperation with EU agencies. Thus, the EU provides financial 
and technical assistance to reinforce domestic institutions. To guide implementation 
of the EU rules and practices in applicant states, the EU organizes twinning and 
T AIEX projects. Study visits and training performed with the support of the EU 
strengthens institutional infrastructure and paves the way for the emulation of the EU 
practices among domestic officials. Training programmes also initiate socialization 
of EU policies in applicant countries and contribute to the alignment of domestic 
threat perceptions with the EU approach. 
In this respect, the EU assistance programmes have served as an important 
instrument for implementing EU practices and strengthening the administrative 
framework for combating transnational crime in Turkey. Following the allocation of 
the financial instrument for Turkey in 2002, nearly one third of the total twinning 
projects were prepared in the field of JHA. In the period between 2002 and 2007, 25 
of 77 twinning projects were performed within the JHA domain. These projects dealt 
with a range of issues including combating drugs, organised crime, trafficking of 
human beings, money laundering, strengthening the forensic capacity of Turkey and 
border management. 
Third, the EU policy towards applicant states maintains cross-border security 
cooperation between EU institutions and national agencies in the fight against 
transnational crime. Conditionality obliges applicant states to establish institutional 
links with the EU agencies to become involved in internal security cooperation 
within the EU. Therefore, applicant states are called on to sign cooperation 
agreements with the EU agencies. The agreements between national institutions and 
the EU agencies set up contact channels for information exchange, training and for 
the exchange of best practices. That way, the EU gets the benefits of internal security 
cooperation with the domestic institutions of applicant states to strengthen internal 
security within Europe. 
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7.2. Evaluation of the conditions shaping the impact of the EU in 
JHA 
In this study, the impact of the EU on Turkey was analysed through comparison of 
EU rewards vs. domestic norms and beliefs. The EU incentives, as well as their 
credibility, were linked with rationalist assumptions. In that sense, the EU rewards 
and the cost-benefit calculations of domestic actors were considered as the 
explanatory variables that mediate the behaviours of decision-makers and constrain 
or facilitate the influence of the EU on the internal security of Turkey. The 
effectiveness of tangible EU incentives or lower adaptation costs are questioned as a 
means of persuading domestic actors to conform to EU conditionality. 
On the other hand, domestic threat perceptions on drugs, terrorism and organised 
crime were taken as the other variable that could mediate the influence of the EU on 
Turkey. Domestic perceptions of security threats are addressed as a condition that 
allows intervention in the behaviours of decision-makers to secure their compliance 
with EU conditionality. In that sense, threat perceptions were linked with the result 
of domestic social and political processes. Domestic norms, traditions and values 
were given as basic references to identify domestic perceptions of security threats in 
Turkey. Threat assessment reports and the suggestions of security institutions were 
considered as the key instruments for classifying security threats and prioritising 
them. Additionally, interactions with international organisations, such as the UN, the 
EU and the CoE were considered as channels for legitimising international security 
cooperation among Turkish officials. In the long-run, together with domestic norms 
and beliefs, the identification and sequence of perceived threats and international 
interactions against cross-border security challenges constitute threat perceptions at 
national level. 
The main theoretical finding of the study reflects that two mediating factors: the 
clarity of the EU requirements and convergence of the threat perceptions between 
Turkey and the EU, are the predominant factors that facilitate conformation with the 
accession conditionality in Turkey in the field of JHA. 
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It was seen that the likelihood of compliance with the EU requirements increases 
when conditionality is formed and the EU puts forth determinate requirements for 
alignment with the EU standards in combating transnational crime. Specifically, 
introduction of Accession Partnership documents and Progress Reports clarify the 
conditionality. Interactions between the ED and applicant country institutions result 
in domestic awareness of the EU policies and practices in the JHA domain. 
In cases of organised crime and drugs, it was observed that lack of progress in the 
EU before 1999 and absence of the recognition of the external dimension of JHA 
constrained the influence of the ED.The impact of the EU started to increase 
however, when concrete policies were developed to fight transnational crime. 
Additionally, increasing awareness in the EU of the need to tackle internal security 
threats at their sources triggered the use of the enlargement policy as an instrument to 
ensure security within the EU. 
Another finding derived from the research demonstrates that convergence of threat 
perceptions between Turkey and the EU facilitates compliance with conditionality in 
Turkey in JHA. It was seen that the decision makers showed more willingness to 
adopt the ED requirements when the domestic perception of internal security threats 
correspond with the ED approach. On the other hand, contrast between domestic 
threat perception and the EU approach mitigates the leverage of accession 
conditionality in JHA. 
Therefore it is concluded that together with determinate requirements, convergence 
of threat perceptions result in alignment with JHA domain in accession countries in 
the enlargement process. The ED incentives integrated within accession 
conditionality fall short of providing transposition of JHA rules if the EU 
requirements do not correspond with the domestic threat perceptions of applicant 
countries. 
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While enthusiasm for the EU membership or use of the EU funds for administrative 
development inspires domestic decision makers to confonn to the EU requirements, 
implementation is hampered in the long tenn if the threat perceptions are diverse. In 
other words, the EU incentives perfonn a complementary role for compliance with 
conditionality on JHA, rather than being a decisive mediating factor. 
In the subsequent parts, an evaluation of the mediating factors that facilitate or 
constrain the influence of accession conditionality on Turkey in combating drugs, 
terrorism and organised crime are analysed in detail. 
Determinacy of the EU requirements 
Due to limited progress in the EU on JHA and the vagueness of the EU requirements, 
the impact of the EU on the internal security of Turkey was constrained prior to 
1999. The EU had neither concrete rules for cooperation under JHA nor accession 
conditionality for Turkey throughout the 1990s. EU conditionality was absent until 
1999 as Turkey was not admitted as a candidate state. The Customs Union 
Agreement of 1995 was the main platfonn to voice the EU requirements before the 
introduction of accession conditionality. However, in the context of this agreement, 
the EU concentrated on economic issues and customs integration rather than internal 
security cooperation. Only on countering terrorism did the EU (primarily the 
European Parliament) revive certain requirements in the negotiation process of the 
Customs Union Agreement of 1996. Nevertheless, the EU demands were too broad 
to propose a concrete roadmap to be adopted by Turkish governments. They were 
just reflecting the disapproval of human rights conditions in Turkey over the 1990s. 
Unlike the situation up until 1999, adoption of the EU rules became more likely after 
1999. The EU recognized Turkey as a candidate state for EU membership and started 
a structured relationship. Conditionality was set up for Turkey through the AP 
documents of 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2008. In these documents, short and medium-
tenn requirements were outlined to prepare Turkey for accession. Concurrently, from 
1999, the European Commission started to monitor progress in Turkey and prepared 
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Annual Progress Reports. In these reports, the Commission further clarified the EU 
requirements in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism. As a result, 
decision makers and domestic security institutions became aware of the EU 
requirements on rnA. 
The external dimension of rnA has also been a particular concern since the end of 
the 1990s. The EU gradually clarified internal security priorities in applicant states 
and put forward a range of requirements within the enlargement policy. Financial and 
technical assistance were allocated to strengthen the capacity of applicant countries 
in combating organised crime, drugs and terrorism. The EU and member state 
security agencies created institutional links with Turkish law enforcement institutions 
to build up internal security cooperation. Institutional interactions also triggered the 
exchange of best practices and disseminated the EU approach among Turkish law 
enforcement officials. 
Convergence of threat perceptions 
Analysis of three cases demonstrated that convergence between the threat 
perceptions of Turkey and the EU is a significant factor in explaining the impact of 
the EU on Turkey. Although the credibility of the EU incentives has declined in 
Turkey since 2005, common threat perceptions have increased the likelihood of 
compliance in combating drugs and organised crime. 
Drugs and organised crime cases reflect that common threat perceptions between 
Turkey and the EU have stimulated domestic change and internal security 
cooperation with the EU since the start of accession conditionality in 1999. As with 
the EU, drug abuse and organised crime are perceived in Turkey as serious security 
threats to the legal economy, social and public order. The threat perception of Turkey 
on drugs and organised crime were driven by domestic norms, and values. Primarily, 
drug abuse and addiction contradict the moral values of Turkish culture and are 
identified as a potential threat to the community. They are considered as a serious 
health problem and source of social disorder. Along with this perception, the use of 
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illicit drugs is listed as a destructive habit against the community in the Turkish 
Constitution of 1982 and the fight against drugs is considered one of the duties of the 
governments. 
Combating serious crimes also finds voice in the Turkish Constitution. The state is 
called on to take necessary security measures to remove social, political and 
economic obstacles which could restrict the use of the fundamental rights of Turkish 
citizens. In this sense, protecting citizens against mafia and organised crime is 
considered as an essential duty of decision makers and enforcement agencies in 
Turkey. Further to the formal norms, the Susurluk traffic accident of November 1996 
initiated the development of domestic threat perception against organised crime in 
Turkey. The accident revealed the connections of high-ranking officials and 
politicians with mafia members. Soon after, intense reactions aroused in civil society 
raised the serious internal security threat from organised crime onto Turkey's 
agenda. In this regard, ''Combating Organised Crime Groups" (Cetelerle mucadele) 
has been a motto for politicians since the end of the 1990s. 
In addition to domestic norms and values, Turkey's lengthy interactions with the UN 
on drugs and organised crime helped facilitate the development of a threat perception 
among Turkish officials and decision makers. Due to being a major poppy producing 
country and being located on the infamous Balkan trafficking route, Turkey has 
attracted the attention of the UN in relation to drugs and organised crime. To be able 
to regulate global poppy production, Turkey and the UN have developed a strong 
relationship since the early 1990s. The UN also supported law enforcement training 
in Turkey to prevent drug trafficking along the Balkan route. The long-lasting 
relationship with the UN legitimised international cooperation among Turkish 
officials and helped with the development of threat perceptions on drugs and 
organised crime. 
Furthermore, after 1999, the EU started to provide assistance to Turkey through 
training programmes and institutional interactions. Especially, with the start of 
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structured relations, the EU supported twinning and T AlEX programmes to develop 
awareness in Turkey about the EU approach in combating drugs and organised 
crime. In the long run, engagement between Turkish and member state security 
institutions have brought threat perceptions closer together and legitimised the 
adoption of the EU requirements in Turkey throughout the enlargement process. 
On the other hand, the case of terrorism proved that diverse threat perceptions have 
constrained the impact of the EU on Turkey. Due to different approaches to the 
definition of the tensions in Southeast Turkey and the selection of security measures 
against terrorism, the EU requirements were not legitimised in Turkey. Despite high 
credibility and modest adaptation costs in the period from 1999 to 2005, Turkey has 
been reluctant to comply with EU demands. 
In the case of terrorism, Turkey'S view of the Kurdish problem and policy 
preferences for eliminating ethnic terrorism has been controversial since Turkey's 
membership application to the EU in 1987. In Turkey, protection of the integrity of 
the state and cultural unification has been a principal reference point for domestic 
threat perception. Attributed to domestic norms and traditions, Turkish identity has 
been considered as supreme to other ethnic cultures living in Turkey. Tensions in 
Southeast Turkey were perceived as an act against the homogeneity of Turkey, rather 
than an identity and cultural problem. From Turkey's perspective, the source of PKK 
terrorism was identified as "underdevelopment" or "lack of education". It was 
perceived by the state that low incomes and lack of investment in Southeast Turkey 
were the main basis of terrorism. In this regard, the tensions in Southeast Turkey 
were considered as a "terror problem", or a "security issue" rather than an issue of 
identity or culture (Atici et al., 2002: 3). 
In contrast to Turkey's perception, the EU identified the tensions III Southeast 
Turkey as ethnic conflict. For a long time, the situation in Turkey was seen as state 
oppression and the denial of the cultural rights of the Kurdish minority. The EU 
perceived that the violence in Turkey could only be overcome through full respect 
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for Kurdish identity and extension of liberties. Therefore, the EU advocated peaceful 
solutions rather than the use of extreme counter terrorism measures. Consequent to 
the divergence between Turkey's perception and the EU approach, the impact of the 
EU on Turkey's counter terrorism policy has been curbed. 
Credibility of conditionality 
Contrary to the studies emphasizing the power of credible EU incentives and 
deterrents for domestic adaptation in applicant states, this study reveals that the 
credibility of conditionality is not a decisive condition for domestic change in JHA. 
The three case studies showed that EU rewards and deterrents have a complementary 
role in mediating the impact of the EU in JHA, rather than being a driving factor for 
compliance. It has been shown that transposition of JHA models and internal security 
cooperation can still occur despite uncertainty about the delivery of the EU rewards 
and low credibility. In contrast, as was seen in the case of terrorism, compliance 
could suffer despite conditionality being seen as credible. 
Over the course of the relationship between Turkey and the EU, the credibility of 
conditionality fluctuates. Credibility of the EU was low in the period from 1987 to 
1999 as Turkey was not admitted as a candidate state. There were no tangible 
incentives and no accession conditionality until 1999. As of 1999, the credibility of 
the EU was increased by the acceptance of Turkey'S candidacy for EU membership 
and with the introduction of conditionality. In the period from 1999 to 2005, EU 
membership and delivery of assistance for capacity development increased the 
reliability of conditionality. 
However, expectation of EU accession started to decline in Turkey with the opening 
of negotiations in 2005. Increasing controversy in the EU on Turkey's membership 
and privilege partnership offers diminished the credibility of the EU's promises. The 
isolation of Turkish Cypriots and partial suspension of negotiations in 2006 have 
further diminished the credibility of conditionality. 
216 
Variation in the credibility of conditionality over the period allowed for testing of the 
control of credible EU incentives on Turkey's internal security across three selected 
policy domains. It has emerged that EU conditionality, accommodated with credible 
incentives, gave an ambition to applicant states to meet the requirements of the EU in 
order to acquire EU membership. The start of a structured relationship with Turkey 
after 1999 prompted domestic desire to join the EU and initiated reforms to meet the 
EU conditions. Inauguration of formal relations as a candidate state allowed Turkish 
Governments to adopt the EU rules in various policy areas. Along with the 
membership offer, delivery of assistance for capacity-development, institutional links 
with the EU agencies and internal security cooperation with member states 
encouraged rule adoption under JHA and internal security cooperation against 
transnational crime. 
In the period from 1999 to 2005, the coalition government formed by the Democratic 
Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP) compromised on the idea of EU membership, despite having diverse party 
policies on relations with the EU. As of the acceptance of its candidacy in 1999, the 
coalition government initiated an agenda to intensify institutional engagement with 
the EU and to get pre-accession assistance for administrative-capacity development. 
Domestic security institutions made applications to join relevant EU agencies. 
Turkey then adopted the first National Plan for Adoption of the Acquis in 2001. Until 
2005, the Justice and Development Party (the AK Party) followed the same track and 
adopted further reforms to meet the requirements of the EU in combating drugs and 
organised crime. 
However, in the case of terrorism, the impact of the EU was observed to be limited 
although the EU offered credible rewards from 1999 to 2005. Credibility of 
conditionality proved an ineffective trigger for change in Turkey's counter telTorism 
policy, despite modest adaptation costs over this period. Although governments 
passed a number of constitutional reforms to balance counter terrorism measures and 
liberties, implementation remained fragmentary. 
217 
The subsidiary role of credible ED incentives for mediating the impact of the EU on 
JHA was also confirmed in drugs and organised crime cases after 2005. Although 
there has been a significant decline in the credibility of conditionality in Turkey and 
suspension of negotiations since 2005, Turkey has maintained the transposition of 
ED templates and internal security cooperation with the ED in combating drugs and 
organised crime. Subsequent to credible ED rewards, the twinning and training 
programmes supported by the ED since 2002 have resulted in the socialisation of EU 
templates and practices among Turkish officials in combating transnational crime. In 
drugs and organised crime cases, domestic norms and capacity development 
instruments of the ED aligned the threat perceptions of Turkey with the EU approach 
and increased the likelihood of compliance even in the absence of the credibility of 
conditionality since 2005. 
Domestic adoption costs 
Material cost-benefit calculations of the domestic actors could imply adjustment 
costs in applicant states and may increase the number of opponents of EU 
conditionality. In Turkey, adoption of the ED acquis and emulation of the EU 
practices do not imply much adjustment costs in combating drugs and organised 
crime. The ED assistance for administrative capacity development, institutional links 
with the ED agencies and information exchange between the EU institutions and 
domestic agencies motivated domestic security institutions and governments to adopt 
the EU's requirements. Internal security cooperation was seen as an opportunity to 
strengthen the internal security of Turkey against transnational crime. Study visits, 
training programmes and exchange of best practices between Turkish law 
enforcement agencies and member state agencies increased the professionalism of 
Turkish security officials. Thus, political decision-makers and officials have been 
willing to maintain institutional links and deepen relations with the EU. 
In drugs and organised crime cases, opposition to ED requirements has also been low 
among domestic security agencies. Implementation of EU models did not have 
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negative consequences on the administrative status quo. On the contrary, 
inauguration of new institutions and international cooperation created new 
opportunity structures for law enforcement officials under the Ministry of the 
Interior. 
In the case of terrorism, opposition against conditionality and the level of adoption 
costs has changed over time. Before 1999, adjustment costs were very high because 
of extensive terrorist attacks and military casualties in Southeast Turkey. Therefore, 
external pressures to address Turkey'S counter-terrorism policy provoked substantial 
resistance. 
Since 1999 however, adoption costs have been modest in countering terrorism in 
Turkey. Following the capture of the PKK leader, Ocalan, in 1999, the PKK declared 
a unilateral ceasefire until the end of 2004. Over the following five years, PKK 
attacks against security forces and casualties dropped to minimum levels. The ending 
of the PKK attacks in this five-year period nourished domestic assumptions about the 
end of ethnic terrorism. Along with aspiration for EU membership, adjustment costs 
further decreased. Candidacy for EU membership and the decline in PKK attacks 
minimized the number of veto players against the EU conditionality. 
Consequently, the coalition government had compromised on the idea of EU 
membership between 1999 and 2002, despite having divergent political ideologies. 
Chief military commander Huseyin Kivrikoglu and his successor Hilmi Ozkok also 
declared support for EU membership. Due to the widespread optimism in Turkey 
regarding EU accession, opposing arguments against EU conditionality remained 
marginal in the period from 1999 to 2005. 
Despite lower adaptation costs and high credibility Turkey showed limited progress 
towards alignment with the EU requirements on countering terrorism. Although 
Turkish governments have made some modifications to the anti-terrorism legislation 
and extended human rights and cultural liberties, these modifications do not touch 
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the essence of Turkey's counter terrorism strategy. The EU proposals to find a 
peaceful solution to PKK activities were rejected. Integrity of the state and national 
homogeneity had been considered as core values of the state to be protected against 
external and internal threats. Therefore, domestic demands for the extension of 
Kurdish cultural rights were considered as separatist propaganda and linked with the 
PKK in the period between 1999 and 2005. 
The resumption of PKK attacks since the end of 2004 and increase in the number of 
casualties among Turkish security forces again lead to an increase in the adoption 
costs for countering terrorism in Turkey. The problematic negotiation process has 
also diminished domestic support for EU conditionality. Ultranationalist alliances 
started to criticize the EU and domestic opposition against conditionality grew. 
The findings of the study show that variation in adaptation costs and veto players do 
not solely mediate the impact of the EU in the field of JHA. Despite modest adoption 
costs and high domestic optimism in the period from 1999 to 2005 on the conclusion 
of PKK activity, Turkey did not comply with the EU requirements on countering 
terrorism. 
7.3. Final remarks 
In brief, the comparison of the three case studies reveals that influence of the EU on 
the internal security of applicant states is high when the EU puts forth detenninate 
conditions to be implemented by applicant countries in the enlargement process. 
Besides, conformation to the conditionality on JHA is more likely in applicant 
countries when domestic threat perceptions converge with the EU approach. 
It also emerges that credibility of conditionality and low adjustment costs do not 
guarantee alignment with JHA in applicant countries. These latter factors function as 
complementary mediating factors for compliance with JHA rather than being a 
driving force. 
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However, further research is needed for confinnation of the fmdings of this study in 
different sub-domains of JHA and in other applicant countries. Since, the EU 
conditionality may come across different domestic responses from one applicant 
country to another. Therefore, future researchers could test the fmdings of this study 
by looking at similar cases in different countries or through an analysis of different 
sub-fields of JHA in Turkey. 
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